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ABSTRACT 
 
  This Article reports and comments on the results of an 
assessment of the legal protection of the right to academic 
freedom (an examination of its factual protection to be 
undertaken at a future point) in EU member states, having 
examined these countries’ constitutions, laws on higher 
education, and other relevant legislation. The assessment relied 
on a standard scorecard, developed by utilizing indicators of 
protection of academic freedom, notably as reflected in 
UNESCO’s Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-
Education Teaching Personnel, a document of 1997 that is not 
legally, but “politically” binding, and which concretizes 
international human rights requirements in respect of academic 
freedom—a right under international human rights law. The 
results for the various countries have been quantified, and the 
countries have been ranked in accordance with “their 
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performance.” Overall, the state of the legal protection of the 
right to academic freedom in Europe appears to be one of “ill-
health.” Increasingly, European countries are merely paying lip 
service to this important right. While the concept of institutional 
autonomy is being misconstrued, self-governance in higher 
education institutions and employment security are being 
subjected to rigorous processes of erosion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This Article builds on earlier research that undertook a 
preliminary comparative analysis of the right to academic freedom in 
Europe. At the time, Terence Karran had analyzed whether twenty-
three member states of the European Union provided a high, 
medium, or low level of protection of the right;1 alternatively, he 
analyzed whether they complied fully, partially, or not at all with 
parameters2 of measurement based on UNESCO’s Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel of 
1997. In the meantime, there have been significant changes in the 
                                                                                                                            
 1.  Terence Karran, Academic Freedom in Europe: A Preliminary Comparative 
Analysis, 20 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 289 (2007). 
 2.  Terence Karran, Academic Freedom in Europe: Reviewing UNESCO’s 
Recommendation, 57 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 191 (2009). 
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legislation on higher education (HE) in many European countries, 
which have enhanced levels of autonomy (or, what policymakers 
consider to constitute autonomy) of HE institutions and have limited 
the extent to which academic staff are involved in the administration 
(or “management,” as it has come to be called) of institutions, which 
has reduced the scope of their participation in strategic decision-
making, while, simultaneously increasing that of rectors or 
rectorates, deans and heads of departments, and external “experts.” 
Moreover, the law regulating conditions of employment of academic 
staff in HE is more and more guided by notions of “flexibilization,” 
which legitimizes the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of service 
(without long-term perspectives) even at post-entry levels of the 
academic career and assures that contracts of service can be 
terminated on operational grounds “without undue restraints.” It 
appears paradoxical, therefore, that national constitutions and HE 
laws all the same continue emphasizing the importance of the right to 
academic freedom. In light of these circumstances, it is meaningful to 
undertake a renewed assessment of the state of health of the right to 
academic freedom in Europe, relying essentially on the standards of 
UNESCO’s Recommendation.3 
 Karran considered his assessment to be a preliminary one.4 This 
Article relies on the parameters of the right to academic freedom used 
by Karran (the protection of “academic freedom” in the constitution or 
other legislation, the autonomy of institutions of HE, academic self-
governance, and academic tenure) and adds a fifth: the ratification of 
international agreements relevant to the protection of the right to 
academic freedom. Furthermore, this Article refines the analysis by 
defining thirty-seven specific indicators to measure compliance by 
individual states. The focus, naturally, has been on defining human 
rights indicators (i.e., indicators operationalizing the requirements of 
the right to academic freedom as protected under international 
human rights law). The indicators chosen will thus purposively not 
measure whether HE reforms in the countries concerned comply with 
requirements of economic or managerial efficiency, as such criteria 
                                                                                                                            
 3.  Similar assessments of the state of HE, including that concerning the right 
to academic freedom at the national level in the light of UNESCO’s Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel of 1997, have, for 
example, been undertaken with regard to Australia and Israel, the West Bank and 
Gaza. See James S. Page, Australian Universities and International Standards: 
Compliance with the 1997 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-
Education Teaching Personnel, 29 J. HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y & MGMT. 95 (2007); DAVID 
ROBINSON, THE STATUS OF HIGHER EDUCATION TEACHING PERSONNEL IN ISRAEL, THE 
WEST BANK AND GAZA (Education International & Canadian Association of University 
Teachers, 2010), http://download.ei-ie.org/Docs/WebDepot/The Status of Higher 
Education Teaching Personnel in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SM8E-Y87C] (archived Mar. 22, 2016). 
 4.  See Karran, supra note 1, at 289 (“[The article] is preliminary . . ., thereby 
establishing the basis for subsequent . . . work.”). 
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are irrelevant in—and, in any event, subordinate to—a human rights 
approach that is binding on all the states considered in this 
assessment. The approach has been to accord a numeric value to each 
indicator in accordance with its relative weight as adjudged under 
international human rights law. Adding up the scores of states for 
each of these values not only makes it possible to rank states 
regarding the five core aspects but also to rank them overall in their 
protection of the right to academic freedom. 
 This Article is written in the context of a larger project on the 
right to academic freedom conducted at the University of Lincoln, 
United Kingdom, examining the doctrinal basis of the right to 
academic freedom in terms of international human rights law and 
further assessing the level of protection of that right in various 
regional contexts, concentrating on the European and African 
contexts for the moment. The Article looks at the legal protection of 
the right to academic freedom in Europe (i.e., its protection in the 
legislation of twenty-eight EU member states).5 It presents an 
overview of the findings and some observations on the purport of 
these for the state of health of the legal protection of the right to 
academic freedom in Europe. The factual protection of the right—
inter alia as a result of institutional, faculty and/or departmental 
regulations, policies, and customs—will be analyzed in subsequent 
publications, relying primarily on the results of an online survey on 
academic freedom carried out in Europe in 2015.6 An overall picture 
of the situation of the right to academic freedom in Europe, to be 
sure, will have to take account of the findings with regard to both its 
legal and factual protection. 
II. THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW AND UNESCO’S RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE 
STATUS OF HIGHER-EDUCATION TEACHING PERSONNEL OF 1997 
 With higher-education teaching personnel in mind, “academic 
freedom” has been described as: 
[T]he right [of such personnel], without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to 
freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and 
                                                                                                                            
 5.  It may well be asked why this Article does not focus on states in their 
capacity as member states of the Council of Europe, which, as a regional organization, 
focuses on the promotion of human rights as one of its primary tasks, the EU’s role 
being to facilitate the economic and, to a more limited extent, the political integration 
of its members. The reason simply is that it would have exceeded available resources to 
study the legal situation in forty-seven states at very different stages of development 
as opposed to that in twenty-eight more or less homogeneous states. 
 6.  The survey is accessible at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Academic 
FreedomSurvey. 
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disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely 
their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from 
institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or 
representative academic bodies. All higher-education teaching personnel should 
have the right to fulfil their functions without discrimination of any kind and 
without fear of repression by the state or any other source.7 
Apart from such freedom of teaching, freedom in carrying out 
research, etc., “academic freedom” in HE—in a comprehensive 
sense—covers at least three additional aspects, namely self-
governance in HE by the academic community, employment security 
(including “tenure”), and the autonomy of institutions of HE, all of 
which will be described more fully in the discussion that follows. The 
various rights thus entailed by “academic freedom” must, however, be 
interpreted in the light of special duties and responsibilities for staff 
and students as well as the fact that a proper balance between the 
level of autonomy enjoyed by HE institutions and their systems of 
accountability should be ensured.8 
 In his chapter on the right to education in the first major 
textbook on economic, social, and cultural rights in international law, 
Manfred Nowak in 1995 still had to concede that international law 
largely neglected the topic of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy.9 This remains true today to the extent that international 
“hard” law (treaties legally binding on states parties thereto) is 
concerned. The right to academic freedom, as such, is not protected in 
the two UN human rights covenants—the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)10 and the International Covenant 
                                                                                                                            
 7.  General Conference (UNESCO), Recommendation concerning the Status of 
Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, ¶ 27, UNESCO Doc. 29 C/Res. 11 (1997) 
[hereinafter UNESCO Recommendation]. 
 8.  See, e.g., Terence Karran, Academic Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna 
Charta? 22 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 163 (2009); JOGCHUM VRIELINK ET AL., ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT (League of European Research Universities, 
Advice Paper No. 6, Dec. 2010), http://www.leru.org/files/publications/AP6_Academic_ 
final_Jan_2011.pdf  (discussing the various elements—rights, duties, responsibilities—
of the right to academic freedom); see also U.N., Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right of Education (Art. 13 of the 
ICESCR), ¶¶ 38–40, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment 
No. 13], http://www.bayefsky.com//general/cescr_ gencomm_13.php 
[https://perma.cc/TJ2F-J7TV] (archived May 10, 2016). The UNESCO Recommendation 
thus contains provisions on “Institutional autonomy” (V.A.), ¶¶ 17–21, “Institutional 
accountability” (V.B.), ¶¶ 22–24, “Individual rights and freedoms: civil rights, academic 
freedom, publication rights, and the international exchange of information” (VI.A.), 
¶¶ 25–30, “Self-governance and collegiality” (VI.B.), ¶¶ 31–32, “Duties and 
responsibilities of higher-education teaching personnel” (VII), ¶¶ 33–36 and “Security 
of employment” (IX.B.), ¶¶ 45–46. 
 9.  Manfred Nowak, The Right to Education, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 189, 209–10 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1995). 
 10.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),11 both of 1966—
or in any other binding instrument of international law at the global 
or regional level. Certain provisions of the various human rights 
treaties applicable globally or regionally may, however, be relied on to 
protect (particular aspects of) the right to academic freedom.12 
Focusing specifically on the UN human rights covenants,13 these 
include Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (also when this 
takes place because a scholar holds or expresses certain academic 
views); Article 9 of the ICCPR, which addresses the right to liberty 
and security of the person (which, for example, protects a scholar 
from being arbitrarily arrested, detained, or falsely prosecuted in 
retaliation for certain academic content); Article 12 of the ICCPR on 
the right to liberty of movement; Article 13 of the ICCPR on the right 
of aliens not to be arbitrarily expelled from a state (Articles 12 and 13 
collectively guarantee the ability of members of the academic 
community to travel abroad, to return home, and to move freely 
within a state for the purposes of study, teaching, and research);14 
Article 18 of the ICCPR on the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion (this provision probably also encompasses the 
right of scholars to object to teaching or carrying out research on the 
grounds that doing so would be contrary to their conscience, religion, 
or beliefs);15 Article 21 of the ICCPR on the right of peaceful 
assembly (affording protection, for example, to scholars organizing a 
conference, in which opinions critical of a government’s policies in one 
area or another are expressed); and Article 22 of the ICCPR on the 
                                                                                                                            
 11.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICESCR]. 
 12.  For an overview of relevant provisions in this respect in the major global 
and regional human rights instruments (including the non-binding Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948), see Robert Quinn & Jesse Levine, Intellectual-
HRDs and Claims for Academic Freedom under Human Rights Law, 18 INT’L J. HUM. 
RTS. 898, 904 (2014). 
 13.  For an analysis of the Covenant provisions referred to in the discussion 
that follows and their relevance to the right to academic freedom in the light of 
relevant international legal materials (decisions of international human rights 
tribunals, General Comments of UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, reports of 
UN Special Rapporteurs, etc.), see id. at 902–12. 
 14.  See Klaus Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Academic Mobility under 
International Human Rights Law, in ACADEMIC MOBILITY 243 (Malcolm Tight & Nina 
Maadad eds., 2014) (discussing the aspect of the right to freedom of movement of 
scholars as one aspect of the right to academic freedom and how to rely on provisions of 
the Covenants to construct a right to academic mobility as a constituent element of the 
right to academic freedom). 
 15.  It is not entirely clear whether Article 18 of the ICCPR covers a general 
right of “conscientious objection.” See MANFRED NOWAK, Article 18: Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience, Religion and Belief, in U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 406, 412–13, ¶¶ 10–11, 421–25, ¶¶ 27–32 (2d rev. ed. 
2005). 
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right to freedom of association (on which members of the academic 
community would rely, for instance, to protect their right to form and 
join trade unions16 attending to their interests).17 
 Three Covenant provisions provide protection for the right to 
academic freedom more comprehensively: Article 19 of the ICCPR on 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression;18 Article 15 of the 
ICESCR on cultural rights—notably giving expression, in 
Paragraph 3, to the right to respect for “the freedom indispensable for 
scientific research”; and Article 13 of the ICESCR on the right to 
education. Some commentators consider the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression and the right to education to constitute the 
two essential pillars of the right to academic freedom.19 Others argue 
that the right to freedom of opinion and expression must be viewed as 
the essential premise of the right to academic freedom.20 Yet others 
hold that, whereas all the various provisions cited above should play 
a role in protecting relevant aspects of the right to academic freedom, 
Article 13 of the ICESCR on the right to education constitutes a 
complete locus for the right to academic freedom: “Article 13 
                                                                                                                            
 16.  Article 22 of the ICCPR “only applies to private associations.” See Human 
Rights Committee, Wallmann v. Austria, Comm. No. 1002/2001, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/1002/2001 (Apr. 1, 2004), ¶ 9.4. It seems thus not to apply to public 
universities, but to, for example, trade unions or private universities. 
 17.  In a wider sense, one could also mention Articles 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 of the 
ICESCR on the right to just and favorable conditions of work, the right to form and join 
trade unions, the right to social security, the right to an adequate standard of living 
and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
respectively. Ultimately, academic freedom can only be enjoyed if the terms and 
conditions of employment are conducive for effective teaching and research. See 
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 40 (calling upon the employers of higher-
education teaching personnel to establish terms and conditions of employment of the 
nature contemplated). 
 18.  Article 19 of the ICCPR needs to be read in conjunction with Article 20 of 
the Covenant, which “limits” the right to freedom of opinion and expression in that it 
prohibits “[a]ny propaganda for war” and “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” 
 19.  See, e.g., Quinn & Levine, supra note 12, at 903–05; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, Academic Freedom as a Human Right: An Internationalist Perspective, 89 
ACADEME, May–June 2003, at 25, 27–28 (“Academic freedom can be asserted as a 
human right in two ways. One is to defend it as a human right to free expression; the 
other is to defend it as a human right to education.”). Similarly, the Belgian Court of 
Arbitration in a decision of 2005 held that the right to academic freedom represented 
an aspect of freedom of expression (BELGIAN CONSTITUTION, art. 19) and was also a 
part of the freedom of education (BELGIAN CONSTITUTION, art. 24, § 1). See Judgment of 
Nov. 23, 2005 (No. 167/2005), Cour d’arbitrage, MONITEUR BELGE, Dec. 2, 2005, 
¶ B.18.1. For a discussion of the decision, see Michel Pâques, Liberté académique et 
Cour d’Arbitrage, in LIBER AMICORUM PAUL MARTENS, L’HUMANISME DANS LA 
RÉSOLUTION DES CONFLITS: UTOPIE OU RÉALITÉ? 399 (2007). 
 20.  See, e.g., Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, A Theoretical Review of the Origins of 
Academic Freedom, SCHOLARS AT RISK NETWORK (July 3, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://salsa4. 
salsalabs.com/o/50943/p/salsa/web/blog/public/?blog_entry_KEY=33 [https://perma.cc/ 
SJ3C-AUN6] (archived Mar. 1, 2016) (arguing that there has been a progression from 
freedom of expression to the right to education to academic freedom). 
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ICESCR . . . constitutes the provision which concurrently assembles 
all aspects of academic freedom under ‘a single roof’ and whose 
normative context provides the proper framework for 
interpretation.”21 There are writers who agree that all the various 
provisions cited should play a role as described but maintain that 
“Article 13 ICESCR alone is too weak a basis to support academic 
freedom.”22 
                                                                                                                            
 21.  See, e.g., KLAUS D. BEITER, THE DOCTRINAL PLACE OF THE RIGHT TO 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER THE UN COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U. VALUES: BULL. 
ON INT’L ACAD. FREED’M, AUTONOMY & RESP. (July 2011), http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/ 
documents/UV_JULY_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6APS-UG32] (archived Mar. 1, 2016); 
KLAUS D. BEITER, THE DOCTRINAL PLACE OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER 
THE UN COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A REJOINDER TO ANTOON DE BAETS, 
U. VALUES: BULL. ON INT’L ACAD. FREED’M, AUTONOMY & RESP. (Dec. 2013), 
http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/documents/UV_DEC_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/69V2-
SRMJ] (archived Mar. 1, 2016). 
 22.  See, e.g., ANTOON DE BAETS, THE DOCTRINAL PLACE OF THE RIGHT TO 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER THE UN COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A REJOINDER, 
U. VALUES: BULL. ON INT’L ACAD. FREED’M, AUTONOMY & RESP. (May 2012), http:// 
scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/documents/UV_MAY_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2GF-JSP7] 
(archived Mar. 1, 2016); Antoon de Baets, Some Puzzles of Academic Freedom (Part 1), 
SCHOLARS AT RISK NETWORK (July 3, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://salsa4.salsalabs.com/ 
o/50943/p/salsa/web/blog/public/?blog_entry_KEY=32&killorg=True [https://perma.cc/ 
J4WG-CK7E] (archived Mar. 2, 2016) (stating that “Article 13 is essential but 
incomplete.”); Antoon de Baets, Some Puzzles of Academic Freedom (Parts 2 and 3), 
SCHOLARS AT RISK NETWORK (Jan. 9, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://salsa4.salsalabs.com/ 
o/50943/p/salsa/web/blog/public/?blog_entry_KEY=46&killorg=True [https://perma.cc/ 
4EST-H27G] (archived Mar. 2, 2016) (discussing the degree to which various human 
rights determine academic freedom). Problems associated with considering the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression as the basis of the right to academic freedom are, 
firstly, the fact that academic freedom entails much more than “free speech” rights, 
namely, also rights of “free action” (e.g. conducting an experiment), and, secondly, the 
fact that the free speech rights covered are, in fact, special speech rights, circumscribed 
by the requirements of learning, teaching and research. See ERIC BARENDT, ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 17–21 (2010). Regarding the right to 
respect for “the freedom indispensable for scientific research” in Article 15(3) of the 
ICESCR, it should be noted that this is a general right belonging to all persons 
undertaking scientific research (including, for example, researchers in private industry 
or those in public or private specialist institutes). It may be rendered as what is termed 
“Wissenschaftsfreiheit” in German constitutional theory, perhaps best translated as 
“the right to free scholarship.” The right to academic freedom, on the other hand, 
accrues to a smaller group of right-holders—namely academic staff in HE institutions 
(or research institutions “close” to the educational milieu)—but it entails entitlements 
which are more far-reaching in their scope. As has been pointed out by a commentator, 
“[a]cademic freedom as it is understood in the United Kingdom and the United States 
is, in contrast [to “Wissenschaftsfreiheit”], a special right to which only those engaged 
in teaching and research at universities and other comparable institutions are 
entitled.” The freedom of those not working at the latter institutions “may be narrower 
than it is for university professors.” The right to academic freedom is, however, also 
enjoyed by students in HE, but the scope of their right is reduced when compared to 
that of academic staff. See id. at 37–38. For a detailed account of the doctrinal place of 
the right to academic freedom under the UN human rights covenants, see Klaus D. 
Beiter, Terence Karran & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Yearning to Belong—Finding a 
“Home” for the Right to Academic Freedom in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants, 11 
INTERCULTURAL HUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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 There have been noteworthy developments at the international 
level pertaining to the right to academic freedom. Three of these 
should briefly be referred to. Firstly, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the body of independent human rights 
experts supervising the implementation of—and “authoritatively 
interpreting”—the ICESCR, has, in its General Comment No. 13 on 
the Right to Education, made some interesting observations 
regarding “academic freedom and institutional autonomy.” It states, 
for example, that it “has formed the view that the right to education 
can only be enjoyed if accompanied by the academic freedom of staff 
and students” and that “[a]ccordingly, even though the issue is not 
explicitly mentioned in Article 13, it is appropriate and necessary for 
the Committee to make some observations about academic 
freedom.”23 
 Secondly, the European Court of Human Rights, deciding on 
applications alleging violations of the rights set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950,24 as amended and 
supplemented, has recently begun commenting on certain aspects of 
the right to academic freedom. It has resolved cases turning on issues 
of free speech in an academic context on the basis of Article 10 of the 
Convention, which protects the right to freedom of expression. The 
first judgment that expressly referred to academic freedom was 
Sorguç v. Turkey.25 In this case, the Court “underline[d] the 
importance of academic freedom, which comprises the academics’ 
freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or 
system in which they work and freedom to distribute knowledge and 
truth without restriction.”26 It found an award of damages for 
                                                                                                                            
 23. General Comment No. 13, supra note 8, ¶ 38. The Committee then goes on 
to provide a definition of “academic freedom,” essentially resembling that cited at note 
7 above, and to describe the concept of “institutional autonomy.” Id. ¶¶ 39, 40. Finally, 
the Committee stresses that, although “staff and students in higher education are 
especially vulnerable to political and other pressures which undermine academic 
freedom,” “staff and students throughout the education sector are entitled to academic 
freedom.” Id. ¶ 38. General Comments are interpretative tools. The Committee 
generates them in an attempt to clarify Covenant provisions. Though not legally 
binding, they do have considerable legal weight. 
 24.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 25.  Sorguç v. Turkey, App. No. 17089/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2009), http:// 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-93161 [https://perma.cc/8F4D-VFZ8?type=image] 
(archived Mar. 2, 2016). 
 26.  Id. ¶ 35. When making its comments on academic freedom, the Court 
referred to Recom. 1762 (2006) on Academic Freedom and University Autonomy of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17469&lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/D2KC-FQC2] (archived May 10, 2016). Id. ¶ 21. It may be mentioned 
that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has recently adopted another 
document on the subject, Committee of Ministers, Recom. CM/Rec(2012)7 on the 
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defamation against a professor to have violated the latter’s right to 
freedom of expression. In a paper, the professor had criticized 
procedures for recruiting and promoting academics in his discipline. 
An assistant professor, who felt the criticism to have been directed at 
his person (although he had not expressly been mentioned), 
subsequently had successfully claimed damages for defamation.27 
 Thirdly, in 1997, UNESCO—the United Nations’ specialized 
agency with primary responsibility for international cooperation in 
the fields of education, the natural, social and human sciences, 
culture, and communication—adopted the Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel. The 
Recommendation “applies to all higher-education teaching 
personnel.”28 This means “all those persons in institutions or 
programmes of higher education who are engaged to teach and/or to 
undertake scholarship and/or to undertake research and/or to provide 
educational services to students or to the community at large.”29 The 
following matters are covered by the Recommendation: 
− guiding principles (regarding HE and teaching personnel in HE) 
(part III, ¶¶ 3–9); 
− educational objectives and policies (in the sphere of HE) (part IV, 
¶¶ 10–16); 
− institutional rights, duties and responsibilities (institutional 
autonomy and institutional accountability) (part V, ¶¶ 17–24); 
                                                                                                                            
Responsibility of Public Authorities for Academic Freedom and Institutional 
Autonomy, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1954741&Site=CM 
[https://perma.cc/7C3U-NRQ3] (archived Mar. 2, 2016). 
 27. Other cases dealing with academic freedom include Lombardi Vallauri v. 
Italy, App. No. 39128/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng#{"itemid":["001-95150"]} [https://perma.cc/GA5W-H4V6] (archived Mar. 2, 2016); 
Sapan v. Turkey, App. No. 44102/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2010), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99160#{"itemid":["001-99160"]} [https://perma.cc/ 
FUK9-MAY8] (archived Mar. 2, 2016); Aksu v. Turkey, App. Nos. 4149/04, 41029/04, 
Eur. Ct. H.R., Grand Chamber (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109577 
[https://perma.cc/SQ8Z-Q3Z7] (archived Mar. 2, 2016); Hasan Yazıcı v. Turkey, App. 
No. 40877/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
142637 [https://perma.cc/KB2K-VSZR] (archived Mar. 2, 2016); Mustafa Erdo an and 
Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 346/04, 39779/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-144129 [https://perma.cc/Y9RP-7T6N] (archived 
Mar. 2, 2016). In the last case, see also the interesting Joint Concurring Opinion of 
Judges Sajó, Vučinić and Kūris, developing criteria for the protection of “extramural” 
speech of academics. 
 28.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 2. 
 29.  Id. ¶ 1(f). Predating this Recommendation is another Recommendation 
adopted by UNESCO: The Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers of 
1974. This instrument, applicable, as it is, to scientific researchers, and protecting, 
amongst others, their freedom of research, covers a wider group of researchers than 
only those in HE. The Recommendation defines “scientific researchers” as “those 
persons responsible for investigating a specific domain in science or technology”—
“sciences” meaning the sciences concerned with social facts and phenomena, to the 
extent that theoretical elements are capable of being validated—irrespective of the type 
of establishment in which such researchers work, the motivation underlying the 
research, and the kind of application to which it relates most immediately. Id. ¶ 1. 
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− rights and freedoms of higher-education teaching personnel 
(individual rights and freedoms, including civil rights, academic 
freedom, publication rights, and the international exchange of 
information, as well as self-governance and collegiality) (part VI, 
¶¶ 25–32); 
− duties and responsibilities of higher-education teaching personnel 
(part VII, ¶¶ 33–36); 
− preparation for the profession (part VIII, ¶¶ 37–39); 
− terms and conditions of employment (entry into the academic 
profession; security of employment; appraisal; discipline and 
dismissal; negotiation of terms and conditions of employment; 
salaries, workload, social security benefits, health and safety; 
study and research leave and annual holidays; terms and 
conditions of employment of women, disabled and part-time 
higher-education teaching personnel) (part IX, ¶¶ 40–72); 
− utilization and implementation (part X, ¶¶ 73–76); and 
− final provision (providing that the Recommendation may not be 
invoked to diminish a more favorable status already granted to 
higher-education teaching personnel) (part XI, ¶ 77). 
 
The Recommendation is more than a mere code regulating the 
profession of HE teaching. Apart from improving the professional, 
material, and social position of higher-education teaching personnel, 
it is also, as a result of improvements in that position, aimed at 
enhancing the quality of the HE system.30 It is appreciated that HE 
is “instrumental in the pursuit, advancement and transfer of 
knowledge” in enabling students to fully satisfy their higher 
educational needs in accordance with their right to education and for 
industry to be able to rely on a well-qualified workforce, but that 
these goals can only be accomplished if there exists a HE system of 
high quality.31 Recognizing the decisive role that higher education 
teaching personnel has towards reaching the stated goals, such 
personnel “[must] enjoy the status commensurate with this role.”32 
Although the Recommendation is not, as such, “an international 
instrument on academic freedom,” guaranteeing academic freedom in 
HE is a fundamental concern of the document. Already the Preamble 
to the Recommendation, in Recitals 8 and 9, 
[e]xpress[es] concern regarding the vulnerability of the academic community to 
untoward political pressures which could undermine academic freedom, [and] 
                                                                                                                            
 30.  See KLAUS D. BEITER, THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION BY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INCLUDING A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 280 (2006). 
 31.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, at pmbl. (recitals 3, 4). 
 32.  Id. recitals 5, 10. 
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[c]onsider[s] that the right to education, teaching and research can only be fully 
enjoyed in an atmosphere of academic freedom and autonomy for institutions of 
higher education and that the open communication of findings, hypotheses and 
opinions lies at the very heart of higher education and provides the strongest 
guarantee of the accuracy and objectivity of scholarship and research. 
It thus recognizes the importance of ensuring academic freedom and 
institutional autonomy if HE is to achieve the objectives identified 
above. Various provisions of the Recommendation address aspects of 
academic freedom. As these constitute the most current expression of 
agreed upon international standards on the topic, they will be used as 
the basis for assessing compliance with the right to academic freedom 
in Europe in the discussion that follows. 
 UNESCO’s Recommendations are not legally binding. However, 
it would be wrong to hold them to be legally irrelevant. They “bind” as 
soft law. Appreciating that Recommendations have been adopted by 
the General Conference of UNESCO, they must be considered to 
reflect an international consensus on their specific subject matter. 
Recommendations “have a normative character in their intent and 
effects and the States concerned regard them as political or moral 
commitments.”33 Of note is Paragraph 74 of the Recommendation of 
1997, which calls upon “Member States and higher education 
institutions [to] take all feasible steps to apply the provisions [of the 
Recommendation] to give effect, within their respective territories, to 
the principles set forth in [the] Recommendation.” Moreover, under 
UNESCO’s Constitution, UNESCO’s members are obliged to submit 
the various recommendations adopted to their competent authorities 
so that the latter may take cognizance of their provisions and are 
further obliged to report on the measures taken towards and the 
progress made in implementing recommendations.34 As the 1997 
Recommendation deals with international labor and international 
education law, a Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel 
(CEART) supervises its implementation by UNESCO member 
                                                                                                                            
 33.  YVES DAUDET & KISHORE SINGH, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS 
OF UNESCO’S STANDARD-SETTING INSTRUMENTS 45 (2001), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ 
images/0012/001238/123817e.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFQ7-4CYR] (archived Mar. 1, 
2016). Examples of other UNESCO Recommendations are the Recommendation 
against Discrimination in Education (1960), the Recommendation concerning the 
Status of Teachers (1966), and the Recommendation on the Status of Scientific 
Researchers (1974). 
 34.  UNESCO, Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization, art. IV(4), (6), opened for signature Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 
275 (entered into force Nov. 4, 1946), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=152 
44&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [https://perma.cc/N8T6-NHDV] 
(archived Mar. 1, 2016). 
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states.35 The Committee is composed of twelve independent experts—
six appointed by UNESCO and six by the ILO. It holds sessions every 
three years. The Committee essentially performs two tasks: it 
examines relevant data, including the reports referred to, to adjudge 
application of the Recommendation, and it examines allegations 
received from teachers’ organizations on the non-observance of 
provisions of the Recommendation in member states.36 
III. DEVELOPING A STANDARD SCORECARD “TO MEASURE” THE RIGHT TO 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN EUROPE 
A. The “Legal” Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom: The 
Requirement of Legislation 
 The Human Rights Committee, the body of independent human 
rights experts supervising implementation of the ICCPR, has 
stressed, in one of its General Comments, that “unless Covenant 
rights are already protected by . . . domestic laws or practices, States 
Parties are required on ratification to make such changes to domestic 
laws and practices as are necessary to ensure their conformity with 
the Covenant.”37 Likewise, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights entertains the view that, in realizing rights under 
the ICESCR, “in many instances legislation is highly desirable and in 
                                                                                                                            
 35.  Already in 1966, UNESCO adopted a Recommendation concerning the 
Status of Teachers, applicable to teachers in schools from the pre-primary up to 
completion of the secondary level of education.  
 36.  For more information on the supervision of the relevant Recommendations, 
see BEITER, supra note 30, at 282–84. See also Rep. of the Joint ILO/UNESCO Comm. 
of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel 
on Its Tenth Session, ILO/UNESCO Doc. CEART/10/2009 (2009); Rep. of the Joint 
ILO/UNESCO Comm. of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations 
concerning Teaching Personnel on Its Eleventh Session, ILO/UNESCO Doc. 
CEART/11/2012/9 (2012); Rep. of the Joint ILO/UNESCO Comm. of Experts on the 
Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel on Its Twelfth 
Session, ILO/UNESCO Doc. CEART/12/2015/14 (2015). 
 37.  General Comment No. 31 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). In fact, Article 2(2) of the 
ICCPR provides that “[w]here not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the . . . Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of 
the . . . Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized in the . . . Covenant.” (emphasis added); see also 
MANFRED NOWAK, Article 2: Domestic Implementation and Prohibition of 
Discrimination, in U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 27, 59–60, ¶ 56 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (stating that “the formulation 
‘legislative or other measures’ demonstrates the priority of legislative measures.”). 
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some cases may even be indispensable.”38 Although the Covenants do 
not unequivocally make the adoption of legislation mandatory, these 
Committee statements, it is submitted, suggest that—to secure the 
effective realization of human rights and to respect fundamental 
principles of democracy—all salient elements in the definition of the 
various human rights, the general framework authorizing measures 
aimed at fulfilling them, and possible limitations of those rights be 
contained in legislation adopted by national parliaments.39 Such 
legislation will increase the visibility of the rights to those entitled to 
claim them, bind organs of government to respect, protect and fulfill 
them, and enable right-holders to enforce them before competent 
administrative or judicial tribunals. Subordinate legislation as 
adopted by executive/administrative organs of state may then “add 
flesh to the bones” and operationalize the norms contained in primary 
legislation, but cannot substitute the latter where it is mandatory. 
Ultimately, the functionaries/organs adopting subordinate legislation 
are (usually) not directly legitimated by and accountable to the 
electorate. Protective standards contained in subordinate legislation 
may, moreover, easily be changed or abrogated again.40 
 The present assessment of compliance with the criteria of 
UNESCO’s Recommendation of 1997 will essentially examine 
whether states have complied with the requirement of adopting 
legislation protecting the different aspects of the right to academic 
freedom, as described in the Recommendation. It will apply the 
standards in respect of “legislation” as just described with regard to 
                                                                                                                            
 38.  General Comment No. 3 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Article 2(1) of 
the ICESCR), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, Annex III, 86 (1991). Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR provides that “[e]ach State Party to the . . . Covenant undertakes to take 
steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the . . . Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.” (emphasis added); see also MATTHEW C. CRAVEN, THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 125 (1995) (stating that “it has commonly been 
asserted that the enactment of legislation is essential to the implementation of 
economic, social, and cultural rights on the domestic plane.”); MANISULI SSENYONJO, 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, ¶ 2.14 (2009) 
(remarking that “[l]egislative measures are indispensable in the protection of all 
human rights including ESC rights.”). 
 39.  In fact, for limitations of rights, this is confirmed in the various general 
and specific limitation provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
 40.  Where essential aspects of the right to academic freedom have been 
provided for in government regulations or directives, or university statutes (but not in 
parliamentary legislation), this ordinarily does not therefore satisfy (or fully satisfy) 
requirements for adequate “legal” protection. The same holds true with regard to 
collective agreements, which, as such, constitute neither primary nor secondary 
legislation. The assessment undertaken in this article has borne out that a number of 
the states analyzed regulate essential aspects of the right to academic freedom only at 
the level of secondary legislation (e.g. Denmark, Portugal, Sweden or the UK) or 
collective agreements (e.g. Austria or the Netherlands). 
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the UN Covenants. Clearly, parliamentary legislation on its own does 
not suffice to realize human rights. Other means (governmental 
policies, regulations and directives, university statutes, financial 
resources, infrastructure, personnel, information, etc.) will 
additionally have to be relied on. The large-scale absence of primary 
legislation on the topic, as the case of the United Kingdom 
demonstrates, does not necessarily mean that academic freedom may 
not, all the same, enjoy protection in practice. However, the chances 
of academic freedom enjoying such protection are greatly enhanced 
where an adequate legislative framework is provided for. 
B. The Provisions on Academic Freedom in UNESCO’s 
Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education 
Teaching Personnel of 1997 
 The relevant provisions of UNESCO’s Recommendation may, for 
purposes of the assessment of the legal protection of the right to 
academic freedom in Europe undertaken here, be divided into four 
groups:41 
− There are provisions on individual rights and freedoms in 
Paragraphs 25 to 30. These include all “internationally recognized 
civil, political, social and cultural rights applicable to all citizens” 
(Paragraph 26) and further “the principle of academic freedom” 
(Paragraph 27)42 (the latter constituting academic freedom stricto 
sensu, academic freedom lato senso encompassing all claims 
relevant to sustaining academic freedom, including the three 
below). 
− There are provisions on institutional autonomy in Paragraphs 17 
to 21, institutional autonomy being “that degree of self-governance 
necessary for effective decision-making by institutions of higher 
education regarding their academic work, standards, management 
and related activities consistent with systems of public 
accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the 
state, and respect for academic freedom and human rights” 
(Paragraph 17). 
− There are provisions on self-governance and on collegiality in 
Paragraphs 31 and 32. Self-governance means the right of higher-
education teaching personnel “to take part in the governing bodies 
and to criticize the functioning of higher education institutions, 
including their own,” and “the right to elect a majority of 
representatives to academic bodies within the higher education 
institution” (Paragraph 31). 
                                                                                                                            
 41.  See Karran, supra note 2, at 195–96. 
 42.  The UNESCO Recommendation’s definition of “academic freedom” has 
been cited at note 7 above. 
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− There are provisions to the effect that higher-education teaching 
personnel should enjoy security of employment, including “tenure 
or its functional equivalent, where applicable,” in Paragraphs 45 
and 46. 
 A few words should be said with regard to each of the aspects 
protected, starting with “the principle of academic freedom.”43 
Scholars have been described as “dangerous” minds.44 As one of the 
Recommendation’s guiding principles articulates, “[i]nstitutions of 
higher education . . . are communities of scholars preserving, 
disseminating and expressing freely their opinions on traditional 
knowledge and culture, and pursuing new knowledge without 
constriction by prescribed doctrines.”45 Challenging orthodox ideas 
and beliefs and creating new knowledge means that, “because of the 
nature of their work, academics are more naturally led in to conflict 
with governments and other seats of authority.”46 
 For this reason, advances in HE not only depend on 
infrastructure and resources but also need to be underpinned by 
academic freedom.47 Higher-education teaching personnel thus “have 
a right to carry out research work without any interference, or any 
suppression, . . . subject to . . . recognized professional principles of 
intellectual rigour, scientific inquiry and research ethics.”48 They 
“should also have the right to publish and communicate the 
conclusions of the research of which they are authors or co-
authors.”49 They further “have the right to teach without any 
interference, subject to accepted professional principles,” “should not 
be forced to instruct against their own best knowledge and 
conscience,” and “should play a significant role in determining the 
curriculum.”50 Academic freedom is subject to important duties and 
responsibilities, as described in Paragraphs 33 to 36. There is, for 
example, a duty of higher-education teaching personnel “to teach 
students effectively,” as there is a duty “to base . . . research and 
                                                                                                                            
 43.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 27; for analyses of academic 
freedom as an individual right, see, e.g., Karran, supra note 8, at 170–75; André Prüm 
& Rusen Ergec, La liberté académique, No. 1 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE 
POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET À L’ÉTRANGER [RDP] 1, 13–17 (2010), https://orbilu. 
uni.lu/bitstream/10993/11016/1/RDP_2010_AP_RE_liberte-academique.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/4BLS-W8MX] (archived Mar. 1, 2016); VRIELINK ET AL., supra note 8, at 9–18, 
¶¶ 27–59. 
 44.  Robert Quinn, Defending “Dangerous” Minds: Reflections on the Work of 
the Scholars at Risk Network, 5 ITEMS & ISSUES 1, 1 (2004). 
 45.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 4. 
 46.  Karran, supra note 2, at 191. 
 47.  See UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 5 (one of the 
Recommendation’s guiding principles). 
 48.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. ¶ 28. 
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scholarship on an honest search for knowledge with due respect for 
evidence, impartial reasoning and honesty in reporting.”51 
 UNESCO member states are obliged “to protect higher education 
institutions from threats to their autonomy coming from any 
source.”52 Threats need not, therefore, necessarily emanate from the 
state, but they may, for example, originate with private actors such 
as private companies commissioning research. As has been indicated, 
institutional autonomy is “that degree of self-governance necessary 
for effective decision-making by institutions of higher education 
regarding their academic work, standards, management and related 
activities . . . .”53 It is important to appreciate that there is no 
automatic link between institutional autonomy and individual 
academic freedom: “[A] highly autonomous institution may offer its 
members only a limited degree of academic freedom. In other words, 
in today’s relationship between university autonomy and the state, 
university autonomy does not subsume academic freedom.” In fact, 
“[a]s certain responsibilities move gradually from public authorities 
to higher education institutions, academic freedom could be 
endangered. Even if the rationale for institutional autonomy were 
specifically to ensure academic freedom, one does not produce the 
other.”54 It is for this reason that the UNESCO Recommendation 
stresses that a proper interpretation of institutional autonomy needs 
to render that term as autonomy “consistent with . . . respect for 
academic freedom.”55 As it were, the Recommendation understands 
autonomy to be “the institutional form of academic freedom.”56 
Autonomy should further “not be used by higher education 
institutions as a pretext to limit the rights of higher-education 
teaching personnel provided for in [the] Recommendation.”57 
 Autonomy must go hand in hand with public accountability. The 
Recommendation requires “Member States and higher education 
institutions [to] ensure a proper balance between the level of 
                                                                                                                            
 51.  Id. ¶ 34(a), (c); see, e.g., DONALD KENNEDY, ACADEMIC DUTY (1997) 
(arguing in support of rigorous standards of academic responsibility). 
 52.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 19. For analyses of 
institutional autonomy as an aspect of the right to academic freedom, see, e.g., Prüm & 
Ergec, supra note 43, at 18–21; VRIELINK ET AL., supra note 8, at 18–22, ¶¶ 60–76. 
 53.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 17. 
 54.  Pavel Zgaga, Reconsidering University Autonomy and Governance: From 
Academic Freedom to Institutional Autonomy, in UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND 
REFORM: POLICY, FADS, AND EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 19 (Hans 
G. Schuetze et al. eds., 2012). 
 55.  UNESCO Recommendation, ¶ 17. 
 56.  Id. ¶ 18; see Walter Berka, Die Quadratur des Kreises: 
Universitätsautonomie und Wissenschaftsfreiheit, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
HOCHSCHULRECHT, HOCHSCHULMANAGEMENT UND HOCHSCHULPOLITIK 37 (2008) 
(describing the general difficulty of reconciling institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom, emphasizing the Austrian context). 
 57.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 20. 
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autonomy enjoyed by higher education institutions and their systems 
of accountability.”58 HE institutions are thus accountable for a 
commitment to quality and excellence in teaching and research, 
ensuring high quality education, the creation of codes of ethics to 
guide teaching and research, honest and open accounting, and an 
efficient use of resources.59 They are also accountable for “assistance 
in the fulfilment of economic, social, cultural and political rights,” 
“ensuring that they address themselves to the contemporary 
problems facing society” and “[playing] an important role in 
enhancing the labour market opportunities of their graduates.”60 
Very importantly, HE institutions are accountable for “effective 
support of academic freedom and fundamental human rights.”61 
 Academics pursue their scholarly activities within an 
institutional setting. The institutions in which they work will have to 
organize themselves—their structures, governance, and activities—in 
one way or another. Respect for academic freedom implies that the 
organization be such as will ensure that free teaching and research 
can take place in the institutions. This will be the case if a specific 
HE institution organizes itself in a way that guarantees 
persons/organs make decisions that are “in the best interest of science 
and scholarship” (“wissenschaftsadäquat”). This, in turn, will only be 
the case if academics as those entitled to claim academic freedom can 
sufficiently participate in the taking of these decisions. Clearly, by 
virtue of their training and competence, their long-lasting 
professional occupation with certain subject matter, as well as the 
fact that such decisions will have a long-term effect on their scholarly 
work, academics are best qualified to ensure that decisions taken are 
“in the best interest of science and scholarship” and support academic 
freedom.62 
 UNESCO’s Recommendation contains provisions on self-
governance and collegiality. As already indicated, self-governance 
                                                                                                                            
 58.  Id. ¶ 22 (caput). 
 59.  See id. ¶ 22(b), (d), (k), (i), (j). 
 60.  Id. ¶ 22(l), (m). 
 61.  Id. ¶ 22(c). 
 62.  See Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 20, 
2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, at 114–18, ¶¶ 88–95 (Ger.) (the court, relying on important 
earlier case law, proposed this line of reasoning in justification of the right of self-
governance, observing that the goal here had to be to ensure that relevant decisions 
were “in the best interest of science and scholarship” (“wissenschaftsadäquat”)); Ralf 
Müller-Terpitz, Neue Leistungsstrukturen als Gefährdung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit?, 
44 WISSENSCHAFTSRECHT 236 (2011) (discussing when governance arrangements of HE 
institutions may be considered to be consistent with academic freedom; although the 
article deals with the situation in Germany, most of its statements are equally 
applicable in a more general sense); for analyses of self-governance as an aspect of the 
right to academic freedom, see, e.g., Karran, supra note 8, at 175–76; Prüm & Ergec, 
supra note 43, at 21–25; VRIELINK ET AL., supra note 8, at 19–20, ¶¶ 65–66. 
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entails that higher-education teaching personnel should have the 
right, “without discrimination of any kind, according to their abilities, 
to take part in the governing bodies and to criticize the functioning of 
higher education institutions, including their own, while respecting 
the right of other sections of the academic community to participate” 
and the right further “to elect a majority of representatives to 
academic bodies within the higher education institution.”63 The 
closely related principles of collegiality that are to apply in terms of 
the Recommendation “include academic freedom, shared 
responsibility, the policy of participation of all concerned in internal 
decision-making structures and practices, and the development of 
consultative mechanisms.”64 It is pointed out that “[c]ollegial 
decision-making should encompass decisions regarding the 
administration and determination of policies of higher education, 
curricula, research, extension work, the allocation of resources and 
other related activities, in order to improve academic excellence and 
quality for the benefit of society at large.”65 If it has been explained 
above that institutional autonomy should be interpreted so as to be 
consistent with academic freedom, it should be added that “[s]elf-
governance, collegiality and appropriate academic leadership are 
essential components of meaningful autonomy for institutions of 
higher education.”66 Consequently, a HE institution that enjoys 
substantial autonomy, but in which higher-education teaching 
personnel cannot sufficiently participate in the taking of decisions 
having a bearing—whether in a wider or a narrower sense—on 
science and scholarship fails to comply with the requirement of 
institutional autonomy as understood by the Recommendation. 
 Finally, UNESCO’s Recommendation emphasizes that higher-
education teaching personnel should enjoy security of employment, 
including “tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable.”67 In 
the Recommendation’s perception, tenure (or its equivalent) 
“constitutes one of the major procedural safeguards of academic 
freedom and against arbitrary decisions.”68 Tenure may seem 
anomalous in the modern working environment, characterized by 
                                                                                                                            
 63.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 31. 
 64.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 67.  Id. ¶¶ 45, 46. 
 68.  Id. ¶ 45; for analyses of “tenure” as an aspect of the right to academic 
freedom, see, e.g., Karran, supra note 8, at 177–85; Prüm & Ergec, supra note 43, at 
26; cf. Margherita Rendel, Human Rights and Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 74, 87 (Malcolm Tight ed., 1988) (explaining that tenure 
also protects institutional autonomy, remarking that it “is important because it can 
defend not only the individual academic but also the institution from ideological and 
managerial pressures, by helping them to continue to teach unfashionable or 
unpopular subjects, to research inconvenient topics and to provide more centres of 
initiative than hierarchical management can.”) 
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high employment mobility, regular retraining for new jobs, previous 
ones becoming obsolete, fixed-term contracts awarded in respect of 
projects rather than “life-time jobs,” and contracts of service that may 
easily be terminated on operational grounds. Yet, it is important to 
remember that tenure is not granted to academics as “a mere 
proprietary benefit,” as it were. 
 In its caput, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, adopted by the American Association of 
University Professors and the Association of American Colleges 
(today the Association of American Colleges and Universities), 
underlines that “[i]nstitutions of higher education are conducted for 
the common good and not to further the interest of either the 
individual teacher or the institution as a whole,” “[t]he common good 
depend[ing] upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.”69 
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, solemnly declared that “[o]ur Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendental value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers 
concerned.”70 Hence, tenure—and academic freedom, which it 
protects by ensuring that academics can engage in a free search for 
the truth without having to fear losing their jobs because of the views 
expressed71—are closely linked to scholars’ responsibility for 
promoting the interests of society as a whole through their teaching 
and research.72 
 Paragraph 46 of UNESCO’s Recommendation envisages tenure 
(or its equivalent) to be granted “after a reasonable period of 
probation”73—“following rigorous evaluation”74—“to those who meet 
stated objective criteria in teaching . . . [and] research to the 
                                                                                                                            
 69.  American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, caput, first paragraph. 
 70.  385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 71.  See CONRAD RUSSELL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM 23 (1993) (stating that “[t]he 
point is not that academics may not be dismissed for their opinions: it is that they need 
freedom from fear that they might be so dismissed. Without it, they cannot be counted 
on to do their work well.”). 
 72.  The justification for safeguarding academic freedom and tenure is, in fact, 
two-fold: first, to ensure that scholars can engage in a free search for the truth for the 
benefit of society as a whole and, second, to advance “ethical individualism” (values of 
intellectual independence). See Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Interpretation of 
Academic Freedom, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 185–89 (Louis 
Menand ed., 1996) (describing both the instrumental and ethical bases of protection for 
academic freedom in this context). 
 73.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 46; see also id. ¶ 42 
(stipulating that the duration of probation should be known in advance and conditions 
for its satisfactory completion strictly related to professional competence, that reasons 
should be provided in the event a candidate fails to complete the probation 
satisfactorily, and that there should be a right to appeal). 
 74.  Id. ¶ 46. 
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satisfaction of an academic body.”75 Tenure (or its equivalent) entails 
“continuing employment” and potential dismissal “on professional 
grounds and in accordance with due process” only.76 The 
Recommendation allows release “for bona fide financial reasons, 
provided that all the financial accounts are open to public inspection, 
that the institution has taken all reasonable alternative steps to 
prevent termination of employment, and that there are legal 
safeguards against bias in any termination of employment 
procedure.”77 Moreover, tenure (or its equivalent) “should be 
safeguarded as far as possible even when changes in the organization 
of or within a higher education institution or system are made.”78 
C. The Scorecard 
 There is no reason why the four parameters of the right to 
academic freedom, as defined above, should not, in an assessment of 
the protection of the right to academic freedom in Europe, be given 
equal weight. Academic freedom (individual freedom to teach and 
carry out research) is as important as are each of institutional 
autonomy, self-governance, and tenure to buttress academic 
freedom.79 The standard scorecard used “to measure” the right to 
academic freedom in each country examined will, therefore, accord 
the four parameters equal weight—20 percent each. The final 20 
percent to arrive at an overall percentage score for each country 
assessed is accorded to the parameter “ratification of international 
agreements and constitutional protection.” Altogether, thirty-seven 
specific indicators measuring state compliance, concretizing the main 
parameters, have been identified. These are human rights 
indicators—indicators essentially operationalizing the requirements 
of the right to academic freedom as protected under international 
human rights law. A numeric value has been assigned to each 
indicator, mirroring its relative weight as adjudged in terms of 
international human rights law. When adding up the scores of states 
in respect of each of these values, it is possible to rank states for each 
of the five parameters, as well as to give them overall rankings. To 
eliminate subjectivity in “giving marks,” the approach with regard to 
each indicator—following Karran’s earlier method in this respect—
has been to determine whether there is “full compliance” (full mark), 
“qualified compliance” (half of the mark), or “non-compliance” (no 
                                                                                                                            
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See Karran, supra note 1, at 291–92 (“[I]n the absence of data as to the 
relative importance of various parameters of academic freedom, [it may be] assume[d] 
that all such parameters are equally important.”). 
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mark).80 Hence, a three-point scale is generally applied. In three 
instances, it was found expedient to apply a five-point scale, to 
highlight positions “between full and partial compliance” and 
“between partial and non-compliance” (see B., D.2.3. and E.3. of the 
scorecard shown below). A two-point scale (“full compliance” or “non-
compliance”) is used for indicators in A.1. on the ratification of 
international agreements. 
 Some detail on the scorecard, its parameters, and the various 
indicators will now be provided—for purposes of illustration, the 
example of the scorecard (with the results for Austria), reproduced at 
the end of this subpart, should be referred to. The first column (A) 
reflects whether the states at issue accept obligations of “superior 
normative force” (in the sense of obligations not “merely” originating 
under ordinary legislation) relevant to the right to academic freedom 
(i.e., whether states have ratified relevant international agreements 
(10 percent) and whether their constitutions provide appropriate 
protection (10 percent)). Regarding international agreements, the 
inquiry is whether states have ratified the following four global 
agreements: the ICCPR of 1966 (with its Article 19 on the right to 
freedom of expression); the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1966 
(setting up a procedure in terms of which allegations of violations of 
Covenant rights may be brought before the Human Rights 
Committee); the ICESCR of 1966 (with its Article 13 on the right to 
education); and the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR of 2008 (setting 
up a procedure in terms of which allegations of violations of Covenant 
rights may be brought before the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights); and the following regional agreement: the ECHR of 
1950, as amended and supplemented (with its Article 10 on the right 
to freedom of expression).81 In view of their universal character, 
slightly more weight has been accorded to the global instruments (60 
percent). A state that has ratified a treaty but has expressed a 
reservation to, notably, the right to freedom of expression or the right 
to education problematic from the perspective of the right to academic 
freedom will be considered “non-compliant.” Regarding constitutional 
                                                                                                                            
 80.  See Karran, supra note 2, at 198 (“For these reasons, . . . each nation was 
adjudged to be in compliance, qualified compliance, or non-compliance with the 
UNESCO Recommendation.”). 
 81.  Although the ECHR also protects the right to education in Article 2 of its 
Protocol No. 1, it does so negatively, stating that “[n]o person shall be denied the right 
to education.” It has convincingly been argued that “[t]he right to university education 
is a human right” under the ECHR. See Tarantino v. Italy, 2013–II Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 
416 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., partly dissenting). The nature and scope of any such 
right remain contentious, however. See BEITER, supra note 30, at 162–66 (commenting 
on the nature and scope of the right to education in the first sentence of Article 2, in 
particular the nature of state obligations). The European Social Charter (opened for 
signature Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S. 35 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965)) does not, also not 
in its revised version (opened for signature May 3, 1996, E.T.S. 163 (entered into force 
July 1, 1999)), contain a right to higher education. 
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protection, it will be assessed whether there are adequate, 
problematic, or seriously deficient/no provisions in the constitutions 
of states in respect of each of the following: (1) the right to freedom of 
expression; (2) the right to academic freedom; and, as aspects of the 
latter, (3) institutional autonomy; and (4) academic self-governance 
(60 percent).82 It will further be assessed whether the normative 
context of constitutions (for example, values reflected by relevant 
provisions and specific or general limitations clauses) fully supports 
the effective protection of the rights concerned (40 percent). 
 The second to fifth columns consider whether states have 
complied with the requirement of adopting legislation providing 
expressly that academic freedom is to be protected (column B), and 
legislation satisfactorily concretizing institutional autonomy 
(column C), self-governance (column D), and job security (including 
“tenure”) (column E) in HE. Under column B, there is only one 
indicator that inquires whether HE legislation contains express 
provisions on academic freedom (primarily in the sense of individual 
freedom to teach and carry out research). Do these comply notably 
with the Recommendation’s criteria on academic freedom, and do 
they show that academic freedom should serve as a guiding principle 
for activity within HE (full compliance)? Or is there a mere reference 
to academic freedom, alternatively, are there more elaborate 
provisions on academic freedom, which, however, reveal various 
deficits (partial compliance)? Or is there no reference to academic 
freedom at all (non-compliance)? Or is there, in fact, a situation that 
may be described as being “between full and partial compliance” or 
“between partial and non-compliance?” The indicator of column B 
thus applies a five-point scale to assess compliance. 
 Column C covers indicators on institutional autonomy. The 
European University Association (EUA) monitors, on an ongoing 
basis, the extent to which HE institutions in the various European 
states enjoy autonomy. As part of these efforts, it has produced two 
reports83 and administers an online platform,84 which may usefully 
                                                                                                                            
 82.  Provisions on the right to education have not been taken into account. 
Full-fledged provisions on the right to education are found in only some European 
constitutions. The notion of protecting economic, social, and cultural rights as entailing 
extensive positive obligations for states is still foreign to constitutional theory in most 
parts of Europe. Also tenure has not been considered separately here because “tenure” 
as a technical concept is unknown in many European counties. 
 83.  THOMAS ESTERMANN & TERHI NOKKALA, UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN 
EUROPE I: EXPLORATORY STUDY (European University Association, 2009), 
http://www.eua.be/typo3conf/ext/bzb_securelink/pushFile.php?cuid=3040&file=fileadmi
n/user_upload/files/Publications/University_Autonomy_in_Europe.pdf; THOMAS 
ESTERMANN, TERHI NOKKALA & MONIKA STEINEL, UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE 
II: THE SCORECARD (European University Association, 2011) [hereinafter ESTERMANN 
ET AL., SCORECARD], http://www.eua.be/Libraries/Publications/University_Autonomy_ 
in_Europe_II_-_The_Scorecard.pdf [http://perma.cc/3E3W-FLY3] (archived Feb. 26, 
2016). 
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be consulted in establishing the elements encompassed by 
institutional autonomy. UNESCO’s Recommendation does not 
provide detail in this respect and only remarks that “the nature of 
institutional autonomy may differ according to the type of 
establishment involved.”85 The EUA thus distinguishes between 
organizational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy and, for 
each of these, applies various indicators to measure compliance. Some 
of these may usefully be applied in establishing to what extent HE 
institutions in the European states enjoy autonomy for purposes of 
this study. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the work 
of the EUA reveals flaws when adjudged from a human rights 
perspective. 
 Although the reports quote literature on academic freedom, 
academic freedom has in many ways been sacrificed on the altar of a 
notion of institutional autonomy misconceived in various respects. To 
mention but a few examples: the EUA considers autonomy to cover 
the ability to charge tuition fees,86 without mentioning that, under 
Article 13(2)(c) of the ICESCR, fees in higher education should 
principally be reduced and eventually be abolished.87 It considers 
autonomy to cover the capacity to generally decide on dismissals, 
without mentioning that, in accordance with criteria on tenure—as 
has been and will be further explained—dismissals may occur in 
defined cases only.88 It considers autonomy to cover the freedom to 
include external members in governing bodies, without mentioning 
that academic self-governance, by its very nature, would require 
there to be restrictions on the inclusion of such members in the 
governing bodies.89 Furthermore, the EUA does not—as it should—
take account of threats to university autonomy emanating from 
actors other than governments, for example, private companies 
                                                                                                                            
 84.  See University Autonomy in Europe, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY ASSOCIATION 
(2012), http://www.university-autonomy.eu [http://perma.cc/2A87-BVC9] (archived 
Feb. 26, 2016) (showing scorecards on university autonomy for twenty-nine European 
countries). 
 85.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 17. 
 86.  See ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 34–36 (stating that 
“[u]niversities’ ability to set fees and decide on their level is often essential to ensuring 
their financial capacity.”). 
 87.  See BEITER, supra note 30, at 387–88, 400–01, 458, 526, 572–73, 594, 651 
(stressing that, by introducing or increasing study fees in HE, states parties to the 
ICESCR, unless they can present sound reasons for doing so, violate the Covenant). 
 88.  See ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 42 (revealing that 
the EUA considers the level of institutional autonomy to be higher, the easier it is for 
HE institutions to be able “to fire” academic staff). 
 89.  Id. at 27–28 (stating that “[t]he inclusion and appointment of external 
members is an important aspect of a university’s governing structure,” clearly 
supporting the notion that the management of HE institutions should have a free hand 
in including and appointing external members). 
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commissioning research.90 In the light of these observations, the 
indicators chosen inquire: whether there is a satisfactory, 
problematic, or seriously deficient/no provision in HE legislation 
expressly protecting institutional autonomy (C.1.) (20 percent); how 
each of organizational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy is 
realized by reference to one or two legitimate key indicators in each 
instance, with each aspect of autonomy weighted equally (C.2.) (40 
percent);91 overall, how wide or narrow the extent of governmental 
powers are (C.3.) (20 percent);92 and, finally, as to the extent to which 
institutional independence is protected against private interests 
(C.4.) (20 percent).93 
 Column D covers indicators on self-governance. The first 
indicator ascertains whether there is a satisfactory, problematic, or 
seriously deficient/no provision in HE legislation expressly protecting 
self-governance (D.1.) (10 percent). This is followed by a group of 
indicators examining the state of self-governance at the level of the 
HE institution (D.2.), and another set of indicators measuring this at 
the faculty/departmental level (D.3.). As institutional decisions 
usually bind those adopting decisions at the faculty/departmental 
level, self-governance at the institutional level has been accorded 
double the weight assigned to self-governance at the 
faculty/departmental level (60 percent to 30 percent). The indicators 
seek to ascertain whether HE legislation safeguards the right of 
academic staff to sufficiently participate in the taking of decisions 
directly or indirectly related to science and scholarship. 
 UNESCO’s Recommendation requires academic staff to be able 
“to elect a majority of representatives to academic bodies within the 
                                                                                                                            
 90.  Id. at 8 (it is thus merely stated that “[u]niversity governance and the 
relationship between the state and higher education institutions are issues that have 
generated intense debate in recent years.” (emphasis added)). 
 91.  The indicators are organizational autonomy (autonomy to determine the 
rector, and autonomy to decide on the internal structure (faculties, departments, etc.)), 
financial autonomy (block grants with/without restrictions or line-item budgets, and 
express competence to perform commissioned research), staffing autonomy (right to 
define academic positions and their requirements, and to recruit and promote academic 
staff), and academic autonomy (capacity to determine the selection criteria for bachelor 
students and to select the latter, and whether or not bachelor programs need not be 
accredited). 
 92.  This covers the aspect of the form state supervision takes, i.e., the question 
whether, in addition to supervising whether legal requirements have been complied 
with (German: “Rechtsaufsicht”), the state is also required to review decisions on their 
merits (German: “Fachaufsicht”). The former should always be an obligation of the 
state, but the latter constitutes a diminution of institutional autonomy. 
 93.  For example, is there a clear statement in HE legislation emphasizing that 
private funding should not compromise the independence of teaching and research in 
HE institutions? Is there a requirement to the effect that HE institutions reveal the 
sources and scope of private funding? Is there a clear restriction of undue influence 
exercised by the representatives of private interests on the HE institution’s governing 
bodies? 
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higher education institution.”94 Countries will earn half the mark 
where they provide that 50 to 59 percent of the members of the senate 
(or its equivalent) are to be representatives of academic staff (D.2.1.). 
The same applies with regard to the composition of collegial bodies at 
faculty/departmental level (D.3.1.). A higher percentage, ideally 
between 60 and 70 percent, will earn them the full mark.95 
 Whereas the taking of decisions on essentially academic matters 
constitutes the core competence of the senate (or its equivalent) or a 
faculty/departmental representative body, the primary responsibility 
of directing the institution/faculty/department accrues to the 
rector/dean/head of department, who is the 
institution’s/faculty’s/department’s chief executive officer. The 
UNESCO Recommendation does not comment on these positions 
separately. It does, however, state that academic staff should have 
the right “to take part in the governing bodies”96 and further 
enshrines the principle of collegiality, remarking that this includes 
shared responsibility, the participation of all in internal decision-
making and consultative mechanisms.97 Clearly, this is closest to the 
primus inter pares model, in terms of which academic staff are to 
decide on “their leaders” themselves, choosing them from among 
themselves, for a certain period of time, after which they become 
ordinary members of staff again. Under this model, academic staff 
should also be able to express a lack of confidence in their leaders’ 
ability to lead, where appropriate.98 Specifically with regard to the 
rector, Karran has pointed out that, if these arrangements apply, the 
rector “is unlikely to take decisions that undermine the academic 
freedom of the staff, as [he/she] knows that at the end [of his/her] 
term of office, someone else could be elected as Rector and take 
retaliatory actions against [him/her].”99 Indicators on the rector 
(D.2.2.) or dean/head of department (D.3.2.) (accorded the same 
                                                                                                                            
 94.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 31. 
 95.  The assessment also takes into account whether the provisions on the 
composition of the senate (or its equivalent) or collegial bodies at the 
faculty/departmental level also comply in all other respects with accepted requirements 
of academic self-governance (for example, all categories of academic staff should take 
part in the election of representatives). 
 96.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 31. 
 97.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 98.  The Latin phrase “primus inter pares” signifies that the rector or 
dean/head of department under this model is considered to be “first among equals,” as 
it were, that he or she is not an unelected professional manager with far-reaching 
executive powers under what has been described as a management model. See Egbert 
de Weert, Pressures and Prospects Facing the Academic Profession in the Netherlands, 
in THE CHANGING ACADEMIC WORKPLACE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 116, 118 
(Philip G. Altbach ed., 2000) (“These managers have increased budgetary 
responsibilities and . . . authority for staffing matters—including appointments, 
personnel assessments, and so on.”). 
 99.  Karran, supra note 1, at 303–04. 
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weight as indicators on the senate (or its equivalent) or 
faculty/departmental representative body, respectively) will thus 
ascertain, firstly, whether these officers come from within the 
institution and hold a PhD or are a professor; secondly, whether 
academic staff can exercise “control” over who is chosen as the rector 
or dean/head of department; and thirdly, whether they can exercise 
“control” over the dismissal of the rector or dean/head of department 
by virtue of a vote of no-confidence. 
 Apart from questions related to how purely academic matters 
should be dealt with and how HE institutions/faculties/departments 
should be directed, a final issue relates to the particular way strategic 
decision-making takes place. Also, in this respect, academic staff 
should have a right to take part in the relevant governing bodies (i.e., 
those bodies responsible for strategic planning, general teaching and 
research policy, overall institutional development, preparing the 
budget, and adopting the HE institution’s statutes).100 Strategic 
decision-making—only considering that which occurs at the 
institutional level here101—would customarily be the task of the 
rector (rectorate) and/or the senate (or its equivalent) and/or, notably 
and increasingly nowadays, a separate board to which academic staff, 
external experts, and other stakeholders are elected/appointed.102 In 
view of the increased importance of the latter boards in the 
governance of HE institutions and as the extent to which science and 
scholarship can flourish within a HE institution significantly depends 
on how “strategic issues” have been resolved, indicator D.2.3., which 
focuses on the composition of the body/bodies taking strategic 
decisions, has been assigned the same weight as indicators under 
D.2.1. and D.2.2. together. It is submitted that academic staff should 
ideally have at least 50 percent representation on any such 
body/bodies.103 
                                                                                                                            
 100.  Ultimately, Paragraph 32 of the UNESCO Recommendation highlights 
that “[c]ollegial decision-making should encompass decisions regarding the 
administration and determination of policies of higher education, curricula, research, 
extension work, the allocation of resources and other related activities.” 
 101.  At faculty/departmental level, these questions should be resolved by the 
dean/head of department and/or staff (representative body). 
 102.  See EURYDICE, THE INFORMATION NETWORK ON EDUCATION IN EUROPE, 
HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: POLICIES, STRUCTURES, FUNDING AND 
ACADEMIC STAFF 33–42 (2008), http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/ 
documents/thematic_reports/091EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5D7-YH3K] (archived 
Mar. 10, 2016) (discussing the typical governance bodies encountered in (European) HE 
institutions). 
 103.  A five-point scale is applied to measure compliance with regard to 
indicator D.2.3.: at least 50 percent representation = full compliance; 40–49 percent 
representation = between full and partial compliance; 30–39 percent representation = 
partial compliance; less than 30 percent, but some form of representation = between 
partial and non-compliance; and no noteworthy representation = non-compliance. 
Where there is a board consisting of external members, and academic staff may 
determine at least 50 percent of its members, this is considered to constitute partial 
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 Finally, Column E covers indicators on security of employment, 
including “tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable.” 
Indicators concern three topics: duration of contract of service (40 
percent) (E.1.), termination of contract of service on operational 
grounds (30 percent) (E.2.), and prospect of advancement based on 
objective assessment of competence (30 percent) (E.3.). Regarding the 
first topic—UNESCO’s Recommendation referring to “continuing 
employment following rigorous evaluation”104—it is to be assessed 
whether the legal framework of the states concerned envisages 
permanent contracts for academic staff, or, alternatively, 
commencement on a tenure-track (i.e., during a first phase,105 a 
probationary period or fixed-term contracts with long-term 
prospects). A lowering of the standards of protection may take on 
various forms: permanent contracts or commencement on a tenure-
track at the level of senior positions (for example, that of associate 
professor) only (partial compliance), leaving the conclusion of 
permanent contracts generally to the discretion of the employer 
(partial or non-compliance),106 or expressly providing for fixed-term 
contracts without long-term prospects at even senior levels (non-
compliance).107 
 Indicators on the second topic, the termination of contracts of 
service on operational grounds, relate to requirements in UNESCO’s 
Recommendation to the effect that potential dismissal of “tenured” 
staff should occur “on professional grounds and in accordance with 
due process” only.108 Dismissals on grounds of serious misconduct, a 
flagrant violation of scholarly duties (for example, fabrication of 
research results or plagiarism), or two or more consecutive negative 
appraisals of work quality will be permissible, if due process rules are 
observed.109 Dismissals on operational grounds (i.e., restructuring, 
                                                                                                                            
compliance. Where they are not in a position to determine at least 50 percent of those 
members, this is considered to constitute non-compliance. 
 104.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 46. 
 105.  This would normally be the phase following the award of a doctoral degree. 
It has been held that this phase typically (and legitimately) is between five to seven 
years. See Karran, supra note 8, at 178.  
 106.  Much will depend on whether fixed-term contracts are subject to strict or 
lax requirements as regards legitimate cases of use, maximum number of successive 
contracts, and maximum cumulated duration. 
 107.  Indicator E.1.1. on the legal framework is supplemented by indicator E.1.2. 
on the situation in practice. This has been included in light of the fact that the legal 
criteria existing in this context are multi-layered and complex, and often containing 
loopholes or having unexpected effects in practice, so that only a look at the situation in 
practice explains the true purport of legal provisions: 66.7 percent or more of academic 
staff at post-entry levels (i.e. following any stage of doctoral employment) having 
permanent contracts of service or on a tenure-track = full compliance; 50–66.6 percent 
= partial compliance; and less than 50 percent = non-compliance. 
 108.  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, ¶ 46. 
 109.  Note should be taken of Paragraph 47 of the UNESCO Recommendation 
on “Appraisal”, Subparagraph (e) stating that the results of appraisal may legitimately 
be taken into account when “considering the renewal of employment,” and of 
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down-sizing, reorganization or economic difficulties), however, should 
ideally not take place. They will only be justifiable exceptionally and 
provided all alternatives have been considered, appropriate priority 
criteria observed, a formalized procedure followed, and procedural 
safeguards respected.110 A first indicator (E.2.1.) ascertains whether 
there is an adequate, problematic, or seriously deficient/no provision 
in HE legislation expressly prohibiting dismissals of specifically (but 
not solely) academic staff with permanent contracts on operational 
grounds, alternatively, providing strict protection in cases of such 
dismissals.111 A second indicator of equal weight (E.2.2.) inquires as 
to the level of protection afforded to academic staff, as defined, in 
cases of dismissals on operational grounds under “ordinary” civil 
service and/or labor law. 
 Finally, regarding the topic of a prospect of advancement based 
on an objective assessment of competence, since academic freedom is 
to be protected by restricting dismissal, it follows, by way of 
implication, that academic freedom should also not be infringed by 
preventing advancement in the academic career where it should take 
place. There should be procedures in place (also capable of being 
initiated by the academic concerned) in terms of which promotion is 
granted, provided defined scholarly criteria have been met as 
objectively assessed, without the need for the academic having to 
newly apply for a higher position within his/her institution on a 
competitive basis. Indicator E.3. thus assesses whether legislation 
makes adequate provision (including, for example, through a tenure-
track system) for advancement to a higher position based on an 
objective assessment of competence.112 
                                                                                                                            
Paragraphs 48–51 on “Discipline and dismissal”, specifically Paragraph 50 on 
“dismissal as a disciplinary measure.” For a description of due process rules in this 
context; see Karran, supra note 8, at 181–85 (figs. 7, 8). 
 110.  For a description of due process rules in this context, see Karran, supra 
note 8, at 179–81, 184–85 (figs. 5, 6, 8). 
 111.  Such a provision may largely be dispensed with where academic staff are 
civil servants whose discharge on very limited grounds, notably serious misconduct, is 
strictly regulated in civil service legislation. 
 112.  This indicator applies a five-point scale: adequate legislation = full 
compliance; legislation with certain deficits = between full and partial compliance; 
legislation with more serious deficits = partial compliance; legislation with substantial 
deficits = between partial and non-compliance; and no legislation = non-compliance. 
Where relevant procedures are provided for in a prominent and sector-wide collective 
agreement, in government regulations or in the statutes of HE institutions generally, 
these will, depending on their specific nature, be rated to be “in partial compliance” or 
“between partial and non-compliance.” 
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Standard Scorecard “to Measure” the Right to Academic 
Freedom 
Country 
A. The Ratification of International Agreements and 
Constitutional Protection (20%) 
Austria 
63.5% 
1. The Ratification of International Agreements (10) 8.5 
1.1. Global Level (6) 
1.1.1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 19, 
Right to Freedom of Expression) [0–1.5] 1.5 
1.1.2. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (International Petition Procedure) [0–1.5] 1.5 
1.1.3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Art. 13, Right to Education) [0–1.5] 1.5 
1.1.4. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (International Petition Procedure) 
[0–1.5] 0 
1.2. Regional Level (4) 
European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 10, Right to Freedom of 
Expression) [0–4] 4 
2. Constitutional Protection (10) 9 
2.1. Provision on Right to Freedom of Expression [0–1–2] 2 
2.2. Provision on Right to Academic Freedom [0–1–2] 2 
2.3. Reference to Institutional Autonomy [0–0.5–1] 1 
2.4. Reference to Academic Self-Governance [0–0.5–1] 0 
2.5. Robustness of Provisions [0–2–4] 4 
Total: 17.5 
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Standard Scorecard “to Measure” the Right to Academic 
Freedom (cont.) 
B. The Express Protection of Academic Freedom in HE Legislation (20%) 
[0–2.5–5–7.5–10 (x2)] 10 
− 0 – No Reference to Academic Freedom at All (Non-Compliance) 
− 2.5 – Provision(s) Seriously Falling Short of Defined Standards (Between 
Partial and Non-Compliance) 
− 5 – Mere Reference to Academic Freedom/Provisions Revealing Various Deficits 
(Partial Compliance) 
− 7.5 – Some or Other Deficit in Otherwise Commendable Provisions (Between 
Full and Partial Compliance) 
− 10 – Academic Freedom Serves as Guiding Principle for Activity within HE 
(Full Compliance) 
Total: 10x2=20 
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Standard Scorecard “to Measure” the Right to Academic 
Freedom (cont.) 
C. The Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation (20%) 
1. Provision on Institutional Autonomy [0–2–4] 2 
2. Autonomy in Detail (8) 6 
2.1. Organizational (2) 
2.1.1. Autonomy to Determine Rector [0–0.5–1] 1 
2.1.2. Autonomy to Determine Internal Structures [0–0.5–1] 1 
2.2. Financial (2) 
2.2.1. State Grant as Block Grant [0–0.5–1] 1 
2.2.2. Express Competence to Perform Commissioned Research [0–0.5–1] 1 
2.3. Staffing (2) 
Right to Define Academic Positions in HE Institutions and their Requirements, and 
to Recruit and Promote Academic Staff [0–1–2] 1 
2.4. Academic (2) 
2.4.1. Capacity to Determine Selection Criteria for Bachelor Students and to Select 
the Latter [0–0.5–1] 0 
2.4.2. Whether or Not Bachelor Programs Need to be Accredited [0–0.5–1] 1 
3. Extent of Governmental Powers [0–2–4] 2 
4. Institutional Independence vis-à-vis Private Interests [0–2–4] 2 
Total: 12 
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Standard Scorecard “to Measure” the Right to Academic 
Freedom (cont.) 
D. The Protection of Self-Governance in HE Legislation (20%) 
1. Provision on Academic Self-Governance [0–1–2] 1 
2. Academic Self-Governance at Institutional Level (12) 7 
2.1. Senate (or its Equivalent) – Composition [0–1.5–3] 3 
2.2. Rector (3) 
2.2.1. Academic Position/Qualification of Rector [0–0.5–1] 0 
2.2.2. Determining the Rector [0–0.5–1] 0.5 
2.2.3. Dismissing the Rector [0–0.5–1] 0.5 
2.3. Participation in Strategic Decision-Making (through Senate or its Equivalent, 
or Otherwise) [0–1.5–3–4.5–6] 3 
3. Academic Self-Governance at Faculty/Departmental Level (6) 1 
3.1. Collegial Bodies (3) 
3.1.1. Existence of Collegial Bodies [0–0.5–1] 0 
3.1.2. Composition of Collegial Bodies [0–1–2] 0 
3.2. Dean/Head of Department (3) 
3.2.1. Academic Position/Qualification of Dean/Head of Department [0–0.5–1] 0.5 
3.2.2. Determining the Dean/Head of Department [0–0.5–1] 0.5 
3.2.3. Dismissing the Dean/Head of Department [0–0.5–1] 0 
Total: 9 
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Standard Scorecard “to Measure” the Right to Academic 
Freedom (cont.) 
E. The Protection of Job Security (including “Tenure”) in Relevant 
Legislation (20%) 
1. Duration of Contract of Service (8) 2 
1.1. Regulatory Framework [0–2–4] 2 
1.2. Situation in Practice [0–2–4] 0 
2. Termination of Contract of Service on Operational Grounds (6) 1.5 
2.1. Provision on Termination on Operational Grounds in HE Legislation [0–1.5–
3] 1.5 
2.2. Protection in the Case of Termination on Operational Grounds in Terms of 
Civil Service/Labor Legislation [0–1.5–3] 0 
3. Prospect of Advancement Based on Objective Assessment of Competence [0–
1.5–3–4.5–6] 1.5 
Total: 5 
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IV. MODUS OPERANDI AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN 
THE ENDEAVOR 
 The assessment of the legal protection of the right to academic 
freedom in Europe undertaken here considers only public institutions 
of HE and, among these, only universities.113 The right to academic 
freedom naturally needs also to be respected in private institutions of 
HE, though there may be differences in the scope of that right in that 
context.114 Infringements of academic freedom further seem more 
prevalent in universities than, for example, polytechnics, which may 
not be as extensively involved in original research as universities.115 
These restrictions in the ambit of the inquiry were necessary in the 
light of limited human and time resources available to examine all 
relevant data. The analysis entailed an examination of thirty 
European HE systems. States with a federal structure in the field of 
HE required a particular approach. In the case of Belgium, the HE 
systems of Flanders and Wallonia were considered separately, 
omitting the German-speaking region. In the case of Germany, with 
different HE systems in each of the sixteen Länder, it has been 
decided to study the situation in the two Länder with the most 
inhabitants, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, one-third of 
Germany’s population living in these Länder. The two HE systems 
also reveal interesting differences, both Länder traditionally having 
been governed by conservative and social-democrat governments, 
respectively. As Germany’s Hochschulrahmengesetz (Framework Act 
on Higher Education) in its version of 1999116 is still on the law books 
(its abolition lingering on the political agenda), differences among the 
various HE systems, though increasing, remain within bounds. 
Where appropriate, developments in the other Länder have been 
taken note of. Regarding Spain, certain powers in the field of HE 
                                                                                                                            
 113.  Moreover, it only considers academic freedom of academic staff, but not 
that of students. It also does not consider artistic freedom, which is a related, but 
separate concept. 
 114.  See, e.g., Tarantino v. Italy, 2013–II Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 419 (Pinto de 
Albuquerque, J., partly dissenting) (“States Parties’ margin of appreciation is wider 
with regard to the regulation of State schools and narrower with regard to that of 
private schools. An even narrower margin of appreciation applies a fortiori to higher 
education, where institutional autonomy plays a pivotal role. (footnote omitted) 
Conversely, the more the State funds private schools and universities, the wider its 
margin of appreciation. (emphases omitted)”). 
 115.  Paragraph 1(e) of the UNESCO Recommendation states that “‘institutions 
of higher education’ means universities, other educational establishments, centres and 
structures of higher education, and centres of research and culture associated with any 
of the above, public or private, that are approved as such either through recognized 
accreditation systems or by the competent state authorities.” 
 116.  HOCHSCHULRAHMENGESETZ in the version of Jan. 19, 1999, BGBL. I, at 18, 
last amended by Art. 2 of Law, Apr. 12, 2007, BGBL. I, at 506. 
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regulation rest with the autonomous regions. As for the United 
Kingdom, the situation in England has been studied primarily (more 
than 80 percent of the United Kingdom’s population living there), 
giving some consideration to elements of the Scottish system. 
 The actual legislation of EU states constituted the primary 
source of information for purposes of the assessment. Legislation as 
in force at the beginning of 2014 has been studied.117 Where relevant 
language competencies existed (Dutch/Flemish, English, French, 
German, and Spanish), the original language versions of the 
legislation were consulted. In other cases, recourse was had to official 
or unofficial English-language translations that seemed reliable. In a 
few cases, no reliable English-language versions could be traced 
(Croatia, Greece, and Italy), probably because the states concerned 
had adopted new HE legislation relatively recently. In these cases, 
but also to take account of recent amendments to HE laws in the case 
of other states, online translation tools had to be utilized.118 In all 
instances, it has been sought to verify the correctness of information 
by studying relevant secondary literature (journalistic and academic 
texts, and information available in online databases119) or 
information provided by states themselves.120 It will be appreciated 
that coping with voluminous and diverse sets of legislation in 
                                                                                                                            
 117.  Hence, attempts by the current Polish government, dominated by the 
right-wing national conservative Law and Justice party (PiS), directed at “undermining 
the constitutional order” in Poland could not yet negatively impact on “the 
performance” of that country in this assessment. Further, as North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany) adopted a new HOCHSCHULZUKUNFTSGESETZ (Act on the Future of Higher 
Education) in September 2014, this was examined for purposes of the comparison. 
 118.  Citations from the constitutions, laws and regulations used here should 
not be seen to reflect official translations, but rather are own renderings of the texts in 
the light of all sources available. 
 119.  In particular, these online databases were consulted: the 
Eurydice/Eurypedia website (maintained by the European Commission’s Education, 
Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)), Eurydice and Eurypedia 
providing information on European education systems and policies: https://webgate.ec. 
europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Main_Page; the website of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), making available online, inter 
alia, the OECD Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education’s 
journal HIGH. EDUC. MGMT. & POL’Y: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/higher-
education-management-and-policy_17269822; the website of the European University 
Association, supplying useful information on university autonomy: http://www.eua.be; 
the website of the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies of the University of 
Twente (Netherlands), containing a collection of publications on HE adopting an 
international comparative perspective: http://www.utwente.nl/bms/cheps. 
 120.  Amongst others, the websites of the ministries responsible for HE in the 
various EU member states were thus consulted. Furthermore, a questionnaire asking 
EU member states to provide information on the legislative framework in place for the 
protection of academic freedom was sent out to states on Oct. 3, 2013. The response 
rate has been rather modest, with only one third of the states having responded. 
Nevertheless, of the replies that were received, some, like those from Denmark, 
Hungary, Slovakia or Sweden, were very instructive. 
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different languages is a daunting task. An error margin of up to three 
percent is thus conceivable. 
V. THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN 
EUROPE: THE RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENT 
 The following six headings provide a brief overview of state 
performance with regard to each of the five columns of the scorecard 
and overall. Each heading provides concise information on trends 
identified, some examples, and a country ranking in the form of a 
table.121 
A. The Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional 
Protection 
 All twenty-eight EU member states have ratified the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR of 1966. The United Kingdom is the only member state 
not to have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1966. 
Claims under Article 19 on the right to freedom of expression alleging 
that the United Kingdom has violated academic freedom thus cannot 
be brought before the Human Rights Committee. In view of the 
recentness of the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in 
2008, only eight states so far (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) have ratified it. The 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR entered into force on May 5, 
2013.122 A number of states have expressed reservations with regard 
to Article 20 of the ICCPR, which prohibits “any propaganda for war” 
(Paragraph 1) and “any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence” (Paragraph 2). Malta and the United Kingdom reserve the 
right not to adopt legislation with regard to Article 20 as a whole. 
Belgium and Luxemburg do so as regards Article 20(1) on war 
propaganda. Ireland defers the right to adopt legislation on a specific 
criminal offense in the sphere of Article 20(1). Also Denmark, 
                                                                                                                            
 121.  Where appropriate, the footnotes include references to literature on 
academic freedom as protected in the states assessed, available in English, French, 
German or Spanish, focusing on more recent literature adopting a legal or quasi-legal 
approach. Regarding the three EU states with the largest populations, Germany, the 
UK and France, reference should, as regards Germany and the UK, be had to 
BARENDT, supra note 22 (see, specifically, the references to further literature at 316–
18) and, as regards France, to OLIVIER BEAUD, LES LIBERTÉS UNIVERSITAIRES À 
L’ABANDON? POUR UNE RECONNAISSANCE PLEINE ET ENTIÈRE DE LA LIBERTÉ 
ACADÉMIQUE (2010) (and the references to further literature there). 
 122.  Status of ratification as at Mar. 19, 2015 as reflected in the online 
databases of the U.N. Treaty Collection at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en  (archived Mar. 12, 2016). 
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Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden do not want to apply 
Article 20(1), with Finland stating that applying this provision “might 
endanger the freedom of expression referred [to] in article 19 of the 
Covenant.” Reservations to Article 20 have not been considered to 
amount to “non-compliance” in the present analysis. As Jack 
Donnelly comments: 
Here the issue is balancing two competing human rights, rather than a conflict 
between human rights and another value. Any resolution will require 
restricting the range of at least one of these rights. Therefore, any approach 
that plausibly protects the conceptual integrity of both rights must be described 
as controversial but defensible.123 
The reservations expressed, it is submitted, should perhaps be 
understood in this context. Malta, however, has made a problematic 
reservation with regard to Article 22 of the ICCPR on the right to 
freedom of association, stipulating that it “reserves the right not to 
apply article 22 to the extent that existing legislative measures may 
not be fully compatible with this article.” All EU member states are 
further bound by the relevant provisions of the ECHR, as amended 
and supplemented.124 
 The constitutions of all EU member states125 protect the right to 
freedom of expression. Express provisions are found in the (written) 
constitutions of twenty-seven countries. In the United Kingdom, this 
right should be considered part of that country’s unwritten 
constitution.126 Whereas the provisions of the Greek, Irish, and 
Romanian Constitutions are problematic (“partial compliance”), that 
of the Hungarian Constitution is seriously deficient (“non-
compliance”). Article 14(3) of the Greek Constitution, for example, 
allows the seizure of newspapers and other publications in cases of 
“an offence against the Christian or any other known religion” or “an 
insult against the person of the President of the Republic.”127 The 
                                                                                                                            
 123.  Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 281, 302 (2007). 
 124.  Status of ratification as at Mar. 21, 2015 as reflected on the Council of 
Europe’s official Treaty Office website at http://conventions.coe.int 
[https://perma.cc/2K8C-AKVA] (archived Mar. 23, 2016). The focus regarding the 
ECHR has been on Article 10 on the right to freedom of expression, ignoring notably 
Protocol No. 12 on an “autonomous” non-discrimination provision. 
 125.  This refers to the constitutional texts as in force on Jan. 1, 2014. It is 
refrained from providing full official citations of constitutions here. 
 126.  There is some case law holding that there exists “a constitutional right to 
freedom of expression in England.” Moreover, the Human Rights Act, 1988, ch. 42, has 
modified the largely “residual nature” of human rights protection available under 
common law. See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under 
the Human Rights Act 1998, 84 IND. L.J. 851, 852–55 (2009). 
 127. The Constitution of Ireland forbids blasphemy. See CONSTITUTION OF 
IRELAND 1937, art. 40(6)(1)(i). The Romanian Constitution forbids “defamation of the 
country and the nation.” See CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA 1991, art. 30(7). 
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Hungarian Constitution substantially constrains political 
campaigning in non-public media and provides that freedom of speech 
may not violate “the dignity of the Hungarian nation” in Article IX(3) 
and (5), respectively. 
 Express provisions on the right to academic freedom—in the form 
of a right to freedom of science128—may be found in the constitutions 
of eighteen countries.129 These protect the right either as part of 
provisions (also) addressing the right to freedom of expression 
(Germany and Spain),130 the right to education/educational rights 
(Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Sweden),131 rights related to 
science, arts, culture, universities, and research institutions 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia),132 the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion (Czech Republic),133 or both the right to 
education/educational rights and rights related to science, arts, and 
culture (Portugal).134 The provisions contained in the Czech, Greek, 
and Hungarian Constitutions may be considered to be problematic 
(“partial compliance”). Regarding the Czech Republic, the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion provides too narrow a 
basis as to cover all aspects of the right to academic freedom. Article 
16(8) of the Greek Constitution prohibits the establishment of private 
universities, thereby also preventing opportunities for diversified 
notions of academic freedom to flourish in different contexts.135 
Although academic freedom does require regulation, the provisions of 
Article X(1) of the Hungarian Constitution—also in the light of the 
                                                                                                                            
 128.  Although, as has been explained at note 22 above, there are differences 
between the right to freedom of science, potentially in the sense of 
“Wissenschaftsfreiheit” or “the right to free scholarship,” and the right to academic 
freedom, the latter probably providing more extensive protection to academic staff, the 
approach here has been not to differentiate between the two. The CONSTITUTION OF 
SPAIN 1978 protects both freedom of science (art. 20(1)(b)) and academic freedom (“la 
libertad de cátedra,” literally meaning “the freedom of the academic chair”) (art. 
20(1)(c)). 
 129.  In the UK, “there is no constitutional guarantee of academic or scientific 
freedom.” See BARENDT, supra note 22, at 74–75. 
 130.  See GERMAN BASIC LAW 1949, art. 5(3); SPANISH CONSTITUTION 1978, 
art. 20(1)(b), (c). 
 131.  See AUSTRIAN BASIC LAW OF 1867, art. 17(1); FINNISH CONSTITUTION 1999, 
§ 16(3); GREEK CONSTITUTION 1975, art. 16(1); ITALIAN CONSTITUTION 1947, art. 33(1); 
SWEDISH INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT 1974, ch. 2, art. 18(2). 
 132.  See BULGARIAN CONSTITUTION 1991, art. 54(2); CROATIAN CONSTITUTION 
1990, art. 69(1); ESTONIAN CONSTITUTION 1992, § 38(1); HUNGARIAN FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 2011, art. X(1), (2); LATVIAN CONSTITUTION 1922, § 113; LITHUANIAN 
CONSTITUTION 1992, art. 42; POLISH CONSTITUTION 1997, art. 73; SLOVAKIAN 
CONSTITUTION 1992, art. 43(1); SLOVENIAN CONSTITUTION 1991, art. 59. 
 133.  See CZECH CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1992, 
art. 15(2). 
 134.  See PORTUGUESE CONSTITUTION 1976, arts. 42(1), 73(4). 
 135.  Article 13(4) of the ICESCR protects “the liberty of individuals and bodies 
to establish and direct educational institutions.” 
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Constitution’s generally paternalistic, even authoritarian, stance—to 
the effect that the right to academic freedom is ensured “within the 
framework laid down in an Act” does not augur too well for the 
protection of that right. 
 Express provisions on institutional autonomy are contained in 
fifteen constitutions (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain), while 
provisions on self-governance are contained in only three (Bavaria 
(Germany), Portugal, and Spain). All of these are “fully compliant,” 
except for Hungary’s provisions on institutional autonomy, which 
must be held to be “non-compliant.”136 Article X(3) of the Hungarian 
Constitution provides that 
Higher education institutions shall be autonomous in terms of the content and 
the methods of research and teaching; their organization shall be regulated by 
an Act. The Government shall, within the framework of an Act, lay down the 
rules governing the financial management of public higher education 
institutions and shall supervise their financial management.137 
 Finally, regarding the robustness of constitutional provisions, the 
question was whether the normative context of constitutions (values 
reflected by relevant provisions, specific or general limitations 
clauses, etc.) fully supports the effective protection of the rights 
concerned, specifically the right to academic freedom.138 The 
Constitution of Poland, for example, in Article 31(3), contains a 
general limitation provision reflecting internationally accepted 
standards, stating that limitations upon human rights  
may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state 
for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural 
environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other 
persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights. 
The Romanian Constitution, in Article 20(1), requires constitutional 
provisions concerning rights and freedoms “[to] be interpreted and 
enforced in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                                                                                            
 136.  See HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, EÖTVÖS KÁROLY POLICY INSTITUTE 
& HUNGARIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MAIN CONCERNS REGARDING THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY point 9 (Statement, Feb. 26, 
2013) (stating that “the Fourth Amendment entirely abolishes the autonomy of 
universities in financial questions.”). 
 137.  The Hungarian Constitution further provides for the President of the 
Republic to appoint university rectors. See HUNGARIAN FUNDAMENTAL LAW 2011, 
art. 9. A similar provision may be found in the Slovakian Constitution. See SLOVAKIAN 
CONSTITUTION 1992, art. 102. 
 138.  It may be noted that all those states whose constitutions do not contain 
express provisions on the right to academic freedom have maximally been considered to 
be in “partial compliance” in this respect. 
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Rights, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to.” 
Many constitutions, such as those of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, or Spain, moreover, call upon states to 
actively promote the development of science, arts, and culture, this 
implicitly requiring that respect for academic freedom be furthered. 
Factors negatively affecting protective standards encompass, for 
example, excluding non-citizens from protection against 
discrimination on the ground of political opinions (see Malta) or 
adopting far-reaching constitutional amendments entailing a general 
erosion of universally accepted constitutional principles (see 
Hungary).139 
Table 1: Country Ranking: Ratification of International 
Agreements and Constitutional Protection 
Country 
Percentage & Score out of 
20 in parentheses 
1. Portugal, Spain 100    (20) 
2. Finland, Italy 95      (19) 
3. Slovakia 90      (18) 
4. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia 
87.5   (17.5) 
5. Latvia, Sweden 82.5   (16.5) 
6. Czech Republic, Greece 77.5   (15.5) 
Average 78.04 (15.61) 
7. Belgium, France, Luxemburg 70      (14) 
8. Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Romania 
62.5   (12.5) 
9. Hungary, Ireland 57.5   (11.5) 
10. Malta, United Kingdom 55      (11) 
B. The Express Protection of Academic Freedom in Higher Education 
Legislation 
 If constitutional provisions on the right to academic freedom 
legitimately may be rather concise, then—in accordance with what 
has been stated regarding the requirement of “legislation”140—all 
salient aspects of that right need to be concretized and 
operationalized by way of parliamentary legislation. Further detail 
                                                                                                                            
 139.  Supra note 136 (regarding Hungary); see infra Annex, Indicator A.2.5. 
(noting that, Full compliance = Aus., Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Bay. (F.R.G.), 
N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Italy, Lat., Lith., Pol., Port., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, Swed.; 
Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Den., Fr., Hung., Ir., Lux., Malta, 
Neth., Rom., U.K.; Non-compliance = none). 
 140.  See Part III.A., supra. 
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can be regulated in subordinate legislation. A state’s Act on Higher 
Education should thus make it clear that academic freedom (stricto 
sensu) entails a right to carry out research, a right to teach, and a 
right to study without restrictions. Ideally, each of these elements 
should then be defined. The Higher Education Act of 2006 of Bavaria 
(Germany), for example,141 provides in Article 3: 
(2) 1. Freedom of research (first sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic Law and 
Article 108 of the [Bavarian] Constitution) shall cover in particular the topic of 
research, the methodological approach applied and the evaluation and 
dissemination of research findings. 2. Decisions on research matters may be 
taken by the competent bodies of an institution of higher education to the 
extent that they refer to the organization of research activities, the promotion 
and coordination of research projects and the formulation of the areas of focus 
for research; such decisions shall not impair freedom of research as defined in 
the first sentence . . . 
(3) 1. Without prejudice to the second sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic 
Law,142 freedom of teaching (first sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic Law and 
Article 108 of the [Bavarian] Constitution) shall, within the framework of the 
teaching duties allocated, cover in particular the holding of classes, including 
the way they are structured in terms of content conveyed and methods applied, 
as well as the right to express scholarly . . . views on doctrinal issues. 2. 
Decisions on questions of teaching may be taken by the competent bodies of an 
institution of higher education to the extent that they refer to the organization 
of teaching activities and the adoption and observance of study and 
examination regulations; such decisions shall not impair freedom of research as 
defined in the first sentence. 
(4) 1. Without prejudice to study and examination regulations, freedom of 
study shall cover in particular the free choice of classes, the right, within a 
study course, to freely choose one’s areas of focus, as well as the formulation 
and expression of scholarly . . . views. 2. Decisions on study issues may be 
taken by the competent bodies of an institution of higher education to the 
extent that they refer to the organization and proper implementation of 
teaching and study activities and to guaranteeing the orderly pursuit of 
studies.143 
                                                                                                                            
 141.  BAYERISCHES HOCHSCHULGESETZ [BAYHSCHG], May 23, 2006, GVBL. 
2006, 245; see BARENDT, supra note 22, at 117–60 (for an analysis of the legal 
protection of academic freedom in Germany); see id. at 317–18 (for a select bibliography 
of relevant literature on the situation in Germany). 
 142.  GERMAN BASIC LAW 1949, art. 5(3), second sentence (“Freedom of teaching 
shall not absolve any person from allegiance to the Basic Law.”). 
 143.  A somewhat different approach is that followed by Lithuania in its Law on 
Higher Education and Research of 2009 (LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS MOKSLO IR STUDIJŲ 
ĮSTATYMAS Apr. 30, 2009, Nr. XI-242, ŽIN., 2009, Nr. 54-2140, 61, 101). Two provisions 
enumerate a whole series of rights that should be considered encompassed by 
“academic freedom.” Article 53 states that academic freedom includes freedom of 
thought and freedom of expression; freedom to choose the methods of research and 
teaching (provided they are in conformity with accepted principles of ethics); and 
protection against restrictions to and sanctions for publishing the results of research 
and manifesting beliefs (unless information constitutes a state/official secret and/or is 
in violation of the law). The provision further mentions intellectual property rights, 
640  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [vol. 49:597 
 Furthermore, legislation should reflect that academic freedom 
serves as a guiding principle for activity within HE, as would be 
evidenced by “academic freedom” forming part of a general part of the 
HE Act on “general principles” and/or it being referred to in various 
contexts throughout HE legislation. In Austria’s Universities Act of 
2002, for example, Section 2, entitled “Guiding Principles,” refers to 
freedom of the sciences and their teaching, diversity of scientific 
theories, methods and opinions, and freedom of study as essential 
principles to be observed by universities in the pursuance of their 
tasks.144 References to academic freedom then recur in various 
sections of the Act. Target agreements concluded with academic staff 
must respect freedom of science and “leave sufficient room” to 
individual members of the academic staff in their research and 
teaching.145 Students are entitled to freedom of study in accordance 
with the provisions of the law.146 Academic staff may not be required 
to participate in scholarly work if this conflicts with their 
conscience.147 The dismissal of a member of the academic staff is null 
and void if this has occurred because that member supported a 
certain opinion or method in his or her research or teaching.148 
 Legislation should, moreover, spell out essential duties of 
academic staff related to the enjoyment of academic freedom. 
                                                                                                                            
equal rights to take part in competitions, and objective and open reviewing of scholarly 
works. Article 64 also provides a list of rights of academic staff: to participate in 
competitions for research projects and research funding, and to utilize any funding 
allocated; to participate in competitions for postdoctoral scholarships in Lithuania and 
abroad; to obtain from state institutions information for research purposes (in the case 
of state/official secrets, in accordance with special procedures provided for); to 
participate in the deliberation of laws and regulations of their institution; to 
participate in trade unions and other associations, including those abroad; to work 
independently or in groups; and to independently publish their scholarly work. 
 144.  BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE ORGANISATION DER UNIVERSITÄTEN UND IHRE 
STUDIEN [UNIVERSITÄTSGESETZ] StF: BGBL. I Nr. 120/2002 (NR: GP XXI RV 1134 AB 
1224 S. 111; BR: 6697 AB 6717 S. 690). To mention another example, also Croatia’s 
recent Act on Science and Higher Education of 2013 (ZAKON O ZNANSTVENOJ 
DJELATNOSTI I VISOKOM OBRAZOVANJU, NARODNE NOVINE broj 123/03, 198/03, 105/04, 
174/04, 2/07 – OUSRH, 46/07, 45/09, 63/11, 94/13, 139/13) clearly articulates that 
academic freedom constitutes a guiding principle: Article 2(3) states: “Higher education 
shall be based on: – Academic freedom, academic self-governance and university 
autonomy, . . . – Reciprocity and partnership among members of the academic 
community – the European humanistic and democratic tradition . . . – Respect for and 
recognition of human rights, . . .” Article 4(2) and (3) further provide for academic 
freedom, academic self-governance and university autonomy “in accordance with the 
Constitution, international agreements and this Act.” 
 145.  UNIVERSITÄTSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144, § 20(5). 
 146.  Id. § 59(1). 
 147.  Id. § 105. 
 148.  Id. § 113; see Walter Berka, Wissenschaftsfreiheit an staatlichen 
Universitäten: Zur Freiheit und Verantwortung des Wissenschaftlers, in VOM 
VERFASSUNGSSTAAT AM SCHEIDEWEG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR PETER PERNTHALER 67 (Karl 
Weber et al. eds., 2005), (discussing the protection of the right to academic freedom in 
public universities in Austria in terms of the Universities Act of 2002). 
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Article 310 of the Romanian National Education Law of 2011,149 for 
example, stipulates that plagiarism, the fabrication of research 
findings, and the provision of false information in applications for 
funding constitute “serious violations of proper conduct in scientific 
research and university activities.” 
 Finally, legislation should make it clear that HE institutions 
themselves are also obliged to respect the academic freedom of 
members of the academic staff. Institutional structures need to be 
established to facilitate the internal enforcement of rights in this 
respect. Latvia’s Law on Institutions of Higher Education of 1995,150 
for instance, in Section 6(5), emphasizes that “[t]he administration of 
an institution of higher education shall have a duty to guarantee and 
respect the rights of students and academic staff [entailed by 
academic freedom].” Section 19 then proceeds to provide for an 
academic arbitration tribunal, competent to receive “submissions of 
students and academic staff regarding a restriction or infringement of 
academic freedom and [other] rights.” 
 The assessment revealed that the express protection of academic 
freedom in HE legislation in the states examined occurs at varying 
levels. The HE legislation of Austria, Croatia, France, North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany), Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia contains 
express provisions on academic freedom largely in compliance with 
generally agreed criteria on academic freedom. The provisions show 
that academic freedom serves as a guiding principle for activity 
within HE (“full compliance”). 
 A second group of HE systems were considered to have 
performed less than wholly satisfactorily (“between full and partial 
compliance”)—namely those of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Bavaria (Germany), Ireland, Luxemburg, Romania, and Spain. 
Within this group, some or other deficit in the otherwise 
commendable legislative provisions could be identified in each case. 
The Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995,151 in Article 19(3), 
provides that “[a]cademic autonomy shall include academic freedom, 
academic self-governance and inviolability of the premises of an 
institution of higher education.” It should rather have been made 
clear that “academic freedom” is the superseding right covering the 
others, including institutional autonomy. The latter finds its confines 
in individual academic freedom, not the other way around.152 The 
                                                                                                                            
 149.  LEGEA EDUCAŢIEI NAŢIONALE, Law No. 1, Jan. 5, 2011, MONITORUL 
OFICIAL AL ROMÂNIEI, Partea I, Aug. 30, 2013. 
 150.  AUGSTSKOLU LIKUMS, Nov. 2, 1995, LATVIJAS V STNESIS 179 (462), 
Nov. 17, 1995, ZIŅOTĀJS 1, Jan. 11, 1996. 
 151.  Закон за висшето образование, Обн., ДВ, бр. 112 от 27.12.1995 г. [Higher 
Education Act, prom. STATE GAZETTE No. 112, Dec. 27, 1995]. 
 152.  A similar conceptual problem is encountered in Article 6 of the Italian Law 
of May 9, 1989, No. 168, on the Establishment of the Ministry of Universities and 
Scientific and Technological Research (LEGGE del 9 maggio 1989, n. 168, ISTITUZIONE 
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preferable way of formulation is reflected in Article 2(3) of the 
Spanish Organic Law on Universities of 2001:153 “The activity of the 
university and its autonomy are based on the principle of academic 
freedom, which encompasses the freedom to teach, carry out research 
and study.” A problem at another level may be identified in 
Section 14 of the Irish Universities Act of 1997.154 Whereas 
Paragraph 2 provides a definition of academic freedom, Paragraph 1 
lays down inter alia these two principles that rank on a par: on the 
one hand, a university is “to preserve and promote the traditional 
principles of academic freedom,” while, on the other hand, in 
regulating its affairs, “it shall have regard to . . . the effective and 
efficient use of resources.” This seems to imply the legitimacy of 
trade-offs between academic freedom and purely economic 
considerations. It is one thing to say that institutional accountability 
entails the efficient use of resources, but yet another—and fatal—to 
state that academic freedom may find its limits in an economic 
calculus.155 
 A third group of HE systems (held to be in “partial compliance”), 
namely those of Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Cyprus, the 
Netherlands, and Poland, merely refer to the principle of academic 
freedom in their HE legislation.156 Article 1.6. (Chapter 1, Title 1) of 
the Dutch Law on Provisions concerning Higher Education and 
Scientific Research of 1992,157 for example, solely states that “[a]t the 
institutions, academic freedom shall be respected.” 
 The legislation in a fourth group of HE systems, those of 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, does address academic freedom, but in a less satisfactory 
way than that in the previous group (“between partial and non-
                                                                                                                            
DEL MINISTERO DELL’UNIVERSITÀ E DELLA RICERCA SCIENTIFICA E TECNOLOGICA, GAZZ. 
UFF. May 11, 1989, No. 108, S.O.), Article 74 of the Portuguese Law on the Legal 
Status of Institutions of Higher Education of 2007 (LEI n.º 62/2007 de 10 de Setembro, 
REGIME JURÍDICO DAS INSTITUIÇÕES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA 1st 
Ser., No. 174, Sept. 10, 2007), and Article 6 of the Slovene Law on Higher Education of 
1993 (ZAKON O VISOKEM ŠOLSTVU [ZVIS], URADNI LIST RS, No. 67/93, Dec. 17, 1993). 
 153.  LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2001, de 21 de diciembre, DE UNIVERSIDADES, BOE 
No. 307, Dec. 24, 2001. 
 154.  Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24 of 1997). 
 155.  Similar formulations may be found in Article 4(3) of the Greek Law 
No. 4009 on Structure, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies and 
Internationalization of Higher Education Institutions of 2011 (Nόµoς υπ’ αριθ. 4009, 
Δοµή, λειτουργία, διασφάλιση της ποιότητας των σπουδών και διεθνοποίηση των ανωτάτων 
εκπαιδευτικών ιδρυµάτων, ΕΦΗΜΕΡΊΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΉΣΕΩΣ, Τεύχος Πρώτο, Αρ. Φύλλου 195 
[GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 1st Iss., Ref. Sheet 195], Sept. 6, 2011, 4255) and 
Article 118(1) of the Romanian National Education Law of 2011 (LEGEA EDUCAŢIEI 
NAŢIONALE 2011, supra note 149). 
 156.  In the case of Italy and Portugal, HE legislation contains more than mere 
references to academic freedom. The overall situation in these countries, however, 
reflects a situation best described to be in “partial compliance.” 
 157.  WET van 8 oktober 1992, HOUDENDE BEPALINGEN MET BETREKKING TOT 
HET HOGER ONDERWIJS EN WETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK [WHW], STB. 1992, 593. 
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compliance”). There may, therefore, be a mere reference to academic 
freedom, simultaneously flawed in some respect or another, or there 
may be more structured provisions, which, however, fall seriously 
short of the standards defined in UNESCO’s Recommendation. 
Section 14(6) of the Danish (Consolidation) Act on Universities of 
2012,158 for instance, provides: 
Academic staff enjoy freedom of research (“forskningsfrihed”) and, within the 
bounds of the university’s research strategy, are free to perform independent 
research during the time when not performing allocated tasks . . . . Academic 
staff may not be directed to perform specific tasks during the entirety of their 
working hours for an extended period of time, which would in essence deprive 
them of their freedom of research (“forskningsfrihed”). 
Restricting the enjoyment of freedom of research and academic 
freedom to the time when academic staff work on independent 
research seriously depletes the meaning of this right. Academic staff 
must enjoy academic freedom whenever acting in their academic 
capacity. The exact nature of their entitlements, of course, will 
depend on the particular circumstance. To mention another example, 
the United Kingdom’s Education Reform Act of 1988,159 in Section 
202(2)(a), stipulates that “academic staff have freedom within the law 
to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas 
and controversial or unpopular opinions.” However, the Act 
recognizes this freedom only whilst simultaneously, and in the 
context of, abolishing academic tenure. In terms of Sections 202 to 
204, university commissioners are to be appointed to ensure that 
dismissals notably for reasons of redundancy (which the Act 
legitimizes) do not violate academic freedom. It seems that, in 
practice, no such commissioners have been appointed to perform that 
function. Altogether, the Act reflects a minimalist view of academic 
freedom.160 
 Finally, there is a fifth group of HE systems (Estonia and Malta), 
whose HE legislation contains no reference to academic freedom 
whatsoever (“non-compliance”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 158.  BEKENDTGØRELSE AF LOV OM UNIVERSITETER [UNIVERSITETSLOVEN], LBK 
No. 960, Aug. 14, 2014. 
 159.  Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40. 
 160.  See BARENDT, supra note 22, at 73–116 (for an analysis of the legal 
protection of academic freedom in the UK); see id. at 316–17 (for a select bibliography 
of relevant literature on the situation in the UK). 
644  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [vol. 49:597 
Table 2: Country Ranking: Express Protection of Academic 
Freedom in HE Legislation 
Country 
Percentage & Score out 
of 20 in parentheses 
1. Austria, Croatia, France, North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany), Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia 
100    (20) 
2. Germany 87.5   (17.5) 
3. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Bavaria (Germany), Ireland, Luxemburg, 
Romania, Spain 
75      (15) 
Average 59.38 (11.88) 
4. Belgium, Cyprus, Flanders (Belgium), 
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Wallonia (Belgium) 
50      (10) 
5. Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
25      (5) 
6. Estonia, Malta 0        (0) 
C. The Protection of Institutional Autonomy in Higher Education 
Legislation 
 HE legislation should expressly provide for HE institutions to be 
autonomous, detailing the various constituent elements of meaningful 
autonomy (organizational, financial, staffing, and academic), to then 
weave the parameters of these into the fabric of the legislative 
framework as a whole. Thirty HE systems having been assessed, the 
HE Acts of nine contain an express and adequate provision on 
autonomy, twenty an express but in certain respects problematic or 
incomplete provision, and one a seriously deficient provision.161 
 Article 2 of the Spanish Organic Law on Universities of 2001,162 
for example, contains a provision on university autonomy by and 
large satisfying criteria to be considered “adequate.” Paragraph 1 
specifies that universities are endowed with legal personality and 
carry out their functions autonomously, and it stresses that the 
objective of autonomy is achievement of the goals of university 
education defined in the Law. Paragraph 2 goes on to mention 
various aspects covered by autonomy, including, for instance, 
development of the university statutes; election, designation, and 
                                                                                                                            
 161.  See infra Annex, Indicator C.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg., 
Croat., Czech Rep., Fin., Lith., Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain; Partial compliance = Aus., 
Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Den., Est., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, 
Ir., Italy, Lat., Lux., Neth., Malta, Pol., Slovn., Swed., U.K.; Non-compliance = Hung). 
 162.  LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2001 DE UNIVERSIDADES, supra note 153. 
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removal of the governing and representative organs; creation of 
specific structures supporting teaching and research; development of 
syllabuses; selection and promotion of teaching, research, and 
administrative staff, and the determination of their working 
conditions; admission of students; preparation of budgets and 
administration of assets; and establishment of relations with other 
relevant organizations. Accordingly, it broadly encompasses all four 
elements of autonomy. Additionally, it is stated that universities have 
“[a]ny other competence necessary for the appropriate fulfillment of 
[their] functions.” Paragraph 3 underlines that university autonomy 
is based on academic freedom. Paragraph 4, finally, points out that 
universities are accountable to society for the use of their means and 
resources.163 
 Externally, university autonomy should be buttressed by 
guaranteeing the inviolability of university premises, a principle long 
since recognized by human rights bodies.164 Article 55 of Croatia’s 
Act on Science and Higher Education of 2013,165 for example, 
provides 
(1) The premises of the university shall be inviolable. 
(2) Competent state bodies may enter the premises of the university only 
with the consent of its head, pursuant to a decision of a competent court or if 
there is immediate danger to life and health of persons or to property. 
(3) Search of the premises of the university may exceptionally be ordered 
only by a competent court if all conditions prescribed by the Criminal 
Procedure Act are fulfilled. 
                                                                                                                            
 163.  For some more recent literature on academic freedom, institutional 
autonomy, and self-governance in Spain, see, e.g., Enriqueta Expósito, Libertad de 
cátedra del professor universitario: Contenido y amenazas en el contexto actual de 
reforma del modelo de universidad pública, LA REVISTA DE EDUCACIÓN Y DERECHO No. 
7 (2013); Lucas A. Galindo, Academic Freedom and Higher Education Regulations: 
Spanish Universities before the European Systems, 2 J.L. & CONFLICT RESOL. 20 (2010); 
Georgeta Ion & Diego Castro, Governance in Spanish Universities: Changing 
Paradigms, 11 J. HISP. HIGH. EDUC. 336 (2012); Juan Pérez de Munguía, New 
Requirements for Higher Education, Academic Freedom and Business Interests, 
ESPECIAL EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR No. 10, 37 (2009); David Vallespín Pérez, La 
gobernanza de la universidad: El camino hacia un “Cambio Razonable” compatible con 
el respeto de la autonomía universitaria y la libertad de cátedra, LA REVISTA DE 
EDUCACIÓN Y DERECHO No. 7 (2013). 
 164.  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supervising 
implementation of the ICESCR, has thus, following the examination of state reports, 
expressed its concern in cases where university campuses have been put under military 
guardianship or has commented that “police presence on university campuses may 
infringe on the freedoms necessary for academic and cultural expression.” See BEITER, 
supra note 30, at 599–600. 
 165.  ZAKON O ZNANSTVENOJ DJELATNOSTI I VISOKOM OBRAZOVANJU 2013, supra 
note 144. 
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(4) A search on the premises of a higher education institution may be 
undertaken in the absence of its head, or the person authorized by him or her, 
only if he or she has not responded to a timely notification without justified 
reason. 
Similar provisions may be found in the HE Acts of Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Universities in Greece 
benefited from a very wide “university asylum” in the past. This has 
been abolished in the course of the reform of university laws in 2011 
and thereafter,166 and the new laws do not mention the principle of 
the inviolability of university premises.167 
 Concerning the assessment of institutional autonomy in detail in 
terms of compliance (or not) with certain key requirements on 
organizational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy (i.e., 
requirements, compliance with which may be considered to be highly 
indicative of a more general compliance with institutional autonomy), 
the following may be stated:168 Regarding determination of the rector: 
The state should not be involved in this; that is, the rector should not 
be required to be appointed or the election to be confirmed by the 
state—also not formally at the highest executive level by the state 
president, the cabinet, or a minister, as this conveys an undesirable 
image of “closeness” of state and HE institutions. In fourteen of the 
HE systems examined, the state is involved in the process in some 
way or another—usually in the stated symbolic manner.169 
 Regarding competence to decide on internal structures, the law 
should clearly not prescribe the specific faculties, departments, or 
institutes to be created. Article 15(3) of the Law of 12 August 2003 on 
the University of Luxemburg,170 for example, prescribes a Faculty of 
Science, Technology, and Communication; a Faculty of Law, 
Economics, and Finances; and a Faculty of Letters, Human Sciences, 
Arts, and Educational Sciences. The state should further not be 
                                                                                                                            
 166.  See, e.g., William Dearden, Tackling Ancient Problems: Higher Education 
Reform in Greece, 30 PERSP. BUS. & ECON. (Greece: The Epic Battle for Economic 
Recovery) 75, 75–81 (2012). 
 167.  On the situation of Greek HE following the most far-reaching reforms in 
this sphere since the HE law of 1982, see, e.g., id.; Dionysios Gouvias, The Post-Modern 
Rhetoric of Recent Reforms in Greek Higher Education, 10 J. CRIT. EDUC. POL’Y STUD. 
282 (2012); Vangelis Tsiligiris, The Debt Crisis and Higher Education Reforms in 
Greece: A Catalyst for Change, 4 ANGLOHIGHER 15 (2012). 
 168.  For an assessment of compliance by European states in the light of the 
indicators addressed in this paragraph (but also other indicators), see ESTERMANN ET 
AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 20–52. 
 169.  See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.1.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus., 
Belg. (nl.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Den., Est., Fin., Fr., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Lith., Malta, 
Pol., Slovn., U.K.; Partial compliance = Neth., Port.; Non-compliance = Belg. (fr.), Czech 
Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Lux., Rom., Slovk., Spain, Swed.). 
 170.  LOI du 12 août 2003 PORTANT CRÉATION DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG, 
MEMORIAL JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE LUXEMBOURG A – No. 149, 
Oct. 6, 2003, 2989. 
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required to set up or dissolve faculties, departments, or institutes or 
to confirm their establishment/dissolution (the latter being the case, 
for example, in Cyprus), and it should not of itself be able to create a 
faculty, department, or institute within a HE institution (e.g., 
Romania).171 
 Financial autonomy requires, amongst others, that HE 
institutions receive state funds as a block grant (global budgets), 
leaving them “free to divide and distribute their funding internally 
according to their needs.” Whereas eleven HE systems fully comply 
with this requirement, another seventeen accept it in principle but 
apply minor restrictions. It appears that only Cyprus and Greece still 
make use of a line-item budget, which “pre-allocates university 
funding to cost items and/or activities.”172 
 HE institutions should further be competent to acquire funding 
additional to that directly allocated by the state from various sources. 
Notably, they should be able to perform (publicly or privately) 
commissioned research against payment. Although this is the case in 
all HE systems analyzed,173 not all of them clearly spell this out in 
their primary legislation.174 While not all the powers of HE 
institutions need to be elaborated on in parliamentary legislation, 
core competences entailed by institutional autonomy should be 
addressed in primary legislation. 
 Staffing autonomy means that the law should lay down a 
minimum of detail regarding the academic positions available and the 
requirements for positions. In the United Kingdom, in fact, the law 
refrains from regulating these matters. In Finland, a minimum of 
detail is laid down; Section 31 of the Finnish Universities Act of 
2009175 merely states that “[a] university has professors and other 
teaching and research staff,” leaving the detail to be dealt with in 
university regulations. Further, there should be no or only minor 
                                                                                                                            
 171.  This is not to say that the state may not encourage and promote certain 
structural developments within HE institutions. See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.1.2. 
(noting that, Full compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Den., Est., Fin., N.R.W. 
(F.R.G.), Ir., Lat., Lith., Pol., Slovn., Swed., U.K.; Partial compliance = Croat., Czech 
Rep., Fr., Hung., Italy, Malta, Neth., Port., Slovk.; Non-compliance = Bulg., Cyprus, 
Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Lux., Rom., Spain). 
 172.  ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 30–31; see infra Annex, 
Indicator C.2.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Den., Est., N.R.W. 
(F.R.G.), Ir., Italy, Lux., Neth., Spain, U.K.; Partial compliance = Belg. (fr.), Bulg., 
Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.) (in the process of moving from line-item to global 
budgets), Hung., Fin., Fr., Lat., Lith., Malta, Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Swed.; 
Non-compliance = Cyprus, Greece). 
 173.  See EURYDICE, supra note 102, at 77–78. 
 174.  See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus., 
Bulg., Croat., Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Lat., Lith., Lux., Pol., 
Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain; Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Czech 
Rep., Greece, Hung., Ir., Italy, Malta, Neth., Slovn., Swed., U.K.; Non-compliance = 
none). 
 175.  YLIOPISTOLAKI (LAG), No. 558/2009, July 24, 2009. 
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restrictions concerning the recruitment and promotion of academic 
staff at faculties and departments. There should also be no 
requirement to the effect that the appointment of professors be 
performed or confirmed by the state. For instance, the Bavarian 
Higher Education Institution Personnel Law of 2006 (Germany) 
stipulates that, in principle, the competence to decide on the 
appointment of professors rests with the responsible minister.176 
 With regard to the selection of first-cycle (Bachelor) students, HE 
institutions should be granted the competence to determine the 
selection criteria for and conduct the actual selection of such students 
largely themselves. This is the case in nine HE systems. In thirteen, 
the responsibilities in this regard are shared between the state and 
HE institutions. In eight, the state plays a dominant role in this 
respect.177 
 Finally, considering that quality control in HE should essentially 
be left to be organized by HE institutions themselves (jointly and/or 
severally), the requirement of having degree programs accredited 
must be considered inimical to academic autonomy. Only six of the 
HE systems examined dispense with the requirement of accreditation 
of first-cycle programs.178 
 Generally addressing the extent of government powers regarding 
HE institutions, a reading of a state’s HE legislation should reflect 
wide competences for HE institutions and a minimal measure of 
involvement of the state in regulating their activity. This is not to say 
that the state does not retain ultimate responsibility in respect of the 
HE sector. Article 121 of the Romanian National Education Law of 
2011179 thus states that “[t]he Ministry of Education, 
Research, . . . controls the way universities exercise their autonomy, 
                                                                                                                            
 176. GESETZ ÜBER DIE RECHTSVERHÄLTNISSE DER HOCHSCHULLEHRER UND 
HOCHSCHULLEHRERINNEN SOWIE DES WEITEREN WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN UND 
KÜNSTLERISCHEN PERSONALS AN DEN HOCHSCHULEN [BAYERISCHES 
HOCHSCHULPERSONALGESETZ – BAYHSCHPG], May 23, 2006, GVBL. 2006, 230, 
Art. 18(6), (10); see infra Annex, Indicator C.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Fin., 
Malta, Neth., Swed., U.K.; Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Den., Est., N.R.W. 
(F.R.G.), Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Pol., Slovn.; Non-compliance = Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., 
Cyprus, Czech Rep., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain). 
 177.  See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.4.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Croat., 
Est., Fin., Hung., Ir., Italy, Lux., Malta, U.K.; Partial compliance = Bulg., Cyprus, 
Czech Rep., Lat., Lith., Neth., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, Swed.; Non-
compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Den., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), 
Greece). 
 178.  See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.4.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus., 
Croat., Ir., Lux., Malta, U.K.; Partial compliance = Belg. (fr.), Est., Fin., Pol.; Non-
compliance = Belg. (nl.), Bulg., Cyprus, Czech Rep., Den., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. 
(F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Lith., Neth., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, 
Swed.). 
 179.  LEGEA EDUCA IEI NA IONALE 2011, supra note 149. 
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assume their overall and their own mission and exercise their 
accountability.”180 
 The state should, however, merely supervise whether legal 
requirements have been complied with (German: “Rechtsaufsicht”), 
but not review decisions on their merits (German: “Fachaufsicht”). 
HE institutions should be in a position to enact most regulations and 
take most decisions without these requiring prior approval or 
subsequent confirmation by the state. Section 5 of the Austrian 
Universities Act of 2002181 thus stresses that universities are not 
subject to ministerial instructions. In Section 45 then, the Act states 
that universities “shall be subject to supervision by the Federal 
Government. This shall comprise monitoring of compliance with laws 
and regulations, including the university statutes (legal 
supervision).” In a handful of the HE systems examined, HE 
legislation reflects a very high degree of proximity between state and 
universities. In terms of the Danish (Consolidation) Act on 
Universities of 2012,182 for example, the responsible minister is 
granted wide-ranging competences to regulate matters or to lay down 
general or specific rules on a variety of topics, using formulations 
such as “The minister may set maximum enrolment quotas for degree 
programmes,”183 “The minister shall lay down the rules regulating 
the acquisition of doctoral degrees,”184 “The minister shall lay down 
rules regarding the education provided, including tests, examinations 
and grading,”185 or “The minister may lay down rules on the 
appointment of academic staff and teachers.”186 Most of the HE 
systems examined may be considered to be in “partial compliance,” 
and about one fifth in “full compliance,” in respect of ensuring that 
                                                                                                                            
 180.  On university autonomy and academic freedom in Romania, see, e.g., 
Camelia F. Stoica & Marieta Safta, University Autonomy and Academic Freedom: 
Meaning and Legal Basis, 2 PERSP. BUS. L.J. 192 (2013). 
 181.  UNIVERSITÄTSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144. 
 182.  UNIVERSITETSLOVEN 2014, supra note 158. 
 183.  Id. § 4(5). 
 184.  Id. § 6(2). 
 185.  Id. § 8(1). 
 186.  Id. § 29(3). On the extensive regulation of the HE sector by the Danish 
government in furthering HE “as a component of the national economy” and limited 
self-governance in Danish universities, see, e.g., Evanthia Kalpazidou Schmidt & 
Kamma Langberg, Academic Autonomy in a Rapidly Changing Higher Education 
Framework: Academia on the Procrustean Bed?, 39 EUR. EDUC. 80 (2007–08); Susan 
Wright & Rebecca Boden, Markets, Managerialism, and Measurement: Organisational 
Transformations of Universities in UK and Denmark, in UNIVERSITY PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT: THE SILENT MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION AT DANISH UNIVERSITIES 79 
(Jens E. Kristensen et al. eds., 2011); Susan Wright & Jakob W. Ørberg, Autonomy and 
Control: Danish University Reform in the Context of Modern Governance, 1 LEARNING & 
TEACHING 27 (2008). 
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their HE legislation reflects restraint in granting governments 
powers to regulate HE institutions.187 
 Finally, the independence of HE institutions vis-à-vis private 
interests should enjoy a notable measure of protection in HE 
legislation. There should be a clear statement emphasizing that 
private funding may not compromise the independence of teaching 
and research in HE institutions, linking this to an obligation of HE 
institutions to reveal the sources and scope of private funding. It 
seems only one HE system roughly complies with this requirement. 
The recent Act on the Future of Higher Education of September 2014 
of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany),188 in Section 71 on “Third 
party-funded research,” provides that a member of the academic staff 
may undertake such research, “provided this does not prejudice the 
performance of other tasks of the HE institution, his or her freedom 
in science, research, teaching and study as well as the rights and 
duties of other persons” (§ 71(2)). In Section 71a, entitled 
“Transparency regarding third party-funded research,” the HE Act 
then calls upon “[t]he rector [to inform] the public in an adequate 
manner about completed research projects in terms of [Section] 71(1)” 
(§ 71a(1)). A similar requirement, obliging public research 
institutions to provide an annual overview of private financing of 
research conducted at such institutions, also exists in Denmark. This 
has not been provided for in terms of legislation, however, but by way 
of guidelines issued by the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation.189 In sum, one HE system may be held to be in “full 
compliance,” five in “partial compliance,” and all the others in “non-
compliance,” with the requirement of adopting legislation protecting 
the independence of HE institutions against threats to autonomy 
emanating from private sources.190 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 187.  See infra Annex, Indicator C.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg. (nl.), 
Fin., Ir., Lat., U.K.; Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Czech 
Rep., Est., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Italy, Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., 
Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain; Non-compliance = Den., Hung., Swed.). 
 188.  HOCHSCHULZUKUNFTSGESETZ [HZG NRW], Sept. 16, 2014, GV. NRW. 
2014, No. 27, Sept. 29, 2014, 543. 
 189.  See EURYDICE, supra note 102, at 85. 
 190.  On accountability measures for private funds in HE in Europe, see id.; see 
infra Annex, Indicator C.4. (noting that, Full compliance = N.R.W. (F.R.G.); Partial 
compliance = Aus., Croat., Cyprus, Den., Italy; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), 
Bulg., Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., 
Malta, Neth., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, Swed., U.K.). 
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Table 3: Country Ranking: Protection of Institutional 
Autonomy in HE Legislation 
Country 
Percentage & Score out of 20 
in parentheses 
1. Finland 75      (15) 
2. United Kingdom 67.5   (13.5) 
3. Croatia, North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany) 
65      (13) 
4. Ireland 62.5   (12.5) 
5. Austria 60      (12) 
6. Lithuania 55      (11) 
7. Estonia, Flanders (Belgium), Malta 52.5   (10.5) 
8. Latvia 50      (10) 
9. Poland 47.5   (9.5) 
Average 46.29 (9.26) 
10. Germany 46.25 (9.25) 
11. Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal 
45      (9) 
12. Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 42.5   (8.5) 
13. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Romania 40      (8) 
14. France 35      (7) 
15. Sweden, Wallonia (Belgium) 32.5   (6.5) 
16. Bavaria (Germany) 27.5   (5.5) 
17. Greece 22.5   (4.5) 
18. Hungary 12.5   (2.5) 
D. The Protection of Academic Self-Governance in Higher Education 
Legislation 
 Also the core elements of the right of academic self-governance 
should be clearly articulated in HE legislation and then be given 
concrete shape in the various provisions on the 
institutional/faculty/departmental governing and representative 
organs of HE institutions. The right of self-governance being a central 
component of meaningful academic freedom, HE legislation that does 
not articulate and operationalize its essential features does not 
comply with the right to academic freedom. Granted, it is in the 
interest of enhanced institutional autonomy to leave the regulation of 
many aspects in this context to institutions of HE themselves; 
nevertheless, criteria such as those requiring academic staff to be 
able to elect a majority of representatives to the senate or requiring 
them to be entitled to exercise “control” over who is chosen as the 
rector, need to be guaranteed at the level of primary legislation. 
Where the United Kingdom’s Education Reform Act of 1988 thus 
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merely refers to “the academic board of an institution,” providing no 
further particulars,191 this falls short of minimum standards of 
compliance. The same holds true where HE legislation does not deal 
with issues of governance at faculty/departmental level at all, as is 
the case, for example, in Flanders (Belgium), Ireland, or Lithuania. 
 Of the thirty HE systems having been assessed, the HE Acts of 
only three contain an express and adequate provision on self-
governance, twelve an express, but in certain respects problematic or 
incomplete provision, and fifteen no express provision.192 An example 
of an express and adequate provision on self-governance would 
perhaps be that of Section 26 of the Latvian Law on Institutions of 
Higher Education of 1995:193 
(3) A staff member shall have the right to participate in the governance of an 
institution of higher education and decisions of self-governance, and the 
formulation of internal laws and regulations of that institution, in accordance 
with the constitution of the institution, as well as to take part in the taking of 
decisions related to the interests of staff, to participate in the meetings of 
collegial governing bodies of an institution of higher education, and to be given 
the opportunity to be heard. 
(4) A staff member shall have the right to participate in elections of self-
governance of an institution of higher education and to be elected therein. 
 A majority—ideally between 60 and 70 percent—of the members 
of the senate (or its equivalent) should be representatives of academic 
staff. Students should, however, also be adequately represented.194 
Article 12(1) of the University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 2013,195 for 
example, provides that the senate is to consist of the rector and the 
vice-rectors (elected from among the professors by the boards of the 
departments (i.e., academic staff and student representatives)), the 
deans of faculties (elected from among the professors and associate 
professors by the boards of the departments of the faculties 
concerned), three representatives of the teaching staff of each faculty 
elected by the board of the faculty (i.e., certain academic staff and 
student representatives), and the representatives of the students 
                                                                                                                            
 191.  Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, § 125(2), sched. 7A, para. 3. 
 192.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Bay. 
(F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Lat.; Partial compliance = Aus., Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., 
Den., Fr., Lith., Neth., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk.; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), 
Cyprus, Est., Fin., Greece, Hung., Ir., Italy, Lux., Malta, Slovn., Spain, Swed., U.K.). 
 193.  AUGSTSKOLU LIKUMS 1995, supra note 150. 
 194.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus., 
Cyprus, Hung., Italy, Spain; Partial compliance = Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., 
Den., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Ir., Lat., Lux., Malta, Pol., Port., Rom., 
Slovk., Slovn., Swed.; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Est., Fin., Fr., Lith., Neth., U.K.). 
 195.  Οι περί Πανεπιστηµίου Κύπρου Νόµοι του 1989–2013 [University of Cyprus 
Law 1989 to 2013] (Αριθµός 144 τoυ 1989 – Αριθµός 116(Ι) του 2013 [No. 144 of 1989 – 
No. 116(I) of 2013]). 
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(whose number is to correspond to the number of faculties). Clearly, 
there will always be at least 80 percent representatives of academic 
staff on the senate. 
 Quite a number of HE Acts remain vague when providing for the 
composition of the senate (or its equivalent). The Estonian 
Universities Act of 1995 thus provides for academic staff 
representatives on the council of the university, not stipulating how 
many representatives there should be, adding that there may also be 
“other persons prescribed by the statutes” on the council.196 The 
French Code de l’Éducation provides for the conseil académique to 
comprise members of the commission de la recherche and the 
commission de la formation et de la vie universitaire. Depending on 
how exactly the provisions of the Education Code are implemented, 
the former may have between 40 and 73 percent representatives of 
academic staff, the latter between 37.5 to 40 percent.197 
 There should further not be too many representatives of students 
on the senate (or its equivalent). In the Czech Republic, there may be 
up to 50 percent representatives of students on the senate.198 
Academic staff other than professors should also be adequately 
represented. In Bavaria (Germany), the ratio of representatives of 
professors to representatives of other academic staff 
(“wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter”) is six to one.199 
 Rectors should be scholars coming from within the HE 
institution they are to serve, the academic staff of that institution 
should be able to exercise “control” over who is chosen as the rector 
(for instance, by holding a majority of votes), rector and staff should 
govern “co-operatively,” and the academic staff should also be able to 
exercise “control” over the rector’s dismissal by means of a vote of no-
confidence. Although principles of “managerial efficiency” may 
perhaps call for a different governance regime, the one above is that 
most beneficial to promoting “the free search for truth” and is 
required in terms of human rights criteria, including the principles of 
self-governance and collegiality as enshrined in the UNESCO 
Recommendation.200 
                                                                                                                            
 196.  ÜLIKOOLISEADUS, Jan. 12, 1995, RIIGI TEATAJA RT I 1995, 12, 119, § 14(2). 
 197.  See CODE DE L’ÉDUCATION, arts. L. 712-4–L. 712-6; see BEAUD, supra note 
121 (for an analysis of the protection of the right to academic freedom in France). 
 198.  ZÁKON 111/1998 Sb., Apr. 22, 1998, O VYSOKÝCH ŠKOLÁCH A O ZMĚNĚ A 
DOPLNĚNÍ DALŠÍCH ZÁKONŮ [ZÁKON O VYSOKÝCH ŠKOLÁCH] [Act on Higher Education 
Institutions], SBÍRKA ZÁKONŮ ČR No. 39/1998, 5388, § 8(1). 
 199.  BAYERISCHES HOCHSCHULGESETZ [BAYHSCHG] 2006, supra note 141, 
art. 25(1). 
 200.  See Georg Krücken, Lässt sich Wissenschaft managen?, 41 
WISSENSCHAFTSRECHT 345 (2008) (generally expressing doubt as to whether science 
and research are susceptible to “management principles” whatsoever). 
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 Article 20(2) of the Spanish Organic Law on Universities of 
2001,201 for example, states that “[t]he rector shall be elected . . . from 
among officials of the body of university professors (“cuerpo de 
catedráticos de universidad”) active in it.” Clearly, the rector here is 
“a scholar” coming from within the HE institution. The assessment 
has shown that rectors increasingly may come from outside the 
institution and often it is not expressly stated that they should be 
academics.202 
 Regarding the particular manner in which rectors are chosen, 
the models employed in this respect in the HE systems examined are 
highly varied.203 Academic staff may be entitled to directly elect the 
head of the institution. Pursuant to the Wallonian Loi sur 
l’organisation de l’enseignement universitaire par l’Etat of 1953 
(Belgium), the rector is elected from among the ordinary professors of 
the university by academic staff, administrative personnel, and 
students, with the vote of academic staff weighted 75 percent.204 The 
government then appoints the rector.205 Article 23 of the Slovene Law 
on Higher Education of 1993206 provides that “[t]he rector shall be 
elected by all higher education teachers, scientific staff and higher 
education employees . . . . Students shall also have a voting right—
namely, a fifth of the votes . . . .” Academic staff may be entitled to 
take part in the rector’s election indirectly through the senate (or its 
equivalent). Section 10(2) of Slovakia’s Act on Higher Education 
Institutions of 2002207 thus stipulates that “[t]he rector shall be 
appointed and dismissed at the proposal of the senate . . . by the 
President of the Slovak Republic.” 
 The general trend, however, is “to do away with” direct or 
indirect participation of academic staff and to have the rector 
appointed by a “third body,” to wit HE institution boards, with many 
introduced in the wake of “new university management” policies en 
vogue since the 1990s. Customarily, all or the majority of the 
                                                                                                                            
 201.  LEY ORGÁNICA 6/2001 DE UNIVERSIDADES, supra note 153. 
 202.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg. 
(nl.), Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Pol., Spain; Partial compliance = Den., Est., Fin., 
Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Lith., Lux., Port., Rom.; Non-compliance = 
Aus., Czech Rep., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Malta, Neth., Slovk., Slovn., Swed., U.K.). 
 203.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Slovn.; 
Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Czech Rep., 
Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain; 
Non-compliance = Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Ir., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., Swed., U.K.). 
The assessment has also taken into account whether or not general principles of 
democratic elections/selection procedures have been complied with. 
 204.  LOI SUR L’ORGANISATION DE L’ENSEIGNEMENT UNIVERSITAIRE PAR L’ÉTAT, 
Law 11338, Apr. 28, 1953, MONITEUR BELGE, May 1, 1953, art. 11. 
 205.  Id. art. 6. 
 206.  ZAKON O VISOKEM ŠOLSTVU [ZVIS] 1993, supra note 152. 
 207.  ZÁKONY 131/2002 Z.z., Feb. 21, 2002, O VYSOKÝCH ŠKOLÁCH A O ZMENE A 
DOPLNENÍ NIEKTORÝCH ZÁKONOV, ZBIERKE ZÁKONOV No. 58/2002, 1462. 
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members of these boards are external, representing a variety of 
interests—including government and corporate. The bodies 
sometimes merely perform a supervisory function, but in many cases 
they play a decisive role in strategic decision-making.208 Under the 
Maltese Education Act of 1988, the council, “the supreme governing 
body of the university,”209 thus elects the rector. There must be 
external members on the council, and, depending on the 
circumstances, “academic” members would constitute between 10 and 
45 percent of council members.210 In the Netherlands, the Law on 
Provisions concerning Higher Education and Scientific Research of 
1992 envisages all members of the rectorate (college van bestuur), 
including the rector, to be appointed by the supervisory board (raad 
van toezicht), consisting of three to five external members, appointed 
by the minister.211 In terms of the Swedish Higher Education Act of 
1992 and the accompanying Ordinance of 1993, the government is to 
appoint a rector based on the proposal of the board of governors, the 
latter making the proposal following consultations with academic and 
other staff, and students.212 The board roughly comprises 50 percent 
external members, appointed by the government, and 25 percent 
representatives of academic staff and students, respectively.213 
 A study of HE laws shows that the dismissal of rectors follows a 
similar logic as the particular manner in which they are chosen, 
discussed above. Some HE systems leave the powers in this respect to 
academic staff. In Estonia, the university council (the equivalent of a 
senate) may thus, by virtue of Section 14(3)(18) of the Universities 
Act of 1995,214 adopt a vote of no-confidence in the rector. Article 2(e) 
of the Italian Law of 30 December 2010, No. 240, on Rules on the 
Organization of Universities, Academic Staff and Recruitment, as 
well as Governance to Enhance the Quality and Efficiency of the 
University System,215 provides that the senate is to be granted the 
competence “to propose to the electorate with a majority of at least 
                                                                                                                            
 208.  Attesting to these developments, but commenting on them neutrally, see 
EURYDICE, supra note 102, at 33–42; ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 
20–29. 
 209.  Education Act, Act XXIV of 1988 (Cap. 327, Laws of Malta, 1988), art. 77. 
 210.  See id. arts. 74(10), 76. 
 211.  WET OP HET HOGER ONDERWIJS EN WETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK [WHW] 
1992, supra note 157, ch. 9, tit. 1, arts. 9.3.1.–2., 9.7., 9.8.1.a. 
 212.  HÖGSKOLEFÖRORDNING, Feb. 4, 1993, SFS No. 1993:100, ch. 2, §§ 8, 11. 
 213.  HÖGSKOLELAG, Dec. 17, 1992, SFS No. 1992:1434, ch. 2, § 4; 
HÖGSKOLEFÖRORDNING 1993, ch. 2, §§ 1, 7a, 7b. 
 214.  ÜLIKOOLISEADUS 1995, supra note 196. 
 215.  LEGGE, 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240, NORME IN MATERIA DI ORGANIZZAZIONE 
DELLE UNIVERSITÀ, DI PERSONALE ACCADEMICO E RECLUTAMENTO, NONCHÉ DELEGA AL 
GOVERNO PER INCENTIVARE LA QUALITÀ E L’EFFICIENZA DEL SISTEMA UNIVERSITARIO, 
GAZZ. UFF. Jan. 14, 2011, No. 10, S.O. No. 11. 
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two thirds of its members a motion of no-confidence in the rector.”216 
Nevertheless, also in this respect, the trend is for those systems in 
which the rector is chosen by a board to also grant the board the 
competence to dismiss the rector. Thus, in Denmark or Lithuania, the 
board appoints or elects the rector and dismisses him or her.217 
 In some of the HE systems assessed, the rector and the senate 
(or its equivalent) retain responsibility for strategic decision-making. 
This is so, for example, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, and Romania. In these cases, there may additionally be 
certain other bodies that include external experts, but these are then 
assigned solely advisory or supervisory powers.218 As has been 
pointed out, however, provision is increasingly made for separate 
boards, composed entirely or to a large extent of external members, 
with important decision-making powers in strategic matters. They 
are usually competent to appoint and dismiss rectors, often coming 
from outside the HE institution. The rectors (or sometimes rectorates) 
may be granted far-reaching executive powers. Together, rector and 
board decide on issues such as internal structure, the heads of units, 
teaching and research strategy, budgets, and administrative setup. 
 It may well be asked to what extent the principles of self-
governance and collegiality permit “managerial” governance 
structures to be introduced in HE institutions. Strengthening the 
rector’s (rectorate’s) powers or providing for a board making external 
expertise available and involved in strategic decision-making would 
probably be permissible provided these measures are adequately 
counterbalanced by securing effective participatory and control rights 
for academic staff, ensuring the system of governance does not 
become “detached” from the academic staff whom it should serve.219 
                                                                                                                            
 216.  On recent changes in the governance of HE institutions in Italy, see, e.g., 
Davide Donina et al., Higher Education Reform in Italy: Tightening Regulation Instead 
of Steering at a Distance, 28 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 215 (2015). 
 217.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Rom., 
Spain; Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), 
N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Hung., Italy, Pol., Port., Slovk.; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Cyprus, 
Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Greece, Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Slovn., Swed., U.K.). 
 218.  In terms of the Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995, for example, a 
board of trustees representing the interests of society is to “express its comments” on 
various matters (Higher Education Act 1995, supra note 151, art. 35a–35c). Likewise, 
under the Czech Act on Higher Education Institutions of 1998, a board of trustees 
representing the public interest, apart from granting its consent to certain legal acts, 
“expresses its views” on different issues (ZÁKON O VYSOKÝCH ŠKOLÁCH 1998, supra note 
207, §§ 14–15). 
 219.  See Hamburgisches Hochschulgesetz, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 20, 
2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, at 114–18, ¶¶ 88–95 (Ger.). The court in this case, in the 
German context, pointed out that, where bodies such as the rector (rectorate) or dean 
(dean’s office) are granted substantive decision-making powers that have a bearing on 
science and scholarship, academic staff must retain effective participatory and control 
rights. 
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It is submitted that academic staff should thus retain the power to 
elect the rector from among their midst and, where appropriate, to 
express a lack of confidence in him or her. Further, academic staff 
should ideally have at least 50 percent representation on the 
board.220 An arrangement in terms of which there are principally 
external members on the board, most of whom are determined by 
academic staff, would perhaps still pass muster, but only at the level 
of “partial compliance” (e.g., Austria221). In Portugal, the general 
council (replacing general assembly and senate) has a majority of 
representatives of academic staff and at least 30 percent external 
members.222 The governing authority in Irish universities could 
include up to about 75 percent external members. Representation of 
academic staff may be as low as 13 or as high as somewhat more than 
50 percent.223 In post-1992 English universities, at least half of the 
12 (13) to 24 (25) members of the governing body must be 
“independent.” Up to two members may be teachers at the institution 
nominated by the academic board. There are further one to nine co-
opted members among the members224 who could potentially be 
teachers at the institution.225 
 The above inquiry has been replicated at the level of the units of 
HE institutions (faculties and departments). First of all, have 
collegial bodies been provided for at the faculty and departmental 
level?226 Do these bodies adequately represent academic staff?227 
                                                                                                                            
 220.  Cf. Lewis Elton, Collegiality and Complexity: Humboldt’s Relevance to 
British Universities Today, 62 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 224, 232 (2008) (stressing the need for “a 
democratic form of leadership, distributed throughout an organisation, very different 
from the current form of top-down leadership” in HE); id. at 233 (emphasizing that the 
vice-chancellor should be the “university’s first servant”); Michael Shattock, Re-
balancing Modern Concepts of University Governance, 56 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 235, 240 
(2002) (arguing in support of “moving back to a more evenly balanced approach to 
governance—the ‘shared governance’ concept”). 
 221.  UNIVERSITÄTSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144, § 21(6) (providing that 50 
percent of the board members are “to be determined” by academic staff, and 50 percent 
by the government). 
 222.  LEI n.º 62/2007, REGIME JURÍDICO DAS INSTITUIÇÕES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR, 
supra note 152, art. 81. For an account of the more recent changes in Portuguese HE, 
see, e.g., Antonio Magalhães et al., Governance of Governance in Higher Education: 
Practices and Lessons Drawn from the Portuguese Case, 67 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 295 (2013); 
Rui Santiago & Teresa Carvalho, Managerialism Rhetorics in Portuguese Higher 
Education, 50 MINERVA 511 (2012). 
 223.  Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24 of 1997), § 16. 
 224.  Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, sched. 7A, para. 3 (composition of 
governing body). 
 225.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg., 
Croat., Pol., Port., Slovk.; Between full and partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), 
Czech Rep., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Lat., Lith., Rom., Slovn.; Partial 
compliance = Aus., Cyprus, Est., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Neth., Spain; Between partial and 
non-compliance = Den., Fin., Ir., Italy, Lux., Malta, Swed.; Non-compliance = U.K.). 
 226.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.1.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg. 
(nl.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), 
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Further, are deans and heads of departments required to be scholars 
from within their institution?228 Do academic staff exercise “control” 
over who is chosen as the dean or head of department, or do they 
exercise certain, but more restricted rights of participation in this 
respect, or, in fact, none at all?229 Likewise, are they able to exercise 
“control” over the dean’s or head of department’s dismissal by means 
of a vote of no-confidence, or have they been accorded qualified or no 
rights of participation in this regard?230 The criteria of compliance 
and the rationale underlying these resemble those at the institutional 
level and need not be repeated here. A number of the HE systems 
assessed (Austria, Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) fail to regulate the right 
of self-governance at the unit level whatsoever or they do so in a 
clearly insufficient way. As has been underlined, although the 
particular manner in which governance at the unit level is 
concretized should as far as possible be left to HE institutions 
themselves to decide, human rights aspects of self-governance at this 
level need to be provided for in primary legislation. 
                                                                                                                            
Greece, Italy, Lat., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain; Partial 
compliance = Den., Port.; Non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Hung., Ir., Lith., Swed., 
U.K.). 
 227.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.1.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Cyprus; 
Partial compliance = Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Den., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain; Non-compliance = Aus., 
Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Est., Fin., Fr., Hung., Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Neth., Swed., U.K.). 
 228.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg., 
Cyprus, Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Lux., Slovn., Spain; Partial compliance = Aus., 
Croat., Den., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Malta, Neth., Pol., Rom.; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), 
Belg. (fr.), Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Hung., Ir., Italy, Lat., Lith., Port., Slovk., Swed., 
U.K.). 
 229.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Cyprus, 
Slovn.; Partial compliance = Aus., Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. 
(F.R.G.), Greece, Lat., Lux., Malta, Rom., Slovk., Spain; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), 
Belg. (fr.), Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Hung., Ir., Italy, Lith., Neth., Pol., Port., Swed., U.K.). 
 230.  See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = none; 
Partial compliance = Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Rom., 
Slovk.; Non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Den., Est., Fin., Fr., 
Greece, Hung., Ir., Italy, Lat., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., Port., Slovn., Spain, 
Swed., U.K.). 
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Table 4: Country Ranking: Protection of Academic Self-
Governance in HE Legislation 
Country 
Percentage & Score out of 
20 in parentheses 
1. Bulgaria 72.5   (14.5) 
2. Croatia 70      (14) 
3. Cyprus, North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Germany), Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
62.5   (12.5) 
4. Germany 61.25 (12.25) 
5. Bavaria (Germany), Spain 60      (12) 
6. Portugal 57.5   (12.5) 
7. Czech Republic, Slovenia 55      (11) 
8. Greece, Latvia 52.5   (10.5) 
9. Austria, Hungary 45      (9) 
Average 42.99 (8.6) 
10. Wallonia (Belgium), Italy 40      (8) 
11. Belgium 37.5   (7.5) 
12. Flanders (Belgium) 35      (7) 
13. Denmark, France 32.5   (6.5) 
14. Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta 30      (6) 
15. Netherlands 27.5   (5.5) 
16. Estonia 22.5   (4.5) 
17. Finland, Ireland, Sweden 15      (3) 
18. United Kingdom 0        (0) 
 
E. The Protection of Job Security (including “Tenure”) in Relevant 
Legislation 
 The legal framework governing the duration of contracts of 
service of academic staff in HE at post-entry levels (i.e., following any 
stage of doctoral employment) should envisage permanent contracts 
or commencement on a tenure-track. HE systems whose laws are in 
compliance with this requirement include, among others, Flanders 
(Belgium), Bulgaria, and France.231 Article V.28 of the Flemish 
Codification of the Decretal Provisions concerning Higher Education 
                                                                                                                            
 231.  See infra Annex, Indicator E.1.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg. (nl.), 
Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Fr., Greece, Hung., Port., Spain; Partial compliance = Aus., Cyprus, 
Den., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Italy, Lith., Lux., Rom., Slovn., Swed.; Non-
compliance = Croat., Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Lat., Malta, Neth., Pol., Slovk., U.K.). 
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of 2013 (Belgium)232 thus provides for full-time members of the 
“independent academic staff” to be appointed, further stating that 
[t]he university administration may, in the case of a first appointment as a 
member of the independent academic staff, appoint a person on a fixed-term 
basis . . . for a period not exceeding three years with the prospect of a 
permanent appointment without new vacancy, if the university administration 
assesses the performance of the person concerned positively. 
Article V.29 further provides for an optional tenure-track system (see 
below when addressing the issue of promotion of academic staff). 
 The legal framework of some of the HE systems assessed—for 
example that in place in Austria or the Czech Republic—leaves it to 
HE institutions themselves to decide whether or not to offer 
permanent contracts.233 In these cases, the use of fixed-term 
contracts may be subject to fairly strict limitations as to legitimate 
cases of use, maximum number of successive contracts, and their 
maximum cumulated duration. The Austrian Universities Act of 
2002234 thus states that “[e]mployment contracts for a limited term 
shall, on pain of the invalidity of the employment contract, be 
concluded for a maximum period of six years”235 and that “[t]he 
conclusion of limited-term contracts immediately succeeding each 
other shall only be permissible for staff employed in connection with 
third party-funded or research projects, for staff engaged exclusively 
in teaching as well as for temporary replacement staff,” adding that 
“[t]he total duration of such contracts immediately succeeding each 
other shall not exceed six years . . . .”236 The use of fixed-term 
contracts may, however, also be subject to rather lax requirements. In 
terms of Section 39 of the Czech Labor Code of 2006,237 a fixed-term 
contract may be concluded for a maximum period of three years, it 
being permissible to renew this twice. The overall labor relation can, 
therefore, last up to nine years (3+3+3)! Whereas cases such as that 
of Austria should be held to constitute instances of “partial 
                                                                                                                            
 232.  CODIFICATIE van 11 oktober 2013 VAN DE DECRETALE BEPALINGEN 
BETREFFENDE HET HOGER ONDERWIJS [CODEX HOGER ONDERWIJS], as endorsed by 
DECREET TOT BEKRACHTIGING VAN DE DECRETALE BEPALINGEN BETREFFENDE HET 
HOGER ONDERWIJS, gecodificeerd op 11 oktober 2013 (1), Dec. 20, 2013, BELGISCH 
STAATSBLAD, Feb. 27, 2014. 
 233.  In Austria, in terms of the Collective Agreement for Employees of 
Universities of 2013, permanent contracts are to be concluded with professors (§ 25(3)) 
and associate professor (§ 27(5)). Such security of employment should, however, already 
be available under parliamentary legislation and not depend on volatile collective 
bargaining. 
 234.  UNIVERSITÄTSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144. 
 235.  Id. § 109(1). 
 236.  Id. § 109(2). 
 237.  Zákon 262/2006, Apr. 21, 2006, ZÁKONÍK PRÁCE, SBÍRKA ZÁKON   R 
No. 84/2006, 3146. 
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compliance,” those in the nature of the Czech example should be 
considered cases of “non-compliance.” 
 Clearly also “in non-compliance” are HE systems, whose legal 
framework expressly envisages fixed-term contracts for academic 
staff at post-entry levels, even those with senior positions (associate 
or full professors), with there being little or no prospect of permanent 
contracts being concluded. The Estonian Universities Act of 1995,238 
in Section 39(1), thus states that “[t]he positions of regular teaching 
and research staff at a university shall be filled for up to five years by 
way of public competition with equal conditions for all 
participants . . . .” It is further stipulated, in Section 391(1), that 
“[t]he successive conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts with 
teaching or research staff shall not cause the employment 
relationship to become one for an unlimited term.” In fact, “[a]n 
employment contract for an unlimited term shall [only] be concluded 
with a person who has been employed in the same university and has 
worked as a professor for at least eleven years, following evaluation 
under conditions and procedures established by the council of the 
university”!239 
 In practice, the situation regarding the duration of contracts of 
service is in many instances not as one would expect it to be in terms 
of the letter of the law in force.240 In some cases, protective 
legislation does not actually have a protective effect. Hence, the effect 
of the provisions of the Austrian Universities Act of 2002, referred to 
above, in practice is not that universities conclude permanent 
                                                                                                                            
 238.  ÜLIKOOLISEADUS 1995, supra note 196. 
 239.  Id. § 391(2); see also European Commission, Commission Asks Estonia to 
Apply the Fixed-Term Employment Directive Fully in Academia and the Arts, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 24, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=de& 
catId=157&newsId=1707&furtherNews=yes [https://perma.cc/K389-9CT7] (archived 
Apr. 10, 2016) (reporting that the European Commission has asked Estonia to provide 
fixed-term staff in universities with protection against successive fixed-term 
employment contracts in accordance with Council Directive 99/70, 1999 O.J. (L 175) 43 
(EC) (Directive concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work Concluded 
by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP), this establishing a framework to prevent abuse arising 
from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships). 
Legislative provisions similar to those in Estonia exist in Croatia, Latvia and Slovakia. 
 240.  See infra Annex, Indicator E.1.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg., Fr., 
Greece, Hung., Ir., Malta, Neth., Slovn., Spain, U.K.; Partial compliance = Cyprus, 
Czech Rep., Den., Italy, Pol., Port., Rom., Swed.; Non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), 
Belg. (fr.), Croat., Est., Fin., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Lat., Lith., Lux., Slovk.). 
Various sources of information have been used to assess compliance regarding this 
indicator. See, e.g., Gülay Ates & Angelika Brechelmacher, Academic Career Paths, in 
THE WORK SITUATION OF THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS OF A 
SURVEY IN TWELVE COUNTRIES 13 (Ulrich Teichler & Ester A. Höhle eds., 2013); IDEA 
CONSULT ET AL., SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
CONCERNING MOBILITY PATTERNS AND CAREER PATHS OF RESEARCHERS (Final Report 
MORE2, Prepared for European Commission, Research Directorate-General, Brussels, 
Aug. 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/pdf/research_policies/more2/Final%20report. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3LX-8PAT] (archived Feb. 27, 2016). 
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contracts with academic staff after six years. Rather, they prefer not 
to retain staff. Many Austrian scholars accordingly leave their 
country at that point to find employment abroad.241 In Germany, the 
provisions of the Act on Fixed-Term Contracts of Employment in 
Academia of 2007,242 intended to restrict the use of fixed-term 
contracts, allowing these only where staff are financed primarily out 
of third-party funds, are being abused by converting ordinary 
academic positions into third-party-funded positions.243 In other 
cases, a legal framework may not be in accordance with required 
standards, yet does not prevent a high level of protection in practice. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, despite the absence of 
parliamentary legislation on the matter, almost 90 percent of 
academic staff either have permanent contracts or fixed-term 
contracts with long-term prospects.244 
 The HE legislation of roughly a third of the HE systems assessed 
either contains provisions prohibiting dismissals of academic staff on 
operational grounds (restructuring, down-sizing, reorganization, or 
economic difficulties) or contains provisions laying down protective 
standards for cases where such dismissals take place.245 Ireland and 
Portugal expressis verbis require academic staff to enjoy “tenure.” 
Section 25(6) of the Irish Universities Act of 1997 insists that “[a] 
university . . . shall provide for the tenure of officers.”246 Article 50 of 
the Portuguese Law on the Legal Status of Institutions of Higher 
Education of 2007247 states that, “[s]o as to guarantee their scientific 
and pedagogical autonomy, higher education institutions must have a 
permanent staff of teachers and researchers benefiting from an 
enhanced level of employment stability (tenure).” 
 In the case of Greece and Poland, dismissals of certain academic 
staff for reasons of redundancy are not allowed or restricted. In 
                                                                                                                            
 241.  See Ingrid Brodnig, Österreich vergrault seinen Wissenschaftsnachwuchs, 
ZEIT ONLINE (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.zeit.de/studium/hochschule/2012-01/ 
oesterreich-nachwuchs [https://perma.cc/K27L-2HBV] (archived Feb. 27, 2016); Fabian 
Kretschmer, Ein Vertrag, der die Forschung in Ketten legt, DERSTANDARD.AT (Mar. 7, 
2012), http://derstandard.at/1330390685392/Externe-Lehrbeauftragte-Ein-Vertrag-der-
die-Forschung-in-Ketten-legt [https://perma.cc/KBY4-5PNG] (archived Feb. 27, 2016). 
 242.  GESETZ ÜBER BEFRISTETE ARBEITSVERTRÄGE IN DER WISSENSCHAFT 
[WISSENSCHAFTSZEITVERTRAGSGESETZ – WISSZEITVG], Apr. 12, 2007, BGBL. I, at 506. 
 243.  See, e.g., Annika Sartor, Forschen auf Zeit: Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter 
sind meistens befristet angestellt—Warum eigentlich?, ZEIT ONLINE (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.zeit.de/campus/2013/04/wissenschaftliche-mitarbeiter-befristung [https:// 
perma.cc/SXJ8-7RMX] (archived Feb. 27, 2016). 
 244.  See Ates & Brechelmacher, supra note 240, at 27 (figures for 2007/08). 
 245.  See infra Annex, Indicator E.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Greece; 
Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Fin., Fr., Bay. 
(F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Italy, Pol., Port., Rom., Spain, U.K.; Non-compliance = 
Czech Rep., Den., Est., Hung., Lat., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Slovk., Slovn., Swed.). 
 246.  Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24/1997) (defining the term “officer” in § 3). 
 247.  LEI n.º 62/2007, REGIME JURÍDICO DAS INSTITUIÇÕES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR, 
supra note 152. 
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Greece, professors may only be dismissed for reasons of a criminal 
conviction, a grave disciplinary breach, illness or disability, or 
professional incompetence.248 In Poland, those “appointed” to their 
position and holding the title of “professor” may generally not be 
dismissed for reasons of redundancy.249 
 In the case of Austria, Finland, and the United Kingdom, HE 
legislation contains provisions to the effect that a contract of service 
may not be terminated because a member of the academic staff has 
exercised his or her freedom to teach or carry out research, precluding 
“redundancy” serving as a pretext for “getting rid of” certain members 
of staff.250 The Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995,251 in 
Article 58(1)(3), countenances dismissals for reasons of redundancy, 
but only if there are no opportunities for reallocation to another 
department or re-qualification in a related discipline. 
 In a number of HE systems, all members or at least senior 
members of the academic staff are civil/public servants or public 
sector workers (i.e., not “ordinary” employees in terms of private law). 
This status may entail their dismissal on operational grounds being 
excluded (even where HE legislation does not expressly affirm such 
protection). This is the case in Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia 
(Belgium), Croatia, Cyprus, Bavaria (Germany), North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In 
the case of France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovenia, 
academic staff who are civil servants may (at least in theory) be 
dismissed on operational grounds.252 Concluding the comments on 
this indicator, it may be noted that the HE legislation (in the form of 
parliamentary enactments) of none of the HE systems assessed 
contains a full-fledged provision providing adequate protection, 
entailing the consideration of alternatives, the observance of suitable 
priority criteria, the following of a formalized procedure, and the 
                                                                                                                            
 248.  This is, in fact, provided for in terms of the Greek Constitution. See GREEK 
CONSTITUTION 1975, art. 16(6). 
 249.  Ustawa, z dnia 27 lipca 2005 r., PRAWO O SZKOLNICTWIE WYŻSZYM [Act, 
July 27, 2005, Law on Higher Education], DZIENNIK USTAW 2005, No. 164, Item 1365, 
as amended, arts. 123–28. Art. 125 does, however, provide for termination “on other 
compelling grounds.” 
 250.  See UNIVERSITÄTSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144, § 113 (Aus.); 
YLIOPISTOLAKI (LAG) 2009, supra note 175, § 32 (Fin.); Education Reform Act, 1988, 
ch. 40, §§ 202–04 (U.K.). 
 251.  Higher Education Act 1995, supra note 151. 
 252.  See CHRISTOPH DEMMKE & TIMO MOILANEN, EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: RESTRUCTURING IN TIMES OF GOVERNMENT TRANSFORMATION AND 
THE IMPACT ON STATUS DEVELOPMENT 49 (Study Commissioned by the Chancellery of 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Nov. 2012), http://www.eupan.eu/files/ 
repository/2013021293522_Study_The_future_of_public_employment.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/97FL-QK8U] (archived Feb. 28, 2016). 
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guarantee of procedural safeguards, in circumscribed cases where 
contracts may be terminated on operational grounds. 
 To the extent that HE legislation does not address the issue of 
the termination of contracts of service on operational grounds, 
recourse needs to be had to the provisions of “ordinary” civil service 
and/or labor law. These may provide adequate, some, or insufficient 
protection to academic staff in this regard. Adequate protection would 
imply that the notice of termination clearly state the grounds of 
termination, that alternatives to termination (such as transfer to 
another similar position within the institution, transfer to another 
similar position in another institution, or retraining) be considered 
and that, where termination cannot be avoided, suitable priority 
criteria (e.g., length of service or age) be followed. In Germany, for 
example, Section 1(2)(2) of the Act on Protection in Cases of Dismissal 
of 1969253 obliges the employer of public law status to try to avoid 
dismissals by offering employees another suitable position. Likewise, 
such employers are required to retain employees where they can be 
retrained or where their working conditions can be changed in such a 
way as to make continued employment possible. Where dismissal 
cannot be avoided, Section 1(3) provides for a mandatory social 
selection on the basis of criteria such as length of service, age, etc., to 
take place. On the whole, twelve HE systems provide a rather high 
level of protection in this context, eleven a medium, and seven a low 
level of protection.254 
 Adequate provision for advancement of academic staff to a 
higher position based on an objective assessment of competence 
should further be made. Some of the HE systems assessed do so 
through a tenure-track system.255 Article V.29 of the Flemish 
                                                                                                                            
 253.  KÜNDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ [KSCHG] in the version of Aug. 25, 1969, 
BGBL. I, at 1317, last changed by Art. 3(2) of Law, Apr. 20, 2013, BGBL. I, at 868. 
 254.  See infra Annex, Indicator E.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Croat., 
Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Ir., Italy, Lat., Lith., Port., Slovn., Swed.; 
Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Est., Fin., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., 
Slovk., Spain; Non-compliance = Aus., Bulg., Czech Rep., Den., Hung., Rom., U.K.). 
Various sources of information have been used to assess compliance regarding this 
indicator. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2014 (2014), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2014_empl_outlook-2014-
en#page1 [https://perma.cc/UAT8-W9ZM] (archived Feb. 29, 2016); legislative texts as 
found in the ILO Employment Protection Legislation Database, i.e., EPLex, 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain.home? 
p_lang=en [https://perma.cc/QR5E-4KDM] (archived Feb. 29, 2016), or on the websites 
of national governments. 
 255.  For an overview of tenure-track systems (most of them not based on 
general legislation) in a number of European countries, see HANS-JOCHEN SCHIEWER 
ET AL., TENURE AND TENURE TRACK AT LERU UNIVERSITIES: MODELS FOR ATTRACTIVE 
RESEARCH CAREERS IN EUROPE (League of European Research Universities, Advice 
Paper No. 17, Sept. 2014), http://www.leru.org/files/publications/LERU_AP17_tenure_ 
track_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8PB-JEH6] (archived Feb. 29, 2016). 
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Codification of the Decretal Provisions concerning Higher Education 
of 2013 (Belgium)256 thus provides for a tenure-track system (which 
is optional, however), in terms of which a “docent” may, following a 
positive evaluation of his or her performance, be promoted to the 
position of “hoofddocent.” Likewise, Article 24(5) of the Italian Law of 
30 December 2010, No. 240, on Rules on the Organization of 
Universities, Academic Staff and Recruitment, as well as Governance 
to Enhance the Quality and Efficiency of the University System,257 
stipulates that certain so-called type “B” researchers, in the third 
year of their contract, in the case of a positive evaluation, are to be 
appointed as associate professors. 
 Other HE systems create entitlements relating to promotion 
otherwise than through a tenure-track system. Article 18(3) of the 
Greek Law on Structure, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies 
and Internationalization of Higher Education Institutions of 2011258 
lays down that 
assistant and associate professors have the right to request a vacancy at the 
next level after a stay at the rank they hold after six and four years, 
respectively . . . In this case, the vacancy notice is mandatory . . . . If assistant 
and associate professors are not promoted to the next level, they have the right 
to request a re-announcement of the position after a lapse of at least three 
years following the decision not to be promoted. 
 At the opposite end of the scale are HE systems such as that of 
Lithuania; Article 65(4) of its Law on Higher Education and Research 
of 2009259 provides that “[p]ersons shall gain access to a higher 
position in the teaching or research staff by way of an open 
competition [only].” Altogether, HE systems fail to adequately deal 
with the issue of advancement. Only the Greek arrangements have 
been considered to be in “full compliance,” while those of sixteen other 
HE systems are in “non-compliance.”260 
                                                                                                                            
 256.  CODEX HOGER ONDERWIJS 2013, supra note 232. 
 257.  LEGGE, 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240, NORME IN MATERIA DI ORGANIZZAZIONE 
DELLE UNIVERSITÀ, supra note 215. 
 258.  Law No. 4009 on Higher Education Institutions 2011, supra note 155. 
 259.  MOKSLO IR STUDIJŲ ĮSTATYMAS 2009, supra note 143. 
 260.  See infra Annex, Indicator E.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Greece; 
Between full and partial compliance = none; Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Cyprus, 
Fr., Italy, Malta; Between partial and non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Den., Bay. 
(F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Neth., Slovn., Swed.; Non-compliance = Bulg., Croat., Czech 
Rep., Est., Fin., Hung., Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain, U.K.). 
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Table 5: Country Ranking: Protection of Job Security 
(including “Tenure”) in Relevant Legislation 
Country 
Percentage & Score out of 
20 in parentheses 
1. Greece 100    (20) 
2. France 77.5   (15.5) 
3. Italy 57.5   (11.5) 
4. Spain 55      (11) 
5. Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia 52.5   (10.5) 
6. Flanders (Belgium), Cyprus 50      (10) 
7. Bulgaria 47.5   (9.5) 
8. Belgium 46.25 (9.25) 
9. Wallonia (Belgium), Malta, Sweden 42.5   (8.5) 
10. Bavaria (Germany), North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany), Germany, 
Hungary 
40      (8) 
Average 37.28 (7.46) 
11. Netherlands 35      (7) 
12. Denmark, Romania, United Kingdom 27.5   (5.5) 
13. Austria, Lithuania, Poland 25      (5) 
14. Croatia 22.5   (4.5) 
15. Luxemburg 17.5   (3.5) 
16. Finland, Latvia 15      (3) 
17. Czech Republic 10      (2) 
18. Estonia, Slovakia 7.5     (1.5) 
 
F. The Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe: 
Overall Results 
 The following two tables provide an overview of the total scores 
and results in the main categories of assessment and further an 
overall country ranking for the legal protection of the right to 
academic freedom in Europe. 
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Table 6: Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom 
in Europe: Overview of Total Scores and Results in Main 
Categories of Assessment (Percentage and Score out of 20 in 
parentheses) 
Country 
Total 
(%) 
Ratification of 
International 
Agreements and 
Constitutional 
Protection 
Express Protection of 
Academic Freedom 
in HE Legislation 
1. Austria (Aus.) 63.5 87.5   (17.5) 100    (20) 
2. Belgium (Belg.) 49.25 70      (14) 50      (10) 
2.1. Belgium (Flanders) (Belg. nl.) 51.5 70      (14) 50      (10) 
2.2. Belgium (Wallonia) (Belg. fr.) 47 70      (14) 50      (10) 
3. Bulgaria (Bulg.) 65.5 87.5   (17.5) 75      (15) 
4. Croatia (Croat.) 69 87.5   (17.5) 100    (20) 
5. Cyprus (Cyprus) 53 62.5   (12.5) 50      (10) 
6. Czech Republic (Czech Rep.) 51.5 77.5   (15.5) 75      (15) 
7. Denmark (Den.) 38.5 62.5   (12.5) 25      (5) 
8. Estonia (Est.) 34 87.5   (17.5) 0        (0) 
9. Finland (Fin.) 55 95      (19) 75      (15) 
10. France (Fr.) 63 70      (14) 100    (20) 
11. Germany (F.R.G.) 64.5 87.5   (17.5) 87.5   (17.5) 
11.1. Germany (Bavaria) 
(Bay. (F.R.G.)) 
58 87.5   (17.5) 75      (15) 
11.2. Germany (North Rhine- 
Westphalia) (N.R.W. (F.R.G.)) 
71 87.5   (17.5) 100    (20) 
12. Greece (Greece) 55.5 77.5   (15.5) 25      (5) 
13. Hungary (Hung.) 36 57.5   (11.5) 25      (5) 
14. Ireland (Ir.) 52.5 57.5   (11.5) 75      (15) 
15. Italy (Italy) 57.5 95      (19) 50      (10) 
16. Latvia (Lat.) 60 82.5   (16.5) 100    (20) 
17. Lithuania (Lith.) 59.5 87.5   (17.5) 100    (20) 
18. Luxemburg (Lux.) 47.5 70      (14) 75      (15) 
19. Malta (Malta) 36 55      (11) 0        (0) 
20. Netherlands (Neth.) 44 62.5   (12.5) 50      (10) 
21. Poland (Pol.) 54.5 87.5   (17.5) 50      (10) 
22. Portugal (Port.) 61 100    (20) 50      (10) 
23. Romania (Rom.) 53.5 62.5   (12.5) 75      (15) 
24. Slovakia (Slovk.) 60.5 90      (18) 100    (20) 
25. Slovenia (Slovn.) 52.5 87.5   (17.5) 25      (5) 
26. Spain (Spain) 66.5 100    (20) 75      (15) 
27. Sweden (Swed.) 39.5 82.5   (16.5) 25      (5) 
28. United Kingdom (U.K.) 35 55      (11) 25      (5) 
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Table 6: Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom 
in Europe: Overview of Total Scores and Results in Main 
Categories of Assessment (% and Score out of 20 in 
parentheses) (cont.) 
Country 
Protection of 
Institutional 
Autonomy in 
HE 
Legislation  
Protection of 
Academic Self-
Governance in 
HE Legislation  
Protection of Job 
Security 
(including 
“Tenure”) in 
Relevant 
Legislation  
1. Austria (Aus.) 60      (12) 45      (9) 25      (5) 
2. Belgium (Belg.) 42.5   (8.5) 37.5   (7.5) 46.25 (9.25) 
2.1. Belgium (Flanders) (Belg. nl.) 52.5   (10.5) 35      (7) 50      (10) 
2.2. Belgium (Wallonia) (Belg. fr.) 32.5   (6.5) 40      (8) 42.5   (8.5) 
3. Bulgaria (Bulg.) 45      (9) 72.5   (14.5) 47.5   (9.5) 
4. Croatia (Croat.) 65      (13) 70      (14) 22.5   (4.5) 
5. Cyprus (Cyprus) 40      (8) 62.5   (12.5) 50      (10) 
6. Czech Republic (Czech Rep.) 40      (8) 55      (11) 10      (2) 
7. Denmark (Den.) 45      (9) 32.5   (6.5) 27.5   (5.5) 
8. Estonia (Est.) 52.5   (10.5) 22.5   (4.5) 7.5     (1.5) 
9. Finland (Fin.) 75      (15) 15      (3) 15      (3) 
10. France (Fr.) 35      (7) 32.5   (6.5) 77.5   (15.5) 
11. Germany (F.R.G.) 46.25 (9.25) 61.25 (12.25) 40      (8) 
11.1. Germany (Bavaria) 
(Bay. (F.R.G.)) 
27.5   (5.5) 60      (12) 40      (8) 
11.2. Germany (North Rhine- 
Westphalia) (N.R.W. (F.R.G.)) 
65      (13) 62.5   (12.5) 40      (8) 
12. Greece (Greece) 22.5   (4.5) 52.5   (10.5) 100    (20) 
13. Hungary (Hung.) 12.5   (2.5) 45      (9) 40      (8) 
14. Ireland (Ir.) 62.5   (12.5) 15      (3) 52.5   (10.5) 
15. Italy (Italy) 45      (9) 40      (8) 57.5   (11.5) 
16. Latvia (Lat.) 50      (10) 52.5   (10.5) 15      (3) 
17. Lithuania (Lith.) 55      (11) 30      (6) 25      (5) 
18. Luxemburg (Lux.) 45      (9) 30      (6) 17.5   (3.5) 
19. Malta (Malta) 52.5   (10.5) 30      (6) 42.5   (8.5) 
20. Netherlands (Neth.) 45      (9) 27.5   (5.5) 35      (7) 
21. Poland (Pol.) 47.5   (9.5) 62.5   (12.5) 25      (5) 
22. Portugal (Port.) 45      (9) 57.5   (11.5) 52.5   (10.5) 
23. Romania (Rom.) 40      (8) 62.5   (12.5) 27.5   (5.5) 
24. Slovakia (Slovk.) 42.5   (8.5) 62.5   (12.5) 7.5     (1.5) 
25. Slovenia (Slovn.) 42.5   (8.5) 55      (11) 52.5   (10.5) 
26. Spain (Spain) 42.5   (8.5) 60      (12) 55      (11) 
27. Sweden (Swed.) 32.5   (6.5) 15      (3) 42.5   (8.5) 
28. United Kingdom (U.K.) 67.5   (13.5) 0        (0) 27.5   (5.5) 
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Table 7: Overall Country Ranking: Legal Protection of the 
Right to Academic Freedom in Europe 
Country Total (%) & Grade (A–F) 
1. North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) 71                                   B 
2. Croatia 69                                   C 
3. Spain 66.5                                C 
4. Bulgaria 65.5                                C 
5. Germany 64.5                                C 
6. Austria 63.5                                C 
7. France 63                                   C 
8. Portugal 61                                   C 
9. Slovakia 60.5                                C 
10. Latvia 60                                   C 
11. Lithuania 59.5                                D 
12. Bavaria (Germany) 58                                   D 
13. Italy 57.5                                D 
14. Greece 55.5                                D 
15. Finland 55                                   D 
16. Poland 54.5                                D 
17. Romania 53.5                                D 
Average 52.79                              D 
18. Cyprus 53                                   D 
19. Ireland, Slovenia 52.5                                D 
20. Czech Republic, Flanders (Belgium) 51.5                                D 
21. Belgium 49.25                              E 
22. Luxemburg 47.5                                E 
23. Wallonia (Belgium) 47                                   E 
24. Netherlands 44                                   E 
25. Sweden 39.5                                F 
26. Denmark 38.5                                F 
27. Hungary, Malta 36                                   F 
28. United Kingdom 35                                   F 
29. Estonia 34                                   F 
VI. ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS: THE STATE OF HEALTH OF THE 
LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN EUROPE 
 The assessment has shown that by and large the twenty-eight 
EU member states formally ascribe to the value of academic freedom. 
In general, they have ratified relevant international agreements 
providing protection to the right to academic freedom (ICCPR, 
ICESCR, ECHR, etc.) and give recognition to the right (or related 
rights) at the constitutional level. Table 1 reflects countries to have 
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scored an average of 78 percent in this category. Also at the level of 
HE legislation, academic freedom enjoys express recognition in most 
HE systems, Table 2 showing that an average of 59 percent 
compliance was achieved in this category. There are, however, some 
HE systems—those of Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Malta, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—whose HE legislation 
does not or only inadequately refers to academic freedom. Whereas all 
HE systems, in a more or less satisfactory manner, expressly provide 
for the autonomy of institutions of HE in their HE legislation, rights 
of self-governance of academic staff and tenure in the sense of 
employment stability are accorded express recognition in fifteen and 
eight HE systems, respectively, with a rating of “full compliance” 
having been awarded in only three cases and one case, respectively. 
 If one turns to analyzing the way the right to academic freedom 
has been concretized in the HE and other legislation of the states 
concerned, it will be noted that performance levels are far less 
satisfactory than those identified in view of its formal protection. The 
average score for institutional autonomy lies at 46 percent (Table 3), 
that for academic self-governance below that at 43 percent (Table 4), 
and that for job security (including “tenure”) at a mere 37 percent 
(Table 5). Many commentators would perhaps disagree and consider 
institutional autonomy to enjoy a higher level of legal protection than 
is borne out here. However, as has been stressed above, “institutional 
autonomy” in the context of this study means “institutional autonomy 
as limited by academic freedom and human rights.” HE institutions 
in many of the HE systems assessed do possess wide competences to 
include external members in their governing bodies, to levy and 
decide on the amount of study fees, to dismiss academic staff for 
reasons of “redundancy,” and to freely engage in collaborative 
activities with private industry to acquire funding subject to only 
limited public control. Such unbridled powers, however, are not 
concomitant with institutional autonomy—rather, they expose a 
misinterpretation of the concept. Table 3 shows Finland and the 
United Kingdom to be the top performers in the category 
“institutional autonomy.” At the bottom of the table is Hungary, 
Hungarian HE legislation reflecting a paternalistic role of the state in 
regulating HE.261 
                                                                                                                            
 261.  A reading of the Hungarian HE Act thus reflects an “omnipresent” role of 
the state in the administration of HE institutions. By way of example, the President of 
the Republic appoints rectors (Sections 64(2)(c), 73(3)(e) of the Hungarian Act on 
National Higher Education of 2011 (2011, ÉVI CCIV, TÖRVÉNY A NEMZETI 
FELS OKTATÁSRÓL, MAGYAR KÖZLÖNY 165, Dec. 30, 2011, 41181)) and professors 
(Sections 27(3), 64(2)(c)). The state’s agreement is required to found business 
organizations (Section 12(3)(g)(gc)), or the state is required to perform typical review 
functions (such as reviewing the budget of a HE institution), which in many other HE 
systems are performed by a (supervisory) organ of the HE institution (Section 73(3)(c)). 
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 The autonomy of an institution of HE, moreover, cannot be 
divorced from the guarantee of academic self-governance. HE 
institutions, which possess wide powers, but in which the academic 
community—encompassing academic staff, but also students—does 
not retain the competence to sufficiently participate in the taking of 
decisions directly or indirectly having a bearing on science and 
scholarship, can at most be seen to be nominally autonomous, and 
they are certainly not in accordance with the standards of the 
UNESCO Recommendation. The assessment has revealed that the 
HE legislation of European states inadequately protects the right of 
“sufficient participation,” which is increasingly being eroded by 
promoting an “alternative model.” At the institutional level, states 
achieve an average score of just 49.4 percent (the percentage average 
of the sum of the scores for indicators under D.2.) and, at the faculty 
and departmental level (where a large-scale failure to regulate 
aspects of self-governance whatsoever by way of legislation may be 
observed), merely 35 percent (the percentage average of the sum of 
the scores for indicators under D.3.) for their implementation of the 
right to self-governance. 
 Legislative changes adopted in the past five to ten years, in some 
instances also before that, have accordingly witnessed the powers of 
senates (or their equivalents) having been restricted to purely 
academic matters (or worse, senates (or their equivalents) having 
been replaced by “committees of academics,” often presided over by 
non-elected administrators); the introduction of institutional boards 
with strategic decision-making powers, composed of various 
stakeholders, many external and representing government and 
corporate interests (academic staff, in the worst case, not being 
represented and/or having no control over candidates appointed);262 
and the strengthening of the executive powers of rectors and deans 
and departmental heads, who frequently come from outside the 
institution, academic staff not being able to adequately participate in 
their election or dismissal. But also generally, governance structures 
in HE institutions increasingly exclude academics, recruiting instead 
a new “caste” of personnel with administrative, but little or no 
subject-specific academic expertise, responsible for “managing” HE 
                                                                                                                            
 262.  According to oral information provided to the authors by the official of a 
union representing academic staff in HE in New Zealand, a country that has very 
recently, in 2015, modified its HE legislation along the lines described—for which 
reason the concerns expressed may be transposed to the European context—the 
indications are that the reforms in that country will lead to HE institution governance 
becoming “whiter and male-dominated” again. As governments and corporate actors 
also in Europe do not reflect a high measure of diversity in their respective composition 
and as they are to play a significant role, directly or indirectly, in “redesigned” 
governance, also European HE institution governance may become less inclusive again. 
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institutions and their affairs.263 Interestingly, states such as 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania that are not yet in the tow of Bologna 
reforms perform best in the category of “self-governance.” The United 
Kingdom, a top performer on “institutional autonomy,” fares worst on 
“self-governance.” 
 Institutional autonomy is also limited by the requirements of 
security of employment, including “tenure or its functional 
equivalent, where applicable.” HE institutions in Europe, however, in 
“managing” their affairs, have come to view their academic staff as 
strategic capital. If staff are not “useful” in accordance with “strategic 
objectives” anymore, they forfeit their right to remain with the HE 
institution concerned. The assessment has shown that states achieve 
an average score of just 47.3 percent (the percentage average of the 
sum of the scores for indicators under E.1.) and merely 43.8 percent 
(the percentage average of the sum of the scores for indicators under 
E.2.) for the assurance of stable employment in terms of the duration 
of contracts of service and the protection against dismissals on 
operational grounds, respectively. 
 While the premise in academia used to be that “the university 
does not employ academics, it facilitates their work,” this notion 
appears to be absent in HE institutions today. As Rebecca Boden and 
Debbie Epstein point out, “[a] facilitator provides resources and eases 
one’s path towards one’s goals. But an employer regards employees as 
resources—along with other inputs—to be managed to achieve 
organizational objectives.”264 The “HE institution as facilitator” 
notion underlies the UNESCO Recommendation and its conception of 
the right to academic freedom. States in Southern and Western 
Europe (Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) are among the 
“top” performers in the category “security of employment.” Only seven 
states altogether, however, achieved a score above 50 percent. 
                                                                                                                            
 263.  In this vein with regard to universities in the UK, see Dr. Matt Waring 
(Cardiff Metropolitan University), researcher on human resource management in HE, 
and also a senior trade union official, in a talk on “Management technologies and 
academic freedom,” delivered on Sept. 9, 2014 at UNIKE (Universities in the 
Knowledge Economy) Workshop 4: Management Technologies, held from Sept. 8–10, 
2014 at the University of Roehampton, London. See also Thomas Docherty, Thomas 
Docherty on Academic Freedom, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2014), https:// 
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/thomas-docherty-on-academic-freedom/2017 
268.article [https://perma.cc/RCG5-CWX4] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (holding that 
“[m]anagerial fundamentalism has taken hold in universities, with scholars viewed as 
resources that must be controlled . . . .”); Paul Taylor, Humboldt’s Rift: Managerialism 
in Education and Complicit Intellectuals, 3 EUR. POLIT. SCI. 75 (2003) (referring to the 
phenomenon of “supinely acquiescent academics,” who disagree with “managerialism,” 
but do not “speak out”). 
 264.  See Rebecca Boden & Debbie Epstein, A Flat Earth Society? Imagining 
Academic Freedom, 59 SOC. REV. 476, 481 (2011), citing Matt Waring, Labouring in the 
Augean Stables? HRM and the Reconstitution of the Academic Worker, 3 INT’L J. MGMT. 
CONCEPT. & PHIL. 257 (2009) in this respect. 
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 Finally, turning to Table 7, showing the overall country ranking 
on the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in accordance 
with the assessment, it will have to be conceded that it is difficult to 
identify clear trends. One HE system—that of North Rhine-
Westphalia (Germany)—scored 71 percent, eight scored between 60 
and 69.9 percent,265 twelve between 50 and 59.9 percent,266 three 
between 40 and 49.9 percent,267 and six between 30 and 39.9 
percent.268 HE systems that used to be steeped in the Humboldtian 
tradition with its emphasis on Lernfreiheit (freedom of study), 
Lehrfreiheit (freedom of teaching), Forschungsfreiheit (freedom of 
research), and further the Einheit von Forschung und Lehre (the 
unity of research and teaching)—those of Austria, Bavaria 
(Germany), and North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany)—still seem to 
benefit from this in terms of their position in the overall ranking.269 
The HE systems of Southern and Western Europe—those of France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—also appear in the upper half of 
the table. The HE systems of the Benelux states—those of Flanders 
(Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Luxemburg, and the Netherlands—
feature in the lower half of the table, as do those of Scandinavian 
countries—i.e., the HE systems of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.270 
Also, the HE systems of Anglophone Europe—those of Ireland, Malta, 
and the United Kingdom—are found in this part of the table. The 
picture is rather diffuse for the Baltic states, as it is for countries of 
Eastern Europe. The HE systems of Latvia and Lithuania lie on 
positions ten and eleven, respectively, but that of Estonia in place 
twenty-eight. Croatia lands on the second place, Slovenia on the 
nineteenth. Bulgaria lands on the fourth place, Slovakia on the ninth, 
Romania on the seventeenth, and the Czech Republic on the 
twentieth. 
                                                                                                                            
 265.  In the order of performance: Croat. (69%), Spain (66.5%), Bulg. (65.5%), 
Aus. (63.5%), Fr. (63%), Port. (61%), Slovk. (60.5%), Lat. (60%). See supra tbl. 7. 
 266.   In the order of performance: Lith. (59.5%), Bay. (F.R.G.) (58%), Italy 
(57.5%), Greece (55.5%), Fin. (55%), Pol. (54.5%), Rom. (53.5%), Cyprus (53%), Ir. 
(52.5%), Slovn. (52.5%), Czech Rep. (51.5%), Belg. (nl.) (51.5%). 
 267.  In the order of performance: Lux. (47.5%), Belg. (fr.) (47%), Neth. (44%). 
 268.  In the order of performance: Swed. (39.5%), Den. (38.5%), Hung. (36%), 
Malta (36%), U.K. (35%), Est. (34%). 
 269.  On the Humboldtian tradition in Germany, see MITCHELL G. ASH, GERMAN 
UNIVERSITIES: PAST AND FUTURE: CRISIS OR RENEWAL? (1997) [German transl.: 
MYTHOS HUMBOLDT: VERGANGENHEIT UND ZUKUNFT DER DEUTSCHEN UNIVERSITÄTEN 
(1999)]. For a critical examination of the relevance of Humboldtian ideals in modern 
HE, see PETER JOSEPHSON ET AL., THE HUMBOLDTIAN TRADITION: ORIGINS AND 
LEGACIES (Peter Josephson, Thomas Karlsohn & Johan Östling eds., 2014). 
 270.  For a discussion of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in the 
Scandinavian countries, see, e.g., Terhi Nokkala & Agneta Bladh, Institutional 
Autonomy and Academic Freedom in the Nordic Context: Similarities and Differences, 
27 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 1 (2014). 
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 The overall average lies at 52.8 percent—demonstrating that the 
state of the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in 
Europe is one of “ill-health.” While this is disappointing in itself, 
what is a matter of greater concern is that, when compared to the 
situation that existed prior to the changes in HE legislation effected 
during the last ten or more years in the states assessed,271 a 
downward trend in protection levels may be observed. The concept of 
institutional autonomy is increasingly being misconstrued as 
autonomy not subject to the requirements of academic freedom, self-
governance, and security of employment, including “tenure.” Self-
governance itself has, at all levels in HE institutions, largely become 
eroded. The same may be stated to be the case with regard to 
employment security, including “tenure,” of academic staff. Although 
the various changes may in some instances be the result of 
“suboptimal legislative draftsmanship skills” (this might perhaps be 
so for Estonia, for example),272 they usually are part of a deliberate 
reform agenda for the HE sector implemented by states in Europe. 
VII. VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT 
TO EDUCATION 
 The academic community has traditionally been—and in many 
parts of the world continues to be—a particularly vulnerable target of 
direct state repression.273 In Europe, however, it is nowadays rather 
sources of a different nature from which direct threats to academic 
freedom emanate, the state having become a (seemingly innocent) 
actor in the background. The state has assigned HE institutions fairly 
wide-reaching powers (as it were, has delegated many of its powers to 
these institutions). In practice, this has had the effect that HE 
institutions themselves have become direct violators of academic 
freedom. Research funding bodies are yet another source of peril to 
academic freedom. It may hence be asked whether the system en 
vogue today of research funding having to be applied for internally, or 
externally through “independent” research councils/foundations, etc., 
on a competitive basis for virtually all research projects, does not by 
its very nature favor research on “fashionable” topics yielding short-
                                                                                                                            
 271.  This has become apparent when, in the course of examining the HE 
legislation of the states concerned, present laws were compared to those existing prior 
to the laws in operation now. 
 272.  See supra text accompanying note 196 (discussing the provisions of the 
Estonian Universities Act of 1995 on the composition of the council of the university at 
V.D. above). 
 273.  On the state of academic freedom in different parts of the world, see 
generally Philip G. Altbach, Academic Freedom in a Global Context: 21st Century 
Challenges, in THE NEA 2007 ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 49 (Nat’l Educ. Assoc., 
2007). 
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term results, thus obstructing research of real or long-term 
significance for society (elementary research).274 Likewise, the 
reluctance to install effective control mechanisms targeting the 
activities of private or corporate actors providing finance to HE 
institutions has made it possible for the activities of such actors to 
compromise the independence of research in HE institutions.275 As 
has been indicated, in only very few cases does the law in Europe 
oblige HE institutions to account to the public for private financing. 
 HE institutions have become direct violators of academic 
freedom because they find themselves in an environment where they 
often cannot but violate that right. These days, HE in Europe follows 
a neoliberal logic. Whereas it used to be a public good, paid for by the 
state, available free of charge to students, and based on the idea that 
(also) “knowledge for its own sake” merits pursuit and transmission, 
HE has now “become the arm of national economic policy,” defined 
both as the problem, failing to produce a skilled workforce and 
marketable academic output, and the solution, in that it should 
upgrade skills and create a source of earnings.276 The 
commercialization of HE is to go hand in hand with reductions in 
government spending for and “new public management” methods in 
HE.277 States consider that HE institutions will use public money 
                                                                                                                            
 274.  See Li Bennich-Björkman, Has Academic Freedom Survived? An Interview 
Study of the Conditions for Researchers in an Era of Paradigmatic Change, 61 HIGH. 
EDUC. Q. 334, 348–52 (2007) (presenting the results of an interview study of academic 
staff in Swedish universities, which, according to the author, reflect the general 
European experience); see also Justin Thorens, Liberties, Freedom and Autonomy: 
Reflections on Academia’s Estate, 19 HIGH. EDUC. POL’Y 87, 100 (2006) (critically 
discussing the role of research councils and funding decisions). 
 275.  See Rendel, supra note 68, at 83 (warning, in 1988, before private industry 
funding assumed the importance in HE it has at present, that those commissioning 
research “may want answers only within their own frame of reference”); David 
Robinson, Corrupting Research Integrity: Corporate Funding and Academic 
Independence, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: EDUCATION 202, 202 (Transparency 
International, Gareth Sweeney et al. eds., 2013), http://files.transparency.org/content/ 
download/675/2899/file/2013_GCR_Education_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDM4-4UZC] 
(archived Feb. 26, 2016) (stating that “[t]he increasing industrial sponsorship of 
university-based research is raising widespread concerns about how these 
arrangements can corrupt and distort academic research.”); Michele Rostan, 
Challenges to Academic Freedom: Some Empirical Evidence, 18 (Suppl. No. 1) EUR. 
REV. 71, 78–80 (2010) (commenting on the threats posed by research funding by private 
actors); id. at 80–85 (commenting on the threats arising from links connecting 
academics to the economic sector). 
 276.  See Jill Blackmore, Globalisation: A Useful Concept for Feminists 
Rethinking Theories and Strategies in Education, in GLOBALISATION AND EDUCATION: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 133, 134 (Nicholas C. Burbules & Carlos Alberto Torres eds., 
2000). On the notion that academic freedom also covers pursuing and transmitting 
“knowledge for its own sake,” see Thaddeus Metz, A Dilemma Regarding Academic 
Freedom and Public Accountability in Higher Education, 44 J. PHIL. EDUC. 529 (2010). 
 277.  On the commercialization of and “new public management” in HE in the 
U.K., see, e.g., ROGER BROWN & HELEN CARASSO, EVERYTHING FOR SALE? THE 
MARKETISATION OF UK HIGHER EDUCATION or ANDREW MCGETTIGAN, THE GREAT 
676  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [vol. 49:597 
responsibly and produce “measurable” outcomes only if they have to 
acquire a substantial part of funding through state and non-state 
sources themselves (by levying study fees, “selling” academic 
“merchandise” and “services” (e.g., marketing intellectual property 
rights or carrying out commissioned research), their academic staff 
applying for external research funding on a competitive basis and 
producing state income-generating publications, etc.), and further if 
they have to account for public money “at every inch of the road” 
(internal and external audits, staff appraisals, student evaluations of 
staff, national research assessment exercises, etc.).278 
 This new model—substituting that in terms of which a solid 
measure of trust is placed in the competence of academics to be good 
teachers/researchers and responsible recipients of adequate finance—
compels HE institutions “to do well” in HE institution rankings if 
they wish to remain able to attract fee-paying students and be 
awarded contracts for their academic “merchandise” and “services.” 
These rankings themselves apply questionable criteria of measuring 
excellence.279 They do not ask, for example, whether students from 
                                                                                                                            
UNIVERSITY GAMBLE: MONEY, MARKETS AND THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
(2013). Regarding these issues in the U.S.A., see ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION, THE ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE 
END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010). Regarding these issues in Canada, see 
HOWARD R. WOODHOUSE, SELLING OUT: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CORPORATE 
MARKET (2009). Regarding these issues in New Zealand, see Cris Shore & Mira Taitz, 
Who “Owns” the University? Institutional Autonomy and Academic Freedom in an Age 
of Knowledge Capitalism, 10 GLOB., SOC’IES & EDUC. 201 (2012). Generally on these 
issues, see Francine Rochford, Academic Freedom and the Ethics of Marketing 
Education, in CASES ON INNOVATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL MARKETING: TRANSNATIONAL 
AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 160 (Purnendu Tripathi & Siran Mukerji eds., 2011); 
HANS G. SCHUETZE ET AL., UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND REFORM: POLICY, FADS, AND 
EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Hans G. Schuetze et al. eds., 2012). On 
“Commercialization as a New Infringement on Academic Freedom,” see William G. 
Tierney & Michael Lanford, The Question of Academic Freedom: Universal Right or 
Relative Term, 9 FRONTIERS EDUC. CHINA 4, 14–18 (2014). 
 278.  Therefore, ironically, although neoliberalism customarily advocates 
“deregulation,” it has entailed a rise of standards and audits in HE in practice. 
Frequently, these instruments have awkward consequences for the quality of teaching 
or research. The national UK research assessment exercises, for example, require 
submission of a certain number of research outputs. In practice, this has meant an 
increased “production” of shorter publications on “easy” topics at the expense of more 
thoroughly researched, longer (including monograph) publications on “more 
demanding” topics. Research is also required to “have impact” beyond the institutional 
context. It may well be asked, how it should be shown, for instance, that a feminist 
critique has actually changed stereotyped attitudes. See generally Susan Wright, What 
Counts? The Skewing Effects of Research Assessment Systems, 29 (spec. ed.) NORDISK 
PEDAGOGIK 18 (2009), on the “skewing effects” of research assessment systems. Also 
assessments of teaching performance potentially unjustifiably interfere with the right 
to academic freedom. See, e.g., Wolfram Höfling, Die Lehrfreiheit: Gefährdungen eines 
Grundrechts durch die neuere Hochschulrechtsentwicklung?, 41 WISSENSCHAFTSRECHT 
92 (2008). Although the article deals with the situation in Germany, most of its 
statements are equally applicable in a more general sense. 
 279.  For a critique of university rankings, see, e.g., Sarah Amsler, University 
Ranking: A Dialogue on Turning towards Alternatives, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV’T POL. 155 
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disadvantaged backgrounds can still afford good quality higher 
education. They do not inquire whether academic staff can exercise 
rights of academic freedom. They assess teaching quality 
quantitatively, but not by having recourse to scientifically sound 
qualitative methods. They do not assess whether research addresses 
“the major questions of humanity” and, moreover, does so in sufficient 
depth. Instead, the rankings rely upon: the volume of research income 
scaled against staff numbers; the “number of papers” published in 
“high-quality peer-reviewed” journals; the “number of citations” of 
published work; the ability “to help industry with innovations, 
inventions, and consultancy;” opinion polls of “experienced 
scholars;”280 and the “satisfaction” of students. On the last point, that 
of student satisfaction, it may be noted that this criterion, coupled 
with the fact that students are required to pay ever-increasing fees 
for their studies, has made them “customers” of HE, quasi-entitled to 
good marks and a qualification, with corresponding duties on 
teachers “to deliver,” relinquishing the ideal of the student as a 
mature young adult also bearing responsibilities himself or herself to 
master the subject.281 
                                                                                                                            
(2013); Barbara M. Kehm, Global University Rankings: Impacts and Unintended Side 
Effects, 49 EUR. J. EDUC. 102 (2014); Kathleen Lynch, New Managerialism, 
Neoliberalism and Ranking, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV’T POL. 141 (2013); Brian Pusser & 
Simon Marginson, University Rankings in Critical Perspective, 84 J. HIGH. EDUC. 544 
(2013); David Robinson, The Mismeasure of Higher Education? The Corrosive Effect of 
University Rankings, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV’T POL. 65 (2013); Konstantinos I. Stergiou & 
Stephan Lessenich, On Impact Factors and University Rankings: From Birth to 
Boycott, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV’T POL. 101 (2013); Michael Taylor et al., Rankings Are the 
Sorcerer’s New Apprentice, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV’T POL. 73 (2013); Susan Wright, 
Ranking Universities within a Globalised World of Competition States: To What 
Purpose, and with What Implications for Students?, in UDDANNELSESKVALITET I EN 
GLOBALISERET VERDEN 81 (Hanne L. Andersen & Jens C. Jacobsen eds., 2012). 
 280.  See World University Rankings 2013–14 Methodology, TIMES HIGHER 
EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-
rankings-2013-14-methodology [https://perma.cc/L4HW-78V9] (archived Mar. 24, 2016) 
(mentioning inter alia the stated parameters; detailing “the essential elements in our 
world-leading formula.”). 
 281.  For a critique of the notion of the student as “customer,” see, e.g., MIKE 
MOLESWORTH ET AL., THE MARKETISATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE STUDENT AS 
CONSUMER (Mike Molesworth et al. eds., 2011); Mark Albanese, Students Are Not 
Customers: A Better Model for Medical Education, 74 ACAD. MED. 1172 (1999); Marcel 
F. D’Eon & Cille Harris, If Students Are Not Customers, What Are They?, 75 ACAD. 
MED. 1173 (2000); Lynne Eagle & Ross Brennan, Are Students Customers? TQM and 
Marketing Perspectives, 15 QUALITY ASSURANCE EDUC. 44 (2007); Tim Kaye et al., 
Criticising the Image of the Student as Consumer: Examining Legal Trends and 
Administrative Responses in the US and UK, 18 EDUC. & LAW 85 (2006); Janice A. 
Newson, Disrupting the “Student as Consumer” Model: The New Emancipatory Project, 
18 INT’L REL. 227 (2004); Göran Svensson & Greg Wood, Are University Students 
Really Customers? When Illusion May Lead to Delusion for All!, 12 INT’L J. EDUC. 
MGMT. 17 (2007). See also Dennis Hayes, Academic Freedom and the Diminished 
Subject, 57 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 127, 143–44 (2009) (lamenting that a “diminished” 
view of humanity in HE institutions has also entailed a “diminished” view of students). 
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 The new model in HE also induces HE institutions to compel 
academic staff to “deliver” under “target/performance agreements,” as 
staff output equals revenue. Usually imposed on staff, structured by 
revenue considerations, and their very premise being that the 
production of scientific truth can “be planned,” “target/performance 
agreements” more often than not are highly arbitrary 
(“wissenschaftsinadäquat”).282 It may further be noted that HE 
institutions these days expect academics to perform so many 
administrative tasks—preparing budget plans, seeking funding, 
etc.—that this has left them with less time to do what they do best—
teaching and carrying out research.283 
 As borne out by the assessment undertaken here, the new model 
in HE as described above is easiest implemented by engaging 
“managers” of various sorts “to control” academics/teaching/research, 
by excluding academic staff from meaningful participation in 
decision-making, and by introducing “executive-style” management 
processes in HE. In sum, HE institutions have become subject to 
various pressures resulting from the new design of HE. Reacting to 
these pressures, these institutions themselves have become direct 
violators of academic freedom. 
 These “developments”—which foreshadow the decline of 
European universities and other HE institutions as entities of 
genuine public and social significance along the lines of their U.S. 
counterparts284—have their basis in legislation designed and 
                                                                                                                            
 282.  Paragraph 47 of the UNESCO Recommendation on “Appraisal” points out 
that the major function of evaluation must be “the development of individuals in 
accordance with their interests and capacities,” that it must be based “only on 
academic criteria of competence,” and that it must “take due account of the difficulty 
inherent in measuring personal capacity, which seldom manifests itself in a constant 
and unfluctuating manner,” (¶ 47(a)–(c), resp.). 
 283.  See Bennich-Björkman, supra note 274, at 352–54. 
 284.  At least, such a “decline” regarding HE in the United States has been held 
to have taken place. See, e.g., CARY NELSON, NO UNIVERSITY IS AN ISLAND: SAVING 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2010); CHRISTOPHER NEWFIELD, UNMAKING THE PUBLIC 
UNIVERSITY: THE FORTY-YEAR ASSAULT ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2008); SCHRECKER, 
supra note 277; see also IVORY TOWER (CNN Films 2014) (produced by Andrew Rossi). 
A decline of universities has generally been held to have taken place. See, e.g., BILL 
READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS 21 et seqq., 62 et seqq. (1996) (considering there 
to have been a paradigm shift from the “university of culture” to that of “excellence,” 
the latter really being a business corporation); THOMAS DOCHERTY, UNIVERSITIES AT 
WAR ix (2015) (arguing that there is a war on for the future of the university 
worldwide, holding that “[m]oney has systematically replaced thought as the key driver 
and raison d’être of [HE] institution’s official existence.”). On the decline of universities 
in Europe, see, e.g., JOSÉ C. BERMEJO BARRERA, LA AURORA DE LOS ENANOS: 
DECADENCIA Y CAÍDA DE LAS UNIVERSIDADES EUROPEAS (2007). Specifically regarding 
universities in France, see, e.g., BEAUD, supra note 121, regarding universities in 
Germany, see, e.g., Barbara Zehnpfennig, Die Austreibung des Geistes aus der 
Universität, 46 WISSENSCHAFTSRECHT 37 (2013), regarding universities in Spain, see, 
e.g., JESÚS HERNÁNDEZ ALONSO ET AL., LA UNIVERSIDAD CERCADA: TESTIMONIOS DE UN 
NAUFRAGIO (Jesús Hernández Alonso et al. eds., 2013). 
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implemented by the state (i.e., they are the consequence of deliberate 
state action). The state, therefore, “pulling the strings in the 
background,” is the ultimate human rights violator! In fact, the 
violation of the right to academic freedom has its root causes in the 
violation by states of another—the overarching—right to education. 
Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, read with Article 2(1) of the Covenant, provides for 
the obligation of states parties—all states examined here having 
ratified the ICESCR—to take steps to the maximum of their available 
resources, with a view to progressively making HE available and 
“equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity.”285 There is an 
obligation to progressively introduce free HE,286 to actively pursue 
the development of a system of HE institutions,287 and to 
continuously improve the material conditions of teaching staff in 
HE.288 
 Article 13 should not be understood as merely protecting “a right 
to receive education.” It rather provides the normative basis for a full-
fledged, rights-based education system, including in the sphere of HE, 
also covering the rights of teaching and research staff.289 
Consequently, to the extent that states—relying on the maximum of 
their available resources—are in a position to finance HE in such a 
way that it can be made available free of charge and that academic 
staff can properly attend to teaching and carrying out research290—
                                                                                                                            
 285.  ICESCR, art. 13(1), (2)(c). 
 286.  Id. art. 13(2)(c). 
 287.  Id. art. 13(2)(e). 
 288.  Id. With regard to the UK, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has thus “note[d] with concern that the introduction of tuition fees and 
student loans, which is inconsistent with article 13, paragraph 2(c) . . . has tended to 
worsen the position of students from less privileged backgrounds, who are already 
underrepresented in higher education.” Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Dependent Territories, ¶ 225, U.N. 
Doc. E/2003/22 (2003). On the topic of the legitimacy of study fees in HE in the context 
of the ICESCR, see generally BEITER, supra note 30, at 387–88, 400–01, 458, 526, 572–
73, 594, 651. 
 289.  See, for example, BEITER, supra note 30, at 460–62, supporting such a wide 
reading of Article 13 of the ICESCR (citing in support of his view inter alia PIUS 
GEBERT, DAS RECHT AUF BILDUNG NACH ART. 13 DES UNO-PAKTES ÜBER 
WIRTSCHAFTLICHE, SOZIALE UND KULTURELLE RECHTE UND SEINE AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF 
DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BILDUNGSWESEN 286–88 (1996)). 
 290.  The obligation generally to have recourse to resources that are “available” 
becomes clear from the statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (even if made only with regard to free HE) on the report submitted by South 
Korea, to the effect that in that state party “[o]nly primary education is provided free of 
charge,” but that “given the strength of the Korean economy it appears appropriate 
that free education should also extend to the . . . higher [sector].” Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea, 
¶ 76, U.N. Doc. E/1996/22 (1996). In the case of the Czech Republic, the Committee 
referred to the “constant decrease in the budget expenditure allocated to education and 
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and this may be held to be the case for most of the states examined, 
keeping in mind that international human rights law envisages 
general taxation as the principal model for financing education 
(study, teaching and research) and other rights under the 
Covenant291—they must do so! In such circumstances, the principle 
of progressive realization, as a matter of principle, forbids cutbacks of 
standards achieved.292 Hence, state legislation in Europe that 
compels HE institutions—in their quest of ensuring their financial 
survival— to violate the right to academic freedom also violates 
Article 13 of the ICESCR. 
 Envisaging “a full-fledged, rights-based education system,” 
Article 13 of the ICESCR does not only address infrastructure, access, 
and costs. Article 13(1) “recognize[s] the right of everyone to 
education,” stipulating the primary aim of education to be “the full 
development of the human personality.”293 This relates to the quality 
or content of education provided and, by necessary implication, also to 
the quality of teaching and research, and, therefore, to the rights and 
duties of academic staff in this context.294 Nobel Literature laureate 
John Coetzee remarked that 
allowing the transient needs of the economy to define the goals of higher 
education is a misguided and short-sighted policy: indispensable to a 
democratic society—indeed, to a vigorous national economy—is a critically 
                                                                                                                            
the consequences thereof on the enjoyment of the right to education” and suggested to 
the Czech Republic that it “consider increasing the budget allocation for education.” 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Czech 
Republic, ¶¶ 91, 110, U.N. Doc. E/2003/22 (2003). 
 291.  The former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina 
Tomaševski, has pointed out that “[i]nternational human rights law assumes that 
states are both willing and able to generate resources needed for education through 
general taxation.” KATARINA TOMAŠEVSKI, FREE AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION FOR ALL 
CHILDREN: THE GAP BETWEEN PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 21 (Right to Education 
Primers, No. 2, 2001). 
 292.  This is clearly borne out by Paragraph 14(e) of the Maastricht Guidelines 
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1997, a document prepared by 
international experts on human rights and published in 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691 (1998). 
 293.  See General Comment No. 13, supra note 8, ¶ 4; see also BEITER, supra 
note 30, at 470–71. 
 294.  See General Comment No. 13, supra note 8, ¶¶ 38–40, in support of the 
view that Article 13 of the ICESCR covers the right to academic freedom. Observations 
to the same effect were made by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, Katarina Tomaševski, in two of her annual reports. Katarina Tomaševski 
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education), Progress Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Katarina Tomaševski, Submitted in Accordance 
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/25, ¶¶42–44, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/6 (Feb. 1, 2000); Katarina Tomaševski (Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Education), Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, 
Katarina Tomaševski, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 2001/29, 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/60 (Jan. 7, 2002). 
2016] “Measuring” the Erosion of Academic Freedom in Europe 681 
literate citizenry competent to explore and interrogate the assumptions behind 
the paradigms of national and economic life reigning at any given moment.295 
He goes on to point out that it is important to “believe in the 
humanities and in the university built on humanistic grounds, with 
philosophical, historical and philological studies as its pillars.”296 A 
HE system that is “the arm of national economic policy,” does not 
value the pursuit and transmission of “knowledge for its own sake” 
and does not breathe the full spirit of academic freedom can never 
further “the full development of the human personality” of students. 
At the same time, it constitutes an assault on the dignity of 
academics and their profession. But, what is worse, such a HE system 
ultimately erodes the very foundations of civilized society!
                                                                                                                            
 295.  John M. Coetzee, Foreword, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A DEMOCRATIC 
SOUTH AFRICA: ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS ON HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE HUMANITIES 
xi, xii (John Higgins ed., 2014). 
 296.  Id. at xiii. 
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ANNEX: LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN 
EUROPE—OVERVIEW OF RESULTS FOR ALL INDICATORS FOR INDIVIDUAL 
COUNTRIES 
Country 
A. Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional Protection 
1. 1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.1.3. 1.1.4. 1.2. 
10 
(Subtotal) 
(0–1.5) (0–1.5) (0–1.5) (0–1.5) (0–4) 
1. Austria 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
2.1. Belgium: 
Flanders 
10 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
2.2. Belgium: 
Wallonia 
10 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
3. Bulgaria 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
4. Croatia 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
5. Cyprus 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
6. Czech Republic 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
7. Denmark 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
8. Estonia 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
9. Finland 10 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
10. France 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
11.1. Germany: 
Bavaria 
8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
12. Greece 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
13. Hungary 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
14. Ireland 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
15. Italy 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
16. Latvia 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
17. Lithuania 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
18. Luxemburg 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
19. Malta 7 (0) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
20. Netherlands 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
21. Poland 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
22. Portugal 10 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
23. Romania 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
24. Slovakia 10 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
25. Slovenia 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
26. Spain 10 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (4) 
27. Sweden 8.5 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (0) (4) 
28. U.K. 7 (1.5) (0) (1.5) (0) (4) 
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Table continued 
 
Country 
A. Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional 
Protection (cont.) 
2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 
10 
(Subtotal) 
(0–1–2) (0–1–2) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) (0–2–4) 
1. Austria 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
3. Bulgaria 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
4. Croatia 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
5. Cyprus 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
6. Czech Republic 7 (2) (1) (0) (0) (4) 
7. Denmark 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
8. Estonia 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
9. Finland 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
10. France 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 9 (2) (2) (0) (1) (4) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
12. Greece 7 (1) (1) (1) (0) (4) 
13. Hungary 3 (0) (1) (0) (0) (2) 
14. Ireland 3 (1) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
15. Italy 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
16. Latvia 8 (2) (2) (0) (0) (4) 
17. Lithuania 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
18. Luxemburg 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
19. Malta 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
20. Netherlands 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
21. Poland 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
22. Portugal 10 (2) (2) (1) (1) (4) 
23. Romania 4 (1) (0) (1) (0) (2) 
24. Slovakia 8 (2) (2) (0) (0) (4) 
25. Slovenia 9 (2) (2) (1) (0) (4) 
26. Spain 10 (2) (2) (1) (1) (4) 
27. Sweden 8 (2) (2) (0) (0) (4) 
28. U.K. 4 (2) (0) (0) (0) (2) 
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Table continued 
 
Country 
B. Express Protection of Academic Freedom in HE Legislation 
10x2 
1. Austria 10x2=20 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 5x2=10 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 5x2=10 
3. Bulgaria 7.5x2=15 
4. Croatia 10x2=20 
5. Cyprus 5x2=10 
6. Czech Republic 7.5x2=15 
7. Denmark 2.5x2=5 
8. Estonia 0 
9. Finland 7.5x2=15 
10. France 10x2=20 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 7.5x2=15 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 10x2=20 
12. Greece 2.5x2=5 
13. Hungary 2.5x2=5 
14. Ireland 7.5x2=15 
15. Italy 5x2=10 
16. Latvia 10x2=20 
17. Lithuania 10x2=20 
18. Luxemburg 7.5x2=15 
19. Malta 0 
20. Netherlands 5x2=10 
21. Poland 5x2=10 
22. Portugal 5x2=10 
23. Romania 7.5x2=15 
24. Slovakia 10x2=20 
25. Slovenia 2.5x2=5 
26. Spain 7.5x2=15 
27. Sweden 2.5x2=5 
28. U.K. 2.5x2=5 
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Table continued 
Country 
C. Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation 
1. 2. 2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 
4 
(0–2–4) 
8 
(Subtotal) 
(0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) 
1. Austria 2 6 (1) (1) (1) (1) 
2.1. Belgium: 
Flanders 
2 4.5 (1) (1) (1) (0.5) 
2.2. Belgium: 
Wallonia 
2 2.5 (0) (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
3. Bulgaria 4 3 (1) (0) (0.5) (1) 
4. Croatia 4 5 (1) (0.5) (0.5) (1) 
5. Cyprus 2 2 (1) (0) (0) (0.5) 
6. Czech Republic 4 2 (0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
7. Denmark 2 5 (1) (1) (1) (1) 
8. Estonia 2 6.5 (1) (1) (1) (1) 
9. Finland 4 7 (1) (1) (0.5) (1) 
10. France 2 3 (1) (0.5) (0.5) (1) 
11.1. Germany: 
Bavaria 
2 1.5 (0) (0) (0.5) (1) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 2 5 (1) (1) (1) (1) 
12. Greece 2 0.5 (0) (0) (0) (0.5) 
13. Hungary 0 2.5 (0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
14. Ireland 2 6.5 (1) (1) (1) (0.5) 
15. Italy 2 3 (0) (0.5) (1) (0.5) 
16. Latvia 2 4 (0) (1) (0.5) (1) 
17. Lithuania 4 5 (1) (1) (0.5) (1) 
18. Luxemburg 2 5 (0) (0) (1) (1) 
19. Malta 2 6.5 (1) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
20. Netherlands 2 5 (0.5) (0.5) (1) (0.5) 
21. Poland 2 5.5 (1) (1) (0.5) (1) 
22. Portugal 4 3 (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (1) 
23. Romania 4 2 (0) (0) (0.5) (1) 
24. Slovakia 4 2.5 (0) (0.5) (0.5) (1) 
25. Slovenia 2 4.5 (1) (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
26. Spain 4 2.5 (0) (0) (1) (1) 
27. Sweden 2 4.5 (0) (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
28. U.K. 2 7.5 (1) (1) (1) (0.5) 
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Table continued 
 
Country 
C. Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation (cont.) 
2.3. 2.4.1. 2.4.2. 3. 4. 
(0–1–2) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) 
4 
(0–2–4) 
4 
(0–2–4) 
1. Austria (1) (0) (1) 2 2 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders (1) (0) (0) 4 0 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia (0) (0) (0.5) 2 0 
3. Bulgaria (0) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
4. Croatia (0) (1) (1) 2 2 
5. Cyprus (0) (0.5) (0) 2 2 
6. Czech Republic (0) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
7. Denmark (1) (0) (0) 0 2 
8. Estonia (1) (1) (0.5) 2 0 
9. Finland (2) (1) (0.5) 4 0 
10. France (0) (0) (0) 2 0 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria (0) (0) (0) 2 0 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. (1) (0) (0) 2 4 
12. Greece (0) (0) (0) 2 0 
13. Hungary (0) (1) (0) 0 0 
14. Ireland (1) (1) (1) 4 0 
15. Italy (0) (1) (0) 2 2 
16. Latvia (1) (0.5) (0) 4 0 
17. Lithuania (1) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
18. Luxemburg (1) (1) (1) 2 0 
19. Malta (2) (1) (1) 2 0 
20. Netherlands (2) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
21. Poland (1) (0.5) (0.5) 2 0 
22. Portugal (0) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
23. Romania (0) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
24. Slovakia (0) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
25. Slovenia (1) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
26. Spain (0) (0.5) (0) 2 0 
27. Sweden (2) (0.5) (0) 0 0 
28. U.K. (2) (1) (1) 4 0 
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Table continued 
Country 
D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation 
1. 2. 2.1. 2.2.1. 2.2.2. 2.2.3. 
2 
(0–1–2) 
12 
(Subtotal) 
(0–1.5–3) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) 
1. Austria 1 7 (3) (0) (0.5) (0.5) 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 0 6 (0) (1) (0.5) (0) 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 0 8 (1.5) (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
3. Bulgaria 1 9.5 (1.5) (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
4. Croatia 1 9.5 (1.5) (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
5. Cyprus 0 7.5 (3) (1) (0.5) (0) 
6. Czech Republic 1 7 (1.5) (0) (0.5) (0.5) 
7. Denmark 1 3.5 (1.5) (0.5) (0) (0) 
8. Estonia 0 3.5 (0) (0.5) (0) (0) 
9. Finland 0 2 (0) (0.5) (0) (0) 
10. France 1 3.5 (0) (0.5) (0) (0) 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 2 6 (1.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 2 7 (1.5) (0) (0.5) (0.5) 
12. Greece 0 7 (1.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0) 
13. Hungary 0 9 (3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
14. Ireland 0 3 (1.5) (0) (0) (0) 
15. Italy 0 6 (3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
16. Latvia 2 7 (1.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0) 
17. Lithuania 1 5 (0) (0.5) (0) (0) 
18. Luxemburg 0 3.5 (1.5) (0.5) (0) (0) 
19. Malta 0 3 (1.5) (0) (0) (0) 
20. Netherlands 1 3 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
21. Poland 1 9 (1.5) (1) (0) (0.5) 
22. Portugal 1 9 (1.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
23. Romania 1 8 (1.5) (0.5) (0.5) (1) 
24. Slovakia 1 8.5 (1.5) (0) (0.5) (0.5) 
25. Slovenia 0 7 (1.5) (0) (1) (0) 
26. Spain 0 8.5 (3) (1) (0.5) (1) 
27. Sweden 0 3 (1.5) (0) (0) (0) 
28. U.K. 0 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
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Table continued 
 
Country 
D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation (cont.) 
2.3. 3. 3.1.1. 3.1.2. 
(0–1.5–3–4.5–6) 
6 
(Subtotal) 
(0–0.5–1) (0–1–2) 
1. Austria (3) 1 (0) (0) 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders (4.5) 1 (1) (0) 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia (4.5) 0 (0) (0) 
3. Bulgaria (6) 4 (1) (1) 
4. Croatia (6) 3.5 (1) (1) 
5. Cyprus (3) 5 (1) (2) 
6. Czech Republic (4.5) 3 (1) (1) 
7. Denmark (1.5) 2 (0.5) (1) 
8. Estonia (3) 1 (1) (0) 
9. Finland (1.5) 1 (1) (0) 
10. France (3) 2 (1) (0) 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria (3) 4 (1) (1) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. (4.5) 3.5 (1) (1) 
12. Greece (4.5) 3.5 (1) (1) 
13. Hungary (4.5) 0 (0) (0) 
14. Ireland (1.5) 0 (0) (0) 
15. Italy (1.5) 2 (1) (1) 
16. Latvia (4.5) 1.5 (1) (0) 
17. Lithuania (4.5) 0 (0) (0) 
18. Luxemburg (1.5) 2.5 (1) (0) 
19. Malta (1.5) 3 (1) (1) 
20. Netherlands (3) 1.5 (1) (0) 
21. Poland (6) 2.5 (1) (1) 
22. Portugal (6) 1.5 (0.5) (1) 
23. Romania (4.5) 3.5 (1) (1) 
24. Slovakia (6) 3 (1) (1) 
25. Slovenia (4.5) 4 (1) (1) 
26. Spain (3) 3.5 (1) (1) 
27. Sweden (1.5) 0 (0) (0) 
28. U.K. (0) 0 (0) (0) 
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Table continued 
Country 
D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation (cont.) 
3.2.1. 3.2.2. 3.2.3. 
(0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) (0–0.5–1) 
1. Austria (0.5) (0.5) (0) 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders (0) (0) (0) 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia (0) (0) (0) 
3. Bulgaria (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
4. Croatia (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
5. Cyprus (1) (1) (0) 
6. Czech Republic (0) (0.5) (0.5) 
7. Denmark (0.5) (0) (0) 
8. Estonia (0) (0) (0) 
9. Finland (0) (0) (0) 
10. France (1) (0) (0) 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria (1) (0.5) (0.5) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
12. Greece (1) (0.5) (0) 
13. Hungary (0) (0) (0) 
14. Ireland (0) (0) (0) 
15. Italy (0) (0) (0) 
16. Latvia (0) (0.5) (0) 
17. Lithuania (0) (0) (0) 
18. Luxemburg (1) (0.5) (0) 
19. Malta (0.5) (0.5) (0) 
20. Netherlands (0.5) (0) (0) 
21. Poland (0.5) (0) (0) 
22. Portugal (0) (0) (0) 
23. Romania (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
24. Slovakia (0) (0.5) (0.5) 
25. Slovenia (1) (1) (0) 
26. Spain (1) (0.5) (0) 
27. Sweden (0) (0) (0) 
28. U.K. (0) (0) (0) 
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Table continued 
Country 
E. Job Security (including “Tenure”) in Relevant Legislation 
1. 1.1. 1.2. 
8 
(Subtotal) 
(0–2–4) (0–2–4) 
1. Austria 2 (2) (0) 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 4 (4) (0) 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 4 (4) (0) 
3. Bulgaria 8 (4) (4) 
4. Croatia 0 (0) (0) 
5. Cyprus 4 (2) (2) 
6. Czech Republic 2 (0) (2) 
7. Denmark 4 (2) (2) 
8. Estonia 0 (0) (0) 
9. Finland 0 (0) (0) 
10. France 8 (4) (4) 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 2 (2) (0) 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 2 (2) (0) 
12. Greece 8 (4) (4) 
13. Hungary 8 (4) (4) 
14. Ireland 6 (2) (4) 
15. Italy 4 (2) (2) 
16. Latvia 0 (0) (0) 
17. Lithuania 2 (2) (0) 
18. Luxemburg 2 (2) (0) 
19. Malta 4 (0) (4) 
20. Netherlands 4 (0) (4) 
21. Poland 2 (0) (2) 
22. Portugal 6 (4) (2) 
23. Romania 4 (2) (2) 
24. Slovakia 0 (0) (0) 
25. Slovenia 6 (2) (4) 
26. Spain 8 (4) (4) 
27. Sweden 4 (2) (2) 
28. U.K. 4 (0) (4) 
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Table continued 
Country 
E. Job Security (including “Tenure”) in Relevant Legislation 
(cont.) 
2. 2.1. 2.2. 3. 
6 
(Subtotal) 
(0–1.5–3) (0–1.5–3) 
6 
(0–1.5–3–4.5–6) 
1. Austria 1.5 (1.5) (0) 1.5 
2.1. Belgium: Flanders 3 (1.5) (1.5) 3 
2.2. Belgium: Wallonia 3 (1.5) (1.5) 1.5 
3. Bulgaria 1.5 (1.5) (0) 0 
4. Croatia 4.5 (1.5) (3) 0 
5. Cyprus 3 (1.5) (1.5) 3 
6. Czech Republic 0 (0) (0) 0 
7. Denmark 0 (0) (0) 1.5 
8. Estonia 1.5 (0) (1.5) 0 
9. Finland 3 (1.5) (1.5) 0 
10. France 4.5 (1.5) (3) 3 
11.1. Germany: Bavaria 4.5 (1.5) (3) 1.5 
11.2. Germany: N.R.W. 4.5 (1.5) (3) 1.5 
12. Greece 6 (3) (3) 6 
13. Hungary 0 (0) (0) 0 
14. Ireland 4.5 (1.5) (3) 0 
15. Italy 4.5 (1.5) (3) 3 
16. Latvia 3 (0) (3) 0 
17. Lithuania 3 (0) (3) 0 
18. Luxemburg 1.5 (0) (1.5) 0 
19. Malta 1.5 (0) (1.5) 3 
20. Netherlands 1.5 (0) (1.5) 1.5 
21. Poland 3 (1.5) (1.5) 0 
22. Portugal 4.5 (1.5) (3) 0 
23. Romania 1.5 (1.5) (0) 0 
24. Slovakia 1.5 (0) (1.5) 0 
25. Slovenia 3 (0) (3) 1.5 
26. Spain 3 (1.5) (1.5) 0 
27. Sweden 3 (0) (3) 1.5 
28. U.K. 1.5 (1.5) (0) 0 
 
 
